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Both anarchism and religion have enjoyed renewed academic at-
tention since the end of the twentieth century: religion has been 
an increasingly visible aspect of political life; and anarchist ideas 
have suffused recent social and political movements to a striking 
degree. Scholars have therefore increasingly turned their attention 
to both of these trends, seeking to illuminate the causes of their 
resurgence, and the underlying debates that have informed this re-
newed prominence.1 In line with these trends, the overlap between 
anarchism and religion has also attracted new interest.2 In print, 
on social media, in the streets and in religious communities, reli-
gious anarchist analysis, and the analysis of religious anarchists, 
is gaining traction.3
Yet anarchism and religion have historically had an uneasy 
relationship. There are defined tensions between the two camps 
that are freighted with historical pedigree: many anarchists insist 
that religion is fundamentally incompatible with anarchism, while 
many religious adherents have grown suspicious of anarchists giv-
en a strain of anticlericalism that has sometimes sparked shocking 
violence.4 At the same time, religious anarchists insist that their 
religious tradition embodies (or at least has the potential to em-
body) the very values that have historically accorded anarchism 
its unique place in the family of political ideologies.5 Their reli-
gious beliefs, they argue, imply a rejection of the state, call for 
an economy of mutual aid, present a denunciation of oppressive 
authorities that often includes religious institutions, and embody 
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a quest for a more just society – despite, and indeed sometimes 
paradoxically because of, the acceptance of a god as ‘master.’
However, despite the renewed attention devoted to the con-
tested terrain between politics and religion, and despite the new 
prominence anarchism has enjoyed in radical politics post-1989, 
scholarship on the relation between anarchism and religion, on 
proponents of religious anarchism, and on their arguments, re-
mains relatively rare. This is now changing. Whether emanating 
from academic, religious or activist circles, there is a growing lit-
erature, much of which centres on the Christian tradition, but is 
refreshed by an emerging focus on anarchism and Islam, Judaism, 
Buddhism, Hinduism and other religions and spiritualities.6
Building on this fertile work, this book aims to open a forum 
for the academic analysis of this contested field, to offer a crit-
ical space for the discussion of the theoretical, theological and 
historical overlaps between anarchism and religion, and to cast 
a probing light on the rich dialogue that these conflicts have 
 created. While the issue of contemporary political relevance 
is one that runs through many of the chapters in this volume, 
the primary intention of this collection is scholarly: tracing the 
under- acknowledged resonances between anarchist politics and 
religious ideas, understanding the historical animus at the heart 
of this relationship, and highlighting examples of common action 
and concern.
It seems appropriate at this point to acknowledge our positionality. 
We – that is, both we the editors and most authors in these volumes – 
write from a predominantly Eurocentric, white, male and therefore 
privileged position. This was not intentional, but does reflect the con-
tinuing intersectional hierarchies present across the academic sector. 
We have attempted to solicit a mix of chapters with a more balanced 
gender mix, seeking contributions from both non-male authors and 
about non-male scholars. For instance, building on the origins of this 
first volume in the Anarchist Studies Network’s (ASN) conference 
held at Loughborough University in 2012, we targeted the 2016 ASN 
conference, which had a central theme of anarcha-feminism. Future 
volumes will hopefully therefore go some way to addressing these 
issues, but the lack of voices belonging to women and non-white 
people in particular highlights enduring issues in higher education.
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It goes without saying that we remain committed to broaden-
ing this ongoing research by considering such papers in the future, 
and indeed, are actively interested in encouraging contributions 
that either in authorship or content are not predominantly white, 
Eurocentric, or Christian (or post-Christian). Yet, as much as 
these volumes may reflect deeper structural biases at play in the 
contemporary scholarly world, each chapter makes an original 
and rigorous contribution to an important and emerging field, 
and these silences simply highlight the exciting work to done.
In what follows, we briefly stake out the current anarchism and 
religious studies landscape, and introduce the essays included in 
this volume.
Tentatively mapping the territory
The overlap between anarchism and religion can be studied in 
many ways, addressing different questions and using different 
methodologies rooted in different disciplinary conventions. While 
a detailed heuristic taxonomy of this burgeoning scholarship can 
be found elsewhere, a condensed summary nevertheless offers a 
useful compass.7 Without meaning to force a limiting set of cat-
egories on to this literature, and noting that there are publica-
tions falling outside of this tentative classification, there seems 
to be four principal types of analysis typical in the scholarship 
examining the relation between anarchism and religion: anarchist 
critiques of religion, anarchist exegesis, anarchist theology, and 
histories of religious anarchists.
An anarchist critique of religion is apparent even in the earli-
est days of anarchism as a political tradition, and has tended to 
attack both religious claims and religious institutions.8 The an-
archist theoretician Peter Kropotkin is a quintessential example 
of this approach, portraying religious belief as an obstacle to a 
critical consciousness of social oppression, and depicting the or-
ganised church as a key ally of the nation-state in its efforts to 
dominate social life in the modern era.9 The social role of religion 
has undergone significant transformations since the nineteenth 
century, but rarely have these changes been sufficient to convince 
anarchist critics that this critique is redundant. Even in Western 
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Europe where secularisation is most pronounced, religious insti-
tutions and religious mindsets continue to play important roles in 
public life, whether through moral conventions, established tradi-
tions or new spiritual and religious perspectives. For many anar-
chists, many criticisms of religion therefore still stand. Anarchists 
have thus condemned religion as, for instance: a source of inequal-
ity and suffering; a deluded and incoherent lie harmful to rational 
self-awareness; a hypnotic deception distracting the masses from 
revolutionary consciousness; an unnecessary, and perhaps harm-
ful, basis for morality; an institution complicit in the perpetuation 
of injustice and slavery; and a residue from an arcane past. Yet 
not all anarchists have been this hostile, with some seeing pos-
itive elements in at least some religious claims and values, and 
acknowledging the contributions of dissenting religious groups 
who have challenged their orthodox counterparts.10 Indeed many 
religious anarchists have themselves articulated sharp criticisms 
of religion, sometimes exhibiting a zealous anticlericalism of 
their own. All these anarchist critiques, and indeed any religious 
counter-arguments, constitute one category of analysis in the area.
The second principal category, religious exegesis, is not uncon-
nected to the anarchist critique in that anticlerical arguments by 
religious anarchists have often been based precisely on the inter-
pretation of religious scripture. Anarchist exegesis, however, does 
not stop with the development of anticlerical arguments. There 
are numerous examples of religious texts being interpreted as im-
plying either direct or implicit criticism of the state, capitalism 
or other structures of oppression. At the same time, the focus of 
anarchist exegesis has more often been the state (and to some 
extent the church) rather than other oppressive structures or phe-
nomena. Leo Tolstoy and Jacques Ellul are the most cited authors 
of such anarchist exegeses, though there are many others who 
each bring different angles of interpretation and focus on differ-
ent varieties of scriptural texts. Many of those authors have been 
weaved together to articulate a more generic anarchist exegesis 
of Christian scripture in, for example, Christian Anarchism: A 
Political Commentary on the Gospel.11 Yet there are many more 
anarchist interpretations of religious texts, many of which have 
been published in recent years, and not only with a Christian 
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focus.12 This category of analysis is vibrant in both religious and 
scholarly circles.
When religious communities have discussions on themes and 
issues as varied as war, poverty, injustice, charity and democracy, 
however, they do not necessarily always refer back to scripture. In 
other words, religious discussions are obviously not always reduced 
to exegesis, and those having discussions about social,  political and 
economic issues based on their religious worldview will still use 
the grammar and referents of their religious tradition to articulate 
their reflections. When those religious reflections develop anarchist 
tropes, arguments or conclusions, what emerges is anarchist theol-
ogy, the third category of analysis bridging anarchism and religion. 
The boundary between anarchist exegesis and anarchist theolo-
gy is not rigid: theological discussions might evoke religious texts 
(without making these the sole basis of analysis) and exegetical dis-
cussions might develop broader reflections on social and political 
themes (without losing sight of scripture), but these remain rath-
er different modes of inquiry, each with their anarchist advocates. 
Scholarly discussion of anarchist theology has been rarer than an-
archist exegesis, yet the potential for anarchist theology is vast, and 
there is exciting research underway in this field.
Finally, there is also a defined strand of research, primarily 
historical, focusing on the lives and ideas of religious anarchist 
individuals and groups. The form of these enquiries varies con-
siderably, from biographical investigations seeking to recover the 
activities of neglected figures from the tradition of religious anar-
chism, to the analysis of religious communities, and the dissection 
of currents of thought, identification of overlooked genealogies, 
and ideological filiations. As this implies, the sub-disciplines that 
characterise modern historical practice often cast a distinctive 
light on the intersections of religion and anarchism. It is a field 
populated by the intellectual, cultural, and social historian, as 
much as the historian of political thought and the historian of re-
ligion. What they share is a concern to recover, uncover or discuss 
the histories of religious anarchists and those who come close to 
fitting such a label.
It is worth noting that this tentative taxonomy, despite aim-
ing to cover much of the area, does not in fact cover all possible 
6 Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume 1
approaches. Nor are these four categories mutually exclusive. 
Many studies in the present volume fruitfully combine elements 
of more than one category, and others take an approach that does 
not fit neatly into any of these traditions. Justin Meggitt’s chapter, 
for instance, belongs primarily to the field of Bible studies – not 
quite exegesis, history or theology, yet arguably containing ele-
ments of each. There are also those such as Simon Critchley who 
adopt a Schmittian take on ‘political theology’ (where political 
discourses and institutions are understood as secularised theo-
logical ones) yet still discuss discernibly religious and anarchist 
themes – a case perhaps of anarchist theology, but not in the sense 
of ‘theology’ familiar to most theologians.13 Or, to cite another ex-
ample, there are interventions that read more as tracts, polemics or 
plaidoyers, perhaps eschewing a rigorously academic framework 
their authors consider constricting. These too are neither exeget-
ical nor strictly theological in the traditional sense, yet they seek 
to develop and interrogate religious anarchist arguments from 
unconventional perspectives. This categorisation of plaidoyer 
is not intended to dismiss work that rejects the conventions of 
academic analysis, but, as a landmark on our tentative map of the 
territory, demonstrates the range of research currently underway 
examining the relationship between anarchist and religious ideas.
Our aim is to foster scholarly work on any of the above cate-
gories in a spirit of critical dialogue that is open to a range of per-
spectives not necessarily limited to the taxonomy outlined here. 
This also explains the sheer diversity of approaches, directions 
and methodologies in this volume. It also explains why some texts 
seem partly driven by an activist interest, and we recognise no 
problem in this method if the argument is rigorous. Our only cri-
teria for us to consider a text for this project are that such work 
should examine the vexed overlap between religion and anar-
chism, and that it can pass the test academic peer-review. Of par-
ticular interest for the future, since particularly understudied thus 
far, are studies that deal with religions other than Christianity; 
analysis by authors outside the privileged demographic of white 
European males; further studies and reflections in anarchist the-
ology; discussions of core accusations between anarchism and re-
ligion; and unwritten histories of important religious anarchists. 
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One of the surprises of working in this area is the true diversity 
of original research on religious anarchism, especially when these 
studies have emerged from different disciplinary areas and meth-
odologies. Our aim with this multi-volume collection is to foster 
this variety, not encage it within a single direction or methodology.
How this book emerged
This book has a predecessor. The first major international confer-
ence organised by the then recently-founded ASN (as a specialist 
group of the United Kingdom’s Political Studies Association) was 
held in Loughborough University in 2008. Out of a stream of 
that conference emerged Religious Anarchism: New Perspectives, 
a book which is unfortunately not available in open access and 
the chapters of which, although closely reviewed by its editor and 
peer-reviewed by the publisher, were ultimately not submitted to 
as rigorous a peer-reviewing process as the present book.14
All the essays in this volume have gone through such a process. 
There are many more papers still in the metaphorical pipeline, so 
we expect at least two more volumes in this collection – hopefully 
more if the volumes generate further interest. Any potential au-
thor interested in submitting a paper for consideration can con-
tact either of the editors.
The essays in this volume
This first volume contains seven chapters of original scholar-
ship on a variety of themes. Few are confined neatly to one of 
the aforementioned categories of analysis: most offer a range of 
perspectives and are inspired by diverse disciplinary approaches. 
Some are primarily historical interventions (Pauli, Blanes), others 
engage with anarchist theology by reflecting on notorious reli-
gious and anarchist thinkers (Podmore). Another considers the 
mystical anarchism of two thinkers not typically classed as reli-
gious anarchists (Hoppen), while one paper blends exegesis and 
history (Galvan-Alvarez). Other papers are rooted in Bible studies 
(Meggitt), and the last offers a philosophical discussion of the rel-
evance of a particular anarchist critique of religion (Strandberg).
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The first paper in this volume, by Benjamin Pauli, examines a 
group perhaps not unfamiliar to those with an interest in anarchist 
history: the Catholic Worker community. Founded in the United 
States by Dorothy Day and Peter Maurin in the early 1930s, in 
Pauli’s analysis the group exemplifies the seeming tension at the 
heart of the overlap between religious ideas and anarchist politics: 
reconciling a religious faith apparently weighted down by a history 
of authoritarianism, with a politics whose first principle is a repudi-
ation of hierarchy. Viewing the Catholic Worker movement through 
the lens of ‘exemplarity’, Pauli sees in Day and Maurin’s efforts to 
offer leadership through the power of example rather than coercion, 
an intriguing model of political action directly inspired by an inter-
pretation of central figures in the Christian pantheon. Rather than 
its Catholicism mutilating its anarchism, Pauli sees the Catholic 
Worker’s religious attachments as ‘enhancing’ its anarchism, a read-
ing that, he contends, is important even to those anarchist theorists 
who regard the claims of religion with scepticism.
In his contribution, Ruy Blanes similarly investigates how a spe-
cific historical moment in the history of Christianity, and a par-
ticular cultural manifestation of organised religious practice, was 
imbued with essentially anarchistic values. The Tokoist Church, 
which rose to prominence in the 1960s and 1970s in Angola as 
it became a key actor in the fight against Portuguese colonial-
ism, continued this oppositional role as a critique of the country’s 
post-independence People’s Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola (MPLA) government. Offering a history of Simão or 
Simao Toko and his followers, Blanes examines the problems as-
sociated with peremptory rejection of religion that is character-
istic of many anarchists, when the religious group itself initially 
embodied many anarchist principles: a commitment to horizon-
talism, a communal approach to leadership, faith in the powers of 
mutualism, and a burning desire to fight the forces of colonialism. 
At the same time, Blanes traces the process of ‘hierarchization’ 
that confronted the Tokoist movement, examining how these ear-
ly principles were co-opted, and now often serve as fetters to ‘pro-
cesses of ideological and institutional innovation’.
Just as Blanes’ contribution looks to the illumination of a fasci-
nating but relatively unknown history as a means of interrogating 
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the connections between anarchist politics and religion, Enrique 
Galván-Álvarez’s chapter looks much further back, to Japan in 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, with a similar ambition. With 
the Buddhism of Shinran Shonin in mind, Galván-Álvarez looks 
to this tradition of Buddhist thought as especially relevant to con-
temporary anarchist practice. Through an analysis of Shinran’s 
neglected writings, which offered a radical reading of the estab-
lished sources of Buddhism, he sees Shinran offering a searching 
critique of political and religious hierarchies that has not only been 
neglected by historians, but retains its relevance nine centuries 
later as a fillip to those seeking to challenge hegemonic political 
forces.
Justin Meggitt’s chapter interrogates the claim that ‘Jesus was 
an anarchist’ through a highly detailed exploration of both the 
history of anarchist thought, and a close reading of scriptural 
sources. Accepting the difficulties imposed by the heated debates 
concerning the very meaning of the label ‘anarchist’, and the is-
sue of anachronism that might imperil efforts to associate Jesus 
with a political movement that emerged from social concerns and 
intellectual currents unleashed by industrial modernity, Meggitt 
nevertheless argues that there are good grounds for seeing Jesus 
through the lens of anarchism. Looking to Jesus’ critique of ex-
isting power relations, and his quest for egalitarian and prefigu-
rative forms of social life, Meggitt argues, echoing the reasoning 
of the anarchist Alexander Berkman, that Jesus was indeed an 
anarchist.
While Meggitt’s contribution to this volume is notable for ex-
amining the perhaps unexpected connections between the histori-
cal Jesus and the anarchist tradition, Franziska Hoppen’s chapter 
similarly sketches an original comparison in the work of two 
thinkers: Gustav Landauer and Eric Voegelin. Landauer’s posi-
tion in the anarchist canon is not in doubt, and his insightful and 
novel efforts to rethink the central claims of anarchist politics, 
while drawing on an idiosyncratic mysticism, are well established. 
Voegelin, however, a German academic with an interest in total-
itarianism and political violence, is probably more unfamiliar to 
those inspecting the fault lines between anarchist theory and reli-
gious studies. This, Hoppen proposes, is a mistake, for considering 
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the ‘mystical anarchism’ of Landauer and Voegelin in tandem re-
veals common threads in their vision of an ‘anti-political commu-
nity’, in which the self is both a ‘primary reality’ and the starting 
point ‘in the struggle for change’.
In this spirit of novel comparisons, the sixth chapter, written 
by Simon Podmore, unites the Danish philosopher and theologian 
Søren Kierkegaard with Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, the first think-
er to wear the label of ‘anarchist’ as a badge of honour rather 
than a term of abuse. Podmore’s paper reflects on the affinities 
between the two thinkers’ negation of God and their paradoxical 
assertions about God implicit in that negation. Their anti-theism 
is thus compared and contrasted, showing that where Proudhon 
settles on the need to insist on the negation of the idea of ‘God’ in 
order to achieve justice, Kierkegaard’s negation of God leads him 
to a theological affirmation of freedom. Juxtaposing these rather 
different thinkers therefore exposes interesting philosophical and 
theological parallels and differences.
Finally, Hugo Strandberg looks to another familiar figure in the 
anarchist pantheon, the German individualist Max Stirner, and 
uses his ideas to ponder the issue of whether religious belief de-
mands servitude. He argues that, on reflection, it is egoism rath-
er than religion which forces self-denial, because the egoist must 
harden their heart and renounce any social concern for others 
to submit to Stirner’s ideal, whereas religion does not necessarily 
require servitude in submission to God, and can in principle be 
understood to affirm a kind of freedom primary to any political 
or religious institutions.
As this selection of papers demonstrates, there is an astounding 
intellectual vibrancy at the heart of contemporary scholarship on 
anarchism and religion. The range of perspectives encompassed in 
these contributions, their inherent interdisciplinarity, and the rich 
variety of thinkers, movements and ideas examined, all highlight 
the health of the field. Editing these papers and the many more 
to come in future volumes was both an intellectually stimulating 
and pleasurable experience, and we hope that readers will gain as 
much from them as we have.
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos & 
Matthew S. Adams, September 2016
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The Catholic Worker, Dorothy Day, and 
Exemplary Anarchism
Benjamin J. Pauli
Kettering University, USA
The Catholic Worker movement’s fusion of anarchism and 
Catholicism is one of the most unusual hybrids in the history of 
the anarchist tradition and is sometimes dismissed as paradoxical 
or contradictory. In arguing that the pairing of these influences is 
not as counter-intuitive as it appears at first glance, this chapter 
seeks to explain the elective affinity of anarchism and Catholicism 
through the concept of exemplarity. The vision for the Catholic 
Worker devised by its founders Peter Maurin and Dorothy Day 
was, I argue, informed by interpretations of central Christian 
 figures like Christ, the saints, and the “holy fool” that placed 
special emphasis on their exemplary qualities. Maurin and Day 
saw in the Catholic tradition of exemplarity a means of exercising 
leadership and authority through the power of examples and vol-
untary emulation rather than coercion, and within the context of 
the Catholic Worker movement the exemplary influence of Day in 
particular helped to reconcile the movement’s need for coherence 
and direction with the autonomy and dignity of its members. In 
highlighting the Catholic Worker’s “exemplary anarchism,” this 
chapter not only reveals one of the ways in which the Worker’s 
Catholicism actually enhanced its anarchism, but also points to 
the broader relevance of the concept of exemplarity to anarchist 
theory.
“I’m like everyone else: I admire people who have become 
outstanding.”
—Dorothy Day
If one wanted to illustrate the proposition, recounted by Noam 
Chomsky in his introduction to Daniel Guerin’s Anarchism, that 
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“anarchism has a broad back, like paper it endures anything,” 
one could hardly do better than to point to the existence of the 
Catholic Worker movement.1 Launched by Dorothy Day and 
Peter Maurin on May 1, 1933, when the first issue of the Catholic 
Worker was distributed to bemused radicals assembled in Union 
Square, Manhattan, the Catholic Worker movement has from its 
inception fused an anarchist sensibility with intense Catholic  piety. 
Effecting that unlikely pairing required, to use the term  employed 
by one of the movement’s most perceptive scholars, nothing less 
than “inventing” Catholic radicalism in the United States, where 
Social Gospel Protestants had a near monopoly on faith-based 
social activism in the early 20th century.2 If the mystery of its very 
existence were not enough, the unusual longevity of the Catholic 
Worker raises questions as to what deeper lessons about social 
movements might be contained in the Worker’s seemingly idiosyn-
cratic synthesis of disparate influences.
By no means can those lessons be illuminated comprehensively 
in the space of this chapter. Instead, in what follows I will attempt 
to draw attention to a feature of the movement that has garnered 
much comment but little systematic exposition, a feature that goes 
some way towards explaining how the Worker was able to find 
an affinity between anarchist ideas and a specifically Catholic ver-
sion of the Christian faith. The concept that will underpin this 
discussion is the concept of “exemplarity,” a concept whose flag-
ging philosophical reputation has begun to revive thanks to recent 
scholarly work on the subject in the areas of philosophy, literary 
criticism, rhetoric, pedagogy, and legal studies.3 Exemplarity, I will 
argue, played an instrumental role in shaping the Catholic Worker 
movement’s self-conception and determining the manner of the 
movement’s operation. After offering a brief history of the idea 
of exemplarity from its roots in ancient philosophy, history, and 
rhetoric to its incorporation into Christianity, I will examine its 
place in the founding vision for the Catholic Worker as fleshed out 
by Dorothy Day and Peter Maurin in the early 1930s. The ideal 
of contemporary sainthood that informed the Worker’s activities 
was, I maintain, informed by interpretations of central Christian 
figures like Christ, the saints, and the figure of the “holy fool” that 
placed special emphasis on their exemplary qualities. I will then 
consider whether Day, the Worker’s de facto leader, consistently 
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adhered to the logic of exemplarity in her exercise of authority 
within the movement, given her reputation for authoritarianism 
and her occasional assertions of direct control over the New York 
Catholic Worker community and newspaper. Finally, I will argue 
that in a number of important respects the idea of exemplarity 
provides a more satisfactory framework than the Weberian theory 
of “charismatic” leadership for assessing Day’s influence over the 
movement and the continued flourishing of the movement after 
her death.
In the course of this discussion I hope to deepen our under-
standing of the relationship of the Catholic Worker to the anar-
chist tradition by outlining one of the ways in which the Worker’s 
Catholic faith was not, from an anarchist perspective, a liability 
but rather a resource. Most importantly, the connection to the 
exemplary tradition provided by Catholicism suggested a means 
of exercising leadership and authority through the power of ex-
amples and voluntary emulation rather than coercion. In this way, 
exemplarity brought to the movement coherence and direction 
that it might not otherwise have possessed, without compro-
mising the autonomy and dignity of the movement’s members. 
In highlighting the ability of exemplarity to reconcile these 
sometimes-competing priorities, I hope to use the example of the 
Catholic Worker movement to suggest some larger lessons for an-
archist thought and practice.
The Christian exemplum
Although the concept of exemplarity found fertile soil in the 
Christian tradition, it did not originate there. In Greek thought 
it can be discerned in the notion of the paradeigma, a term first 
invested with philosophical significance by Plato. For Plato, pa-
radeigma referred to a model derived from the transcendent Forms 
at the centre of his ontology. He used the term to connote a top-
down, general-to-particular relationship involving the appearance 
of divine qualities in the world of phenomena, although sensible 
objects could partake of the Forms only imperfectly.4 In Aristotle’s 
work on rhetoric, by contrast, the idea of paradeigma was treated 
inductively, as a particular from which general conclusions could 
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be derived.5 The latter sense of the term, which gave  paradeigma 
a functional role independent of larger ontological claims, was 
not far removed from the way in which early Greek historians 
like Herodotus and Thucydides began to conceive of the im-
port of historical examples. In his History of the Peloponnesian 
War, Thucydides first made explicit an idea at best implicit in 
Herodotus’ Histories: the study of history had utility in the pres-
ent because it allowed one to learn from the examples—both 
good and bad—of one’s historical predecessors, and to act with 
prudence in confronting situations similar to those they faced.6 
Later historians like Xenophon and Ephorus gave paradeigma an 
even more prominent role in their work by introducing an ex-
tradiegetic authorial voice meant to identify exemplary conduct 
unambiguously and ensure that it would be recognized as such 
by the reader. This innovation was increasingly put in the service 
of didactic and moralistic aims by the Greek historian Polybius, 
as well as historians of ancient Rome like Livy, for whom the 
Latin term corresponding to paradeigma was exemplum.7 Aside 
from the prominent place accorded exempla in ancient histories, 
orators like Cicero helped to make exempla a standard feature of 
Roman rhetoric.8
In Roman thought and culture, the idea of the exemplum was 
closely linked to the figure that modern parlance knows as the ex-
emplar, an individual whose body of accomplishments as a whole 
is considered exemplary and worthy of emulation. Romans memo-
rialized great personages in a manner that linked their great deeds 
to an underlying greatness of character, as reflected in physical 
monuments like public statuary and imagines (images of ances-
tors displayed in the atria of noble residences), which often tout-
ed the high points of the individual’s résumé in pictorial or even 
list form. Exemplarity became intertwined not just with specific 
acts, but with the overarching biographies of exceptional people, 
setting the stage for the exemplary personal narratives later asso-
ciated with the venerated figures of Christendom. Unsurprisingly, 
given the dominant values of Roman society, exemplars tended to 
be revered politicians and military leaders, national heroes whose 
most admirable actions involved the subordination of self and 
personal relationships to patriotic duty. Despite the fact that these 
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figures were, in some sense, prototypes for the Christian exem-
plar, the nationalistic morality they embodied was roundly ex-
coriated by early Christians like Augustine, whose interpretation 
of the exempla virtutis emphasized allegiance to a transcendent 
order beyond the saeculum.9
Christians may have been critical of the particular ways in 
which exemplarity was manifested in pagan thought and culture, 
but the idea of exemplarity itself thrived within Christianity. For 
Christians, writes Peter Brown, “God Himself was proposed to 
man as the Exemplar behind all exemplars.”10 The exemplary re-
lationship of God to man was facilitated by the idea that God, 
for all of His omniscience and omnipotence, was not an absolute 
Other to humanity. The creation myths of the early Hebrew Bible 
bequeathed to Christians the idea that human beings had been 
made in God’s image and raised the prospect of a godly original 
condition or essential nature that could be discerned and pro-
moted even within the context of a fallen world. “The result of 
this view,” Brown continues, “was to present human history as 
containing a sequence of exemplars, each of which made real, at 
varying times and in varying degrees, the awesome potentiality of 
the first model of humanity.” While precedents can be identified in 
the prophetic tradition of the Christian Old Testament, the gospel 
narratives brought this idea of exemplarity to its climax in the 
figure of Jesus Christ, in whom “the original beauty of Adam…
blazed forth.”11 The precise nature of Christ—the relationship of 
His divine qualities to His human qualities—was of course one 
of the prickliest controversies within the early Church, and the 
significance of Christ’s deeds was interpreted differently depend-
ing on where one placed emphasis. But as early as the Epistles 
of Paul there was suggestion that Christ’s example was meant to 
be imitated by ordinary Christians: “Follow my example,” Paul 
exhorted the Corinthians, “as I follow Christ’s.”12 According to 
this conception of examples building upon examples, an apostolic 
disciple of Christ like Paul was, as John Howard Yoder writes, 
“merely an exemplary follower of the true example.”13
Paul’s words capture both the foundational quality of exemplar-
ity within Christianity—Christ conceived, henceforth, as the ulti-
mate exemplar, a point of reference for all who follow Him—and 
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the self-replicating quality of exempla, in which present exempla 
spawn future exempla by referring back to past exempla (even 
Christ Himself referred back to the “perfection” of the “ heavenly 
Father”).14 The proliferation of stories of saints in the Middle 
Ages attested to the potency of the exemplary idea, particularly 
among laypeople, for whom the vividness of a saintly example 
offered a concrete means of engaging with the teachings of the 
Church. In these stories, Christian principles were not transmitted 
in a dry, legalistic manner but instead embodied and dramatized 
in order to produce a visceral impact. It is probable, however, 
that the concretization of exemplarity in the tangible deeds of spe-
cific persons whose humanness was less in question than Christ’s 
owed its appeal not only to its ability to make Christian doctrine 
more accessible, but to its vaguely subversive, anti-clerical qual-
ity. The exempla presented instances of self-sacrificing religious 
 authenticity—sometimes associated with figures outside of the 
Church hierarchy—that were often meant to contrast with the 
privileged and hypocritical lives led by many Church officials. The 
exempla celebrated individual integrity rather than institutional 
position, proposing that individual holiness be judged on the basis 
of the way of life one adopted rather than the external trappings 
of religious authority. Accordingly, medieval authors like Chaucer 
and Gower placed emphasis on exemplarity “as doing, as fac-
tum, rather than dictum,” a prioritization of praxis that the saints 
shared—or so it was claimed—with Christ. As Larry Scanlon ex-
plains, “If even Christ’s dicta depend on his facta, then the textual 
authority of the clergy must always be secondary to their actual 
piety as a group of historical individuals.” By this measure, most 
clergy did not merit the level of respect bestowed upon them.15
As has already been demonstrated, there were always grounds 
within the Christian tradition for putting stress on the similarities 
between God and His creation, between God’s son and the crea-
tures He was sent to redeem. Undoubtedly, the existence of these 
similarities helped to make plausible the suggestion that the char-
acteristics and actions of God and Son stood in an exemplary re-
lation to humanity, providing targets for aspiration and guides for 
action rather than being prohibitively transcendent. Nevertheless, 
until the rise of the mendicant orders in the 13th century, there 
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was a general tendency to treat the idea of exemplarity metaphor-
ically, to see in exceptional behaviour a moral lesson perhaps, 
but also the presence of something which, for the average person, 
was unreachably divine. As Christ began to be conceptualized less 
as an impossibly exalted, quasi-supernatural figure and more as 
the most perfect human being who ever lived, the idea that oth-
er  human beings could live in “imitation” of Him became more 
 influential. Figures like Saint Francis of Assisi adopted a more lit-
eral interpretation of what it meant to “imitate” Christ, aspiring 
not only to live up to His moral vision, but to replicate His vol-
untary poverty and His translation of neighbourly love into an 
active principle manifested in an ongoing commitment to good 
works. The godliness of Francis and those he himself inspired was 
expressed in a consistent and all-consuming pattern of life.16
Aside from what has already been canvassed in this necessarily 
brief overview, there are three further things to note about the 
Christian exemplum before assessing the way it was taken up by 
the Catholic Worker. First of all, the moral quality of Christian 
exemplarity was central—Christian exempla united not just uni-
versal and particular (as a more technical definition of exemplum 
might connote) but “ought” and “is.” They fit that category of ex-
emplarity identified by the critical theorist Alessandro Ferrara as 
overcoming the “dichotomic view of our world as split between 
facts and values, facts and norms, Sein and Sollen, is and ought.” 
Exemplars, from this perspective, are “entities, material or sym-
bolic, that are as they should be, atoms of reconciliation where is 
and ought merge and, in so doing, liberate an energy that sparks 
our imagination.”17 Secondly, it is important to note that within 
mainstream Christianity the notion of the “imitation” of Christ 
was invoked not as a binding moral commandment so much as 
an exemplary ideal. Understandings of just how relevant such 
an  ideal was to everyday people evolved over the course of time. 
Isolated groups always existed in which individuals attempted 
to attain a state of Christ-like “perfection,” but only gradually 
did similarly ambitious movements arise (like the Franciscans) 
that were strong enough to carve out an officially recognized 
place within the Church. Were we to carry the story of Christian 
 exemplarity  beyond the Catholic tradition specifically and into the 
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19th century, we would find a multiplication of groups aspiring 
to a Christ-like ideal and the increasing feeling that “sainthood” 
of a kind was within the reach of any committed practitioner of 
the Christian faith. Finally, we should highlight the tendency to 
see in the exemplum a kind of authority distinct from the law-like 
authority of Christian  doctrine—authority that inspires imitation 
rather than commanding obedience. In some sense, exempla “com-
pel” emulation, but they owe their influence principally to the vol-
untary actions of those who find their spirits stirred by them, not 
to feelings of obligation or threats of sanction for noncompliance.
Exemplarity and the origins of the Catholic Worker
There is ample evidence that the tradition of Christian exemplar-
ity described above directly informed Dorothy Day’s and Peter 
Maurin’s visions for the Catholic Worker. It is in the nature of 
examples, however, that they tend to give rise to a multiplicity of 
interpretations, and it will be necessary not only to show that Day 
and Maurin found inspiration in the Christian exempla but to 
describe more precisely the manner in which they selectively ap-
propriated the tradition for the sake of the movement. Both Day 
and Maurin, for instance, saw Christ’s example as a model with 
great relevance to their own activities. But their understanding of 
His example placed heavy stress on His human qualities and lent 
credence to their own emphasis on anarchism, decentralism, and 
active ministry to the poor. Day argued that
Philosophical anarchism, decentralism, requires that we follow the 
Gospel precept to be obedient to every living thing: “Be subject 
therefore to every human creature for God’s sake.” It means wash-
ing the feet of others, as Jesus did at the Last Supper. “You call 
me Master and Lord,” He said, “and rightly so, for that is what I 
am. Then if I, your Lord have washed your feet, you also ought to 
wash one another’s feet. I have set you an example; you are to do 
as I have done for you.” To serve others, not to seek power over 
them. Not to dominate, not to judge others.18
Maurin, similarly, maintained that “Self-giving love…was the ex-
ample Christ gave to his followers and was the consistent witness 
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of Christians in the early Church.” The implication was that the 
works of mercy articulated by Christ in Matthew 25 “must again 
become the Christian way of life.”19 Day’s account of the facta of 
Christ’s life in her autobiography The Long Loneliness highlight-
ed His humble origins, His eschewal of political power, His close-
ness to the people and concern for their material welfare:
He was born in a stable…He did not come to be a temporal King…
He worked with His hands, spent the first years of His life in exile, 
and the rest of His early manhood in a crude carpentry shop in 
Nazareth. He fulfilled His religious duties in the synagogue and 
the temple. He trod the roads in His public life and the first men 
He called were fishermen, small owners of boats and nets. He was 
familiar with the migrant worker and the proletariat, and some 
of His parables dealt with them. He spoke of the living wage, not 
equal pay for equal work, in the parable of those who came at the 
first and the eleventh hour.20
Beyond the paramount example of Christ, the subsidiary exem-
plarity of the saints was frequently referenced by both Day and 
Maurin. Implicitly gesturing to the broader exemplary tradition, 
Maurin counselled Day early on in their collaboration that it was 
“better to know the lives of the saints than the lives of kings and 
generals.”21 The advice was, perhaps, superfluous: from an ear-
ly age, Day had been impressed by saintly demonstrations of pi-
ety and driven to imitate them. Long before her conversion to 
Catholicism, Day’s response to first hearing the story of a saint 
was to experiment with sleeping on the floor in her own attempt 
at asceticism.22 As Day began to drift towards the Church, she 
was especially drawn to the life of Teresa of Avila, “a saint with 
whom [she] readily identified,” as Day’s biographer puts it.23 The 
magnetic effect that Teresa and other saints had on Day was at 
first largely a consequence of their exemplary devotion, as Day 
struggled to transition from liberated bohemian to faithful ad-
herent of the Church’s teachings.24 Maurin, however, encouraged 
Day to view the saints not just as exemplars of personal moral 
probity but as exemplars of radical social action who had pio-
neered strategies of translating Christian love into active care for 
the underprivileged.25 Maurin helped Day to see that the answer 
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to her well-known question—“Where were the saints to try to 
change the social order, not just to minister to the slaves but to do 
away with slavery?”—lay at least in part in forgotten and under-
emphasized aspects of the Christian tradition itself.26
As important as Maurin’s perspective was in encouraging 
Day to mine the Christian past for unexploded “dynamite,” the 
fuller answer to her question was that the saintly precedents of 
Christian lore had to inspire analogous saintliness in the pres-
ent. The movement Day and Maurin hoped to create would re-
quire, both realized, modern-day “saints,” and although they were 
hesitant to claim the mantle of sainthood for themselves,27 they 
were less reluctant to apply the designation to one another. As 
Jim Forest writes, Maurin believed that Day “had the potential of 
becoming a new Saint Catherine of Siena, the outspoken medie-
val reformer and peace negotiator who had counselled and repri-
manded both popes and princes. What Saint Catherine had done 
in the fourteenth century, Peter believed Dorothy could do in the 
twentieth.”28 Day, likewise, regarded Maurin, who “lived the pov-
erty he admired in St. Francis,” as something of a saint.29 Maurin’s 
chief importance to the movement, in fact, may have been as an 
exemplar, as a “religious archetype and symbol.”30 As Mel Piehl 
explains:
ultimately, Maurin’s most important function for Day was that he 
provided her—and through her the Catholic Worker movement—
with a personal symbol of traditional Catholic spirituality…
Because he advocated and lived a life of absolute poverty and gen-
erosity based on Catholic ideals, Maurin expressed perfectly Day’s 
most deeply held beliefs about religion and society. His humble 
appearance and openhearted simplicity brought to mind the saints 
she knew so well from her studies and suggested that sainthood 
was a present as well as a past reality.31
Day may indeed have had “an intuitive sense of saintliness, even 
when it came in strange disguises, and an intense desire to see the 
heroic potential of every person whom she met,”32 but undoubt-
edly her exposure to Maurin played a substantial role in leading 
her to the conclusion that, in her own words, “There are many 
saints here, there and everywhere and not only the canonized 
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saints that Rome draws to our attention.” Referring back to Saint 
Paul’s original call for Christians to live in imitation of Christ, 
Day held that “saints should be common” because “we are all 
called to be saints.”33
As Day and Maurin interpreted them, then, the examples set by 
the saints were not to be regarded with passive awe but to be con-
sulted as guides, not just by the “leaders” of the Catholic Worker 
movement, but by its rank-and-file, for whom it was not out of 
the question to aspire to saintliness in their own lives. The impli-
cation was that “the traditional ‘counsels of perfection’ applied 
to laypeople as well as to those in religious orders.”34 One means 
the Worker adopted of inculcating this view was through the 
sponsorship of annual weeklong retreats, inspired by the retreat 
movement of the Canadian Jesuit Father Onesimus Lacouture. 
These retreats
offered a lofty vision of personal holiness, urging every Christian to 
aspire to the “counsels of perfection” that mainstream Catholicism 
enjoined only on members of religious orders. Participants were 
urged to take the Sermon on the Mount literally—to turn the other 
cheek and go the second mile—and to give up even minor indul-
gences if these stood in the way of loving Christ and the poor. In the 
retreat, Day explained, “We had to aim at perfection; we had to be 
guided by the folly of the Cross.”35
Although their aims were in a sense “lofty,” however, these re-
treats helped to convince Day of the wisdom of the “Little Way” 
advocated by one of her favourite saints, Saint Thérèse of Lisieux, 
who had modelled the possibility of sanctifying even the smallest 
and humblest acts. The greatness of Thérèse lay not in superhu-
man feats but in the plodding consistency with which she conse-
crated her life to God. While Day had initially been attracted to 
“spectacular saints who were impossible to imitate,” she found 
in Thérèse a message “obviously meant for each one of us, con-
fronting us with daily duties, simple and small, but constant.”36 
The example of Thérèse illustrated the possibility of bridging the 
lowly and the transcendent within the context of everyday life, of 
planting modest “seeds” in one’s own patch of ground that would 
ultimately bear fruit far beyond it in myriad, often unexpected 
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ways. This idea was best captured, perhaps, in one of Day’s favou-
rite metaphors, the “loaves and fishes” of scripture: “we must lay 
one brick at a time, take one step at a time; we can be responsible 
only for the one action of the present moment. But we can beg for 
an increase of love in our hearts that will vitalize and transform 
all our individual actions, and know that God will take them and 
multiply them, as Jesus multiplied the loaves and fishes.”37
The prospects of divine assistance aside, Day understood that 
in order for small actions to have this kind of multiplier effect 
they had to have propagandistic value, for actions cannot qual-
ify as exemplary unless they command the attention of an au-
dience.38 This meant that some thought had to be given to the 
image that the Worker projected to those outside the movement. 
Rather than relying on the simplified, stereotypical imagery of 
traditional propaganda, however, the Worker consciously courted 
an image that looked, on the surface, counterintuitive and even 
contradictory. Workers challenged the idea that cleanliness was 
next to godliness through their “often ragtag appearance,”39 they 
fought to eradicate poverty even as they embraced it themselves, 
and they preached the need for social action while adopting an 
approach that was strangely tolerant of failure. The upshot of the 
Worker’s incongruous appearance was that it encouraged specta-
tors to re-evaluate entrenched assumptions about the nature of 
holiness and the vocation of the saint. Day often appealed to the 
idea of the “holy fool” to capture this relationship between the 
quizzical spectator and the spectated.40 A recurring character type 
within the Christian tradition sometimes attributed even to Christ 
Himself,41 the holy fool is an individual whose outward bearing 
is contemptuous of social conventions, but whose actions hint at 
his underlying saintliness and superiority of character. The holy 
fool has sometimes been interpreted as engaging in wilful deceit, 
or at the very least in a complex performance meant both to con-
ceal and reveal his true nature.42 Day clearly liked the implica-
tion that immediate appearances can be deceiving, and that it was 
necessary to look for the deeper meaning in seemingly eccentric 
and provocative behaviour before passing judgment. There was 
no component of deliberate concealment in the Worker’s actions, 
however: its departure from accepted notions of propriety was 
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meant—in part, anyway—to expose the ways in which social and 
cultural conditions worked against genuine godliness, causing 
saints to appear peculiar, irrelevant, or even threatening. Within 
the context of the movement, therefore, the holy fool metaphor 
took on a significance aimed less at the exceptional qualities of 
the individuals in question, and more at the social structures that 
made such qualities appear exceptional. It also reinforced the 
“loaves and fishes” idea that the effects of one’s actions were not 
rationally calculable, that the path of saintliness was not, there-
fore, the path of the so-called “rational actor,” who is dependent 
upon conventional wisdom and focused on attaining immediate, 
tangible results within existing institutional structures.
Aside from the influence exerted on Day and Maurin by the 
figures of Christ, the saint, and the holy fool, the philosophy of 
personalism—a term which, for Maurin in particular, often served 
as a pithy encapsulation of the Worker’s outlook—strengthened 
their attraction to the idea of exemplarity. While the concept of 
personalism is too complicated and capacious to be examined in 
detail here, a few ideas falling under that heading can be singled 
out as especially relevant. Like the exemplars of the Christian tra-
dition, the notion of the “person,” as formulated by early-20th 
century thinkers like Nikolai Berdyaev and Emmanuel Mounier, 
united the sacred with the secular. Personalism held that each per-
son, in all of his or her uniqueness, was an absolute end, made in 
the image of God and therefore not to be sacrificed to any ostensi-
bly “higher” cause. The same love and respect that one bestowed 
upon God was to be bestowed upon the least of His creatures as 
well. This helped to explain Day’s determination “to meet Christ 
in the persons who came to her.”43 Personalism fostered a way of 
seeing that sensitized its exponents to the godly qualities of every-
day people and held out the possibility that saintliness could be 
embodied not simply in abstract principles or Christian folklore 
but in living flesh and blood, in the here and now.
Aside from encouraging an exemplary way of seeing, per-
sonalism encouraged an exemplary way of acting. Rather than 
offloading social problems like poverty onto the impersonal, bu-
reaucratic apparatus of the welfare state, Workers were expected 
to address them in a manner that not only established a direct 
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relationship between benefactor and beneficiary (whose human 
dignity was violated by being termed a “client” or a “case”) but 
that demanded personal sacrifice and fostered personal develop-
ment. The Worker saw social change as inseparable from person-
al change: thus, “While trying to transform society…a Catholic 
Worker was engaged in transforming himself as well.”44 The de-
velopment of the self in this sense was personalistic rather than 
individualistic: cultivating the personality was supposed to result, 
in the words of the French philosopher and Catholic Worker sup-
porter Jacques Maritain, in “the generous self of the heroes and 
saints.”45 The philosophy of personalism helped to enrich, there-
fore, the links the Worker posited between exemplary personal 
qualities, the striving for saintliness in everyday life, and the strug-
gle for social change.
Exemplarity, leadership, and authority
If the influence of the exemplary tradition on Day and Maurin 
has been well documented, less well understood is the relationship 
between exemplarity and the operation of leadership and author-
ity within the Catholic Worker movement. In the third section 
of this chapter, I will argue that the concept of exemplarity is in 
many ways more useful than the Weberian concept of “charisma” 
in capturing these aspects of the movement as well as explaining 
the movement’s ability to sustain itself in the absence of Day, who 
died in 1980. I hope to demonstrate that the Worker’s emphasis 
on exemplarity created a functional model of leadership and au-
thority which, by eschewing domination and coercion in favour 
of voluntary emulation, helped to reconcile these components of 
the movement with anarchist principles.
Before exploring these claims, however, it must be admitted 
that leadership and authority in the Catholic Worker movement 
were not always exerted in a strictly exemplary fashion, partic-
ularly in the case of Day, whose influence was in a number of 
important instances both direct and, arguably, authoritarian. 
Day has, in fact, been described as something of a “benevolent 
dictator.”46 As Catholic Worker John Cort remembered: “I don’t 
think I ever argued with her, so great was her authority among us. 
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What it came down to was that the Catholic Worker was an ex-
traordinary combination of anarchy and dictatorship.”47 Michael 
Harrington, a member of the movement as a young man, had a 
similar impression: “we were living in a community where, when-
ever we made a decision, we all had a completely democratic, 
anarchist discussion, and then Dorothy made up her mind. The 
place was run on a führer concept, and Dorothy was the führer.”48 
Day ensured that “certain convictions (pacifism, personalism, the 
centrality of the works of mercy) prevailed in the Worker publi-
cations as non- negotiable and publicly expressed values.”49 It was 
one of these convictions—pacifism—that inspired Day’s most am-
bitious attempt to exercise control, not only over the New York 
Catholic Worker community, but over the movement as a whole: 
unflinching in her commitment to nonviolence during World War 
II, Day insisted that Catholic Worker communities throughout the 
country adopt a pacifist position in their publications or disasso-
ciate themselves from the movement.
Furthermore, Day often used her influence to ensure that her 
conservative orientation to Church theology and hierarchy pre-
dominated, in form if not in spirit. This was most evident, per-
haps, in Day’s approach to her role as overseer of the New York 
Catholic Worker paper. Day used this privileged position to super-
vise the hiring and activities of editors as well as the contributions 
of writers, closely monitoring the paper’s content: “Day allowed 
her writers and editors creative freedom,” Nancy Roberts writes, 
“but within what she perceived as Catholic Worker principles. 
She usually screened everything that went into the paper, with 
few exceptions.” Rather than risk a quarrel with the matriarch, 
many writers resorted to “self-censorship.”50 This meant, for one 
thing, that no criticism of church officials was to be found in the 
paper. It also meant that the paper carried many articles espousing 
traditional roles for women and was prevented from becoming an 
active advocate for women’s liberation after the emergence of the 
women’s movement. Additionally, Day used the paper as a means 
of promulgating a very conservative view of abortion and birth 
control, labelling both “genocide.”51
Finally, Day’s de facto authority as watchful “mother and 
grandmother”52 of the movement meant that “Certain behavioural 
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assumptions pervaded life at the Catholic Worker.” She would 
often chastise people whose conduct she disapproved of, as in 
the case of Jim Forest, whose “divorce and remarriage in 1967 
moved Dorothy to request that Forest remove himself as head 
of the Catholic Peace Fellowship or she would remove her name 
from the list of sponsors.”53 On another occasion, she banned 
alcohol at Peter Maurin Farm. Her most forceful actions, how-
ever, consisted of the outright expulsion of individuals from the 
movement. The most notorious of these episodes took place in 
1962, when “there were young people living in Worker house 
apartments whose standards were so at variance with traditional 
morality that Dorothy, in one of her moments of a towering righ-
teous anger, threw them all out.”54
Within her own Worker community in New York, Day’s ex-
ercise of authority—as has often been remarked—was to a large 
extent modelled on the monastic role of the abbess, who exer-
cised final sovereignty within an institution whose components 
functioned more or less autonomously on an everyday level. 
While many of the criticisms of Day’s heavy-handedness by oth-
er Workers are undoubtedly justified, any explanation of Day’s 
willingness to vest such authority in herself must take into con-
sideration the fact that she felt a strong personal responsibility 
for the institutional survival of the New York Catholic Worker. 
Arguably, it was because Day voluntarily shouldered this burden 
and the complex and often painful problems of decision-making 
that came along with it that other figures within the movement—
Maurin in  particular—were able to lead lives of greater consisten-
cy, to adopt more literally “the values of smallness and openness 
to failure that Day espoused.” As Dan McKanan points out, 
Maurin’s “practice, during all the years he was associated with 
the movement, was simply to outline his ‘program’ and provide a 
personal example of a life of scholarship and manual labour, then 
leave it to others to follow suit or not.”55 Determined to build a 
movement, Day clearly felt that she could not afford the luxury of 
perfect exemplarity, and it was in New York more than elsewhere 
that the instrumentalities of movement-making stood out in her 
actions and gave them a more controlling aspect. It is crucial to 
acknowledge with McKanan, however, that whatever truth there 
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is to claims about Day’s authoritarian streak, “her authoritarian-
ism had little influence on the movement beyond New York.” In 
fact, “The one time she seriously tried to assert her authority on a 
national level”—the aforementioned effort to force other Worker 
communities to adopt a position of absolute pacifism or leave the 
movement— “the attempt backfired,” resulting in a rash of defec-
tions by and dissolutions of Worker communities and even the 
burning of the New York Catholic Worker.56
However dictatorial some of Day’s actions during her “long 
tenure as charismatic leader” may seem, Piehl is correct to argue 
that ultimately “the strength of Day’s leadership was exercised as 
much through her role as spiritual writer and exemplar as through 
her position as head of the movement.”57 What I would like to 
suggest in evaluating that claim, however, is the utility of making 
a further distinction, a distinction between the concepts—both of 
which are invoked by Piehl—of “charisma” and “exemplarity.” 
Piehl is far from alone in attaching the ideas of charisma and char-
ismatic leadership to Day and to the Worker more generally. Aside 
from one full-length study of this connection,58 it is frequently in-
voked in the secondary literature: Day’s “charismatic leadership” 
has been described, for example, as “the glue of the movement,” 
at least during her lifetime.59 Max Weber’s pioneering theory of 
charismatic leadership and authority—although it has been sub-
jected to much critique and revision—remains the standard point 
of reference in this literature, and for this reason it is most useful 
to distinguish the concept of exemplarity from the concept of cha-
risma as understood by Weber.60
There are at least three important respects in which Weber’s 
theory of charisma and the concept of exemplarity would seem 
to be in tension. Firstly, Weber’s understanding of charisma puts 
emphasis on the perception of special qualities in an exception-
al individual. He describes charisma as “the surrender to the 
extraordinary…i.e., actual revelation or grace resting in such a 
person as a savior, a prophet, or a hero.”61 Charismatic leaders are 
seen as “the bearers of specific gifts of body and mind” that are so 
unusual they are “considered ‘supernatural’ (in the sense that not 
everybody could have access to them).”62 Charisma is thus bound 
up with the specific person who bears it—it is “a highly individual 
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quality” not easily reproduced because inaccessible to most.63 The 
corollary of the idea that charisma is a scarce resource is that only 
a select few will possess the qualifications for leadership,  sharply 
distinguishing them from those over whom they exercise their 
authority.
Secondly, although Weber gives charisma some strikingly anar-
chistic features, arguing that it “transforms all values and breaks 
all traditional and rational norms”64 and, famously, that it is “the 
specifically creative revolutionary force of history,”65 he ultimate-
ly makes it a handmaiden to political domination. The portrait 
Weber paints of the charismatic leader is of a figure who aspires 
to march at the head of a column of obedient disciples, a figure 
who out of a special sense of personal mission “seizes the task 
for which he is destined and demands that others obey and fol-
low him.”66 While the charismatic leader’s followers technically 
sign on to his cause voluntarily, in some sense “it is their duty 
to recognize his charisma.”67 In other words, his superior qual-
ities generate a sense of obligation that takes on a compulsory 
aspect. The charismatic leader may begin by inspiring others, but 
he ultimately puts inspiration in the service of command. Weber 
envisioned this playing out quite literally in the realm of politics, 
where his personal preference was for strong but plebiscitarian 
leadership, combining wide executive prerogative with popular 
appeal. Charisma’s political utility, as Weber saw it, was in its abil-
ity to secure the consent of the public to the exercise of power by 
elites and thus obviate the need for the naked exercise of political 
domination.
Thirdly, Weber saw charisma as inherently unstable and transi-
tory. This was precisely because it is premised on the recognition 
of unique qualities in individuals. Even when the original char-
ismatic leader is alive, he can only perpetuate his authority by 
“proving his powers in practice” again and again, by continuously 
working “miracles”—a feat few are able to sustain indefinitely.68 
When the charismatic leader dies, the group or movement built up 
around him almost inevitably experiences a severe crisis of succes-
sion, a desperate search for a replica of what cannot be  replicated. 
To forestall such crises and ensure their survival, charismatic 
movements must “transform charisma and charismatic blessing 
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from a unique, transitory gift of grace of extraordinary times and 
persons into a permanent possession of everyday life.”69 It is for 
this reason that charisma is subject to perennial decay: charismat-
ic movements attempt to institutionalize the authority associated 
with the charismatic leader, adopting strategies of rationalization 
and bureaucratization that make authority stable and transmissi-
ble. While the organizations that evolve out of this process may 
continue to benefit from a lingering charismatic aura, on a day-
to-day level their operations look much the same as those of any 
other rationalized enterprise and generally bear little resemblance 
to the charismatic leader’s original vision.
Each of these three characteristics of charisma can be useful-
ly contrasted with the characteristics I have associated with the 
concept of exemplarity. While exemplarity proposes that some in-
dividuals are especially accomplished, for example, it is less con-
ducive to a rigid distinction between leader and follower, since 
examples must, in some sense, be accessible to those expected to 
imitate them. Rather than treating the exemplar as a quasi-divine 
figure in possession of unique qualities, exemplarity envisions peo-
ple operating on a more or less equal plane of ability. Exemplarity 
presumes, in other words, that exceptional people do not have a 
monopoly on the qualities they exemplify, and that the proper re-
sponse to exemplary behaviour is not genuflection or obedience, 
but an effort to discover and develop similar qualities in oneself. 
Both Day and Maurin, as we have seen, demurred when charac-
terized by others as saints, and, like most exemplars, downplayed 
their own exemplarity by claiming merely to be imitating even 
worthier predecessors. Furthermore, they articulated an egalitar-
ianism of aspiration according to which all members of the move-
ment were invited to adopt saintliness as their own ideal. Day went 
even further, in fact, by consistently highlighting saintly qualities in 
the actions of figures outside the movement altogether, including 
the many secular radicals she counted as personal friends.
Exemplarity also differs from Weber’s charisma in that it is, 
by its very nature, less likely to be employed as a means of legiti-
mating domination. The actions of the exemplar, unlike the char-
ismatic leader, have little to do with amassing and commanding 
followers.70 The exemplar is generally content to exert an indirect 
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influence, and imitation of the exemplar is voluntary rather than 
obligatory. The fact that the Catholic Worker used the idea of ex-
emplarity to undermine rather than reinforce differences between 
leaders and led speaks to the fact that there was no general drive 
for domination within the movement. Although Day may have 
abused her authority at times, she also helped to ensure that the 
Worker remained “a voluntary organization eschewing credo and 
constitution.”71 Day actively promoted the idea that authority of 
all kinds—from exemplary authority to the authority of God72—
must be willingly acceded to by the individuals subject to it, and 
she explicitly rejected—along with other Workers—the model of 
command and obedience epitomized by the state.
Finally, while charisma is distinguished by its incessant  tendency 
to decay, exemplarity has a self-proliferating quality: exemplars, 
as already noted, tend to give rise to new exemplars, while cha-
risma, bottled up in the exceptional few, is less communicable 
and thus shorter-lived. This fact may help to explain the Catholic 
Worker’s failure to follow the trajectory Weber prophesied for 
charismatic movements that seek to overcome the mortality of 
their leaders and the resultant loss of charisma through routiniza-
tion and bureaucratization. Even before Day’s death the Catholic 
Worker’s particular brand of exemplarity, which urged Workers 
to keep things “small” and to found autonomous communities in 
response to new needs, made it unusually indisposed to the idea 
of a large, bureaucratic organization. When Day’s health began 
to decline in the 1970s, the movement did not suddenly aban-
don its principles in a frantic bid to institutionalize her author-
ity. This is not to suggest that Day’s role in the movement had 
been insignificant in holding things together over the years: her 
exemplarity did exert a kind of centripetal influence that helped 
imbue the  loosely-organized Worker communities with a sense of 
common identity and the feeling that they were orbiting, how-
ever autonomously, around a common core. But there was no 
suggestion that the only way for the movement to survive was 
to become radically more centralized and rule-bound after her 
death. Rather, the movement has continued to favour centraliza-
tion of a symbolic rather than an institutional kind. As McKanan 
notes, what is even more remarkable than the Worker’s avoidance 
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of bureaucratization, given its model of organization, is that “it 
has not simply disintegrated into hundreds of local houses and 
farms, without any sense of connection to a larger movement.”73 
McKanan concludes, in line with the thesis being proposed here, 
that what accounts for this is largely that Day “modeled a practice 
of friendship” that fostered ties between diverse communities and 
even “reached beyond the boundaries of her movement.”74 With 
Day’s death, Catholic Worker communities themselves took up 
the role that Day had exemplified, providing support and encour-
agement to one another and sustaining the movement’s sense of 
identity.75 It was the exemplary model of leadership and  authority 
that Day brought to the Worker from its origins onward, in con-
tradistinction to the charismatic leader’s drive for domination, 
that allowed the movement as a whole to be “a multifaceted anar-
chist affair, with a variety of other leaders and tendencies.”76
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, the Catholic Worker’s 
reliance upon an exemplary model of leadership and authority 
has had the (largely intended) effect of enhancing the anarchist 
aspects of the movement. The concept of exemplarity has allowed 
the Worker to draw sustenance from contemporary and histor-
ical examples of excellence while simultaneously emphasizing 
the equality and the empowerment of all individuals within the 
movement, who are urged to think of themselves as having the 
capacity for self-determination as well as the capacity for self-
less commitment to those in need. The Worker’s emphasis on the 
noncoercive and indirect influence of examples rather than the 
coercive and direct influence of commands has meshed nicely with 
the traditional anarchist resistance to all forms of authority that 
are not voluntarily accepted. Finally, the concept of exemplarity 
has helped Workers to envision the possibility of a movement that 
opts for the centralization of common identity and purpose rather 
than the centralization of institutions, enabling Worker communi-
ties to develop autonomously while retaining ties of solidarity and 
support to the rest of the movement. It is not an exaggeration to 
say that for Day, Maurin, and the Catholic Worker, anarchism was 
not embraced as an abstract political ideology, but rather under-
stood as the social arrangement that flowed logically out of exem-
plarity pushed to its limit. While this points to the counterintuitive 
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conclusion that the Catholic Worker’s Catholicism has—at least 
in some respects—enriched rather than undermined its anarchism, 
it also suggests that scholars of anarchism would do well to look 
more carefully at the potential for exemplarity to influence organi-
zational structure and to serve as a binding agent within anarchist 
movements and communities. Exemplarity may help to separate 
authority from domination and to explain how the phenomenon 
that Paul McLaughlin labels “moral authority” may indeed be 
reconcilable with anarchist principles.77
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have attempted to use the concept of exemplarity 
to account for the affinity the Catholic Worker movement found 
between Catholicism’s traditional celebration of saintly exempla 
and anarchism, the political philosophy that best describes the 
approach to organization the movement adopted internally, and 
promoted externally, through its social activism. More specifical-
ly, I have endeavoured to dissipate some of the “bewilderment” 
that many scholars have experienced in trying to make sense of 
Dorothy Day’s “successful use of authority,” by arguing that on 
the level of the movement as a whole she adopted an exemplary 
model of leadership that was ultimately more decisive than her 
occasionally authoritarian impulses.78 This is not because I wish 
to exonerate Day of her shortcomings—indeed, I believe that she 
is open to criticism not only for overstepping her bounds with 
 respect to the direct influence she exerted on the movement, but 
also for the example she set. In some ways, her exemplary au-
thority, quite aside from whatever direct power she possessed, also 
served to close down possibilities within the movement that might 
otherwise have emerged.79 Regardless of the manner in which Day 
wielded the exemplary leadership I have attributed to her, however, 
examining her relationship to the broader movement—in which, 
as Nancy Roberts writes, “Day’s authority was most reinforced by 
the power of her own pristine example”80—can help us to discern 
the concept of exemplarity in action and to weigh its merits.
That Day should go down as the “inventor” of Catholic rad-
icalism in the United States is instructive, for it teaches us one 
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last, ironic, lesson about exemplarity. Exemplars are rarely the 
straightforward imitators of past greatness that they claim to be. 
Rather, in attempting to make the exemplary models of the past 
relevant to the present, they more often than not create something 
new. The chain of exemplary causation is as much about innova-
tion as it is about the endless recycling of accomplishment. The 
greatest exemplars—those who liberate the sparks of the imagina-
tion rather than inspiring mere mimicry—are those whose deeds 
are familiar enough to bring to mind the best of the exemplary 
tradition, yet who steer the profound authority of that tradition 
into new channels.
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Mutuality, resistance and egalitarianism in a 
late colonial Bakongo Christian movement
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In this chapter I describe how a specific Christian movement (the 
‘Tokoist Church’, a prophetic, reformist movement that emerged 
in late colonial Angola) incorporated anarchist values (mutual-
ism, autonomism and egalitarianism) in its theology and praxis. 
Through a discussion of its posterior historical developments, I 
discuss how the introduction of hierarchical processes in its organ-
isation contributed towards the current state of internal contesta-
tion it is experiencing. I argue that the case of the Tokoist Church 
exemplifies the existence of conflicting theologies within Christian 
thought.
The ‘Tokoist Church’ is an Angolan Christian prophetic move-
ment that became a cornerstone of anti-colonial resistance in the 
1960s and 1970s, and later opposed to the post-independence to-
talitarian MPLA government.1 They became known in Angola for 
their peaceful resistance to the colonial endeavour, as well as for 
a particular sense of autochthon dignity they conveyed, which en-
gaged ideologically in the rejection of prior political and religious 
establishments and the self-improvement towards a messianic 
new kingdom that they envisioned.2 In the process, they cultivated 
a form of utopian mutualist egalitarianism that rejected imposed 
hierarchies and governmentalities. From this perspective, as I will 
describe throughout this chapter, in its first years of existence 
the Tokoist Church exemplified, through specific political utopi-
an stances, a particular version of Christianity that, unlike other 
 hierarchical traditions, reveals an understanding of Jesus Christ’s 
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gospel as inherently anarchistic in its core values. This follows 
recent proposals that outline this understanding in the history of 
Christianity, while establishing a philosophical and political cri-
tique to historical processes of Christian institutionalization and 
hierarchization.3 Here, I propose an ethnographic description of 
one such example from the Angola and Lower Congo region.
The movement emerged in the 1940s when its founder, Simão 
Gonçalves Toko (1918–1984), a former student and teacher in the 
Baptist missions of northern Angola (Kibokolo, Bembe), migrated 
to the capital of what was then the Belgian Congo, Léopoldville, 
and founded a musical choir (the ‘Coro de Kibokolo’) among the 
community of Angolan expatriates in the city.4 This choir, after a 
series of spiritual events, eventually evolved into a religious move-
ment, with its members preaching around the city about a new 
spiritual order. The first event was the participation of the choir in 
an international protestant missionary conference that took place 
in Léopoldville in 1946, which hosted missionaries, theologians 
and officials from several African, North American and European 
countries. In the conference Toko was given the chance of address-
ing the audience, and requested that “the Holy Spirit may descend 
upon Africa and save it from darkness”.5 A second event took 
place in July 1949, when Toko organized a prayer vigil, in which 
himself and a group of his followers witnessed the descent of the 
Holy Spirit and began to speak in tongues, prophesy, engage in 
biblical acknowledgement and perform other miraculous events.6 
Immediately after this event, those present took the streets and be-
gan to preach the Bible throughout the city. It was not long before 
the Belgian authorities took notice of this unwarranted proselytism 
and eventually imprisoned and expelled them from the colony, de-
porting them back to Angola in early 1950. From this moment un-
til Angolan independence in 1974, the story of the members of this 
movement was one of repression and suffering through imposed 
prison, forced labour, exile and other forms of violence; but it 
was also one of resistance and successful clandestine organization 
against the colonial apparatus, until it became officially recognized 
in the wake of the political transition to independency.
In the following pages, I will describe how the church’s 
anti-colonialist moment was based on socio-political configurations 
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of mutualism, egalitarianism and self-sovereignty vis-à-vis the 
metropolitan state, whilst promoting a non-hierarchical organi-
zation based on solidarity and respect – all of which core aspects 
of anarchistic thought and ethics. In the second part of the text, 
I will explain how the memory of this egalitarian and mutualist 
past reverberates today as an operative concept in the church’s 
contemporary internal politics of dissent, after a historical pro-
cess that has introduced diverse hierarchical structures in its so-
cial and political organization. I will also explore the ambiguities 
behind these configurations, namely in what concerns the auton-
omy of the believer versus the authority of both the state and 
God. This, as has been stated, has been a problematic question in 
the history anarchist political thought, considering the seemingly 
irreconcilable adherence to a supreme god and the rejection of 
all forms of authority that subdue the individual, as well as the 
traditional resistance of most (if not all) religious movements to 
conceive themselves in any way as ‘anarchistic’ (the Tokoists be-
ing no exception).7 But the acknowledgement of egalitarian, resis-
tant and utopian histories to be found in many of such cases has 
progressively pushed it into the centre of debate, as this volume 
exemplifies.
Resistance and political contestation in late colonial 
Congo
The fact that the Tokoist Church, despite being an Angolan based 
movement, emerged not in this territory but in the neighbouring 
Belgian Congo, was less a surprise as it could seem from the start. 
In fact, Simão Toko was but one of the many northern Angolans 
of Kongo ethnicity who crossed the colonial borders and headed 
towards the nearest metropolis. Despite the political frontier that 
separated, since the late nineteenth century, Portuguese, French 
and Belgian colonial endeavours, there was also a strong tradi-
tion of mobility, circulation and commercial exchange among the 
different Bakongo groups in the region that did not necessarily 
observe the juridical-political imposition on behalf of the Lisbon, 
Brussels and Paris metropolitan governments.8 Therefore, a strong 
community of zombo (Angolans from the Maquela do Zombo 
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region) expatriates concentrated in the suburbs of Leopoldville, 
namely the Quartier Indigène (Indigenous Neighbourhood) of the 
city. Likewise, other ethnicities and international expatriate com-
munities concentrated around this urbanized portion around the 
river Congo.9
Thus, Leopoldville was everything but a restful city in the 
1940s. In fact, many political and religious movements were be-
coming increasingly present in the local public scene, engaging 
progressively in the contestation of the colonial regime culminat-
ing in the Congolese independence in 1960. Political associations 
such as Joseph Kasa-Vubu’s ABAKO (Alliance des Bakongo), 
which emerged in the 1950s, was one culmination of this polit-
ical fervour.10 Likewise, most political and paramilitary organi-
sations that struggled towards Angolan independence were also 
found among exiled communities in this city, and the presence 
of Portuguese communist exiles – who fought the Estado Novo 
dictatorship in Portugal – in the region was a matter of fact.11 
Simultaneously, as Georges Balandier described, many religious 
movements that emerged in the particular ‘colonial situation’ of 
the Belgian Congo cultivated a messianistic ideology –  usually 
concentrated around the figure of a leader or prophet who was 
at the same time a politician: Simon Kimbangu, Simon-Pierre 
Mpadi, Lassy Simon Zéphyrin, André Matswa and others – which 
typically evolved into specific nationalist ideologies that simulta-
neously contested the political state while addressing, more or less 
prophetically, new religious orders.12 Such was the case of Simon 
Kimbangu (1887–1951), also a former Baptist student who, after 
a religious ministry of just months in the city, was arrested by 
the Belgian authorities and spent the rest of his life (thirty years) 
in prison in Élisabethville (today Lubumbashi) – but not before 
announcing prophetically to his followers that “the white will 
become black and the black will become white”.13 And in fact, 
as was observed in the decades after Congolese independence, 
movements such as the Kimbanguist Church would become ref-
erentials of the postcolonial nationalist projects. Another particu-
larly interesting example in this respect was the movement known 
as Amicalisme – Société Amicale des Originaires de l’Afrique 
Equatorielle Française – founded in 1926 by André Matswa in 
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Paris as a self-improvement group for expatriates from French 
Equatorial Africa, through which money was collected to im-
prove their condition as well as that of their original territories. 
This movement became largely influential in the Lower Congo re-
gion, and eventually evolved into a religious following known as 
‘Matswanism’ after the founder’s passing in 1942.14 At the same 
time, in post-independence Congo his figure would become inspi-
rational for several politicians.15
In this framework, the border between such religious and po-
litical movements was often more than blurry, or perhaps even ir-
relevant, conjured under concepts of charisma and utopia.16 This 
was evident in the colonial setting, where such prophetic leaders 
were endogenously and exogenously construed as being political-
ly agent – reason why they sojourned in local prisons more often 
than not – and in the postcolonial setting, where political move-
ments such as Bundu Dia Kongo (“Union of the Kongo”), led by 
Ne Muanda Nsemi, have combined a struggle for the restoration 
of the ancient Kingdom of Kongo with religious ideologies, to the 
extent of clashing against state authorities.17
Apart from the religious/political conflation, such examples 
also highlight the emergence of a process of religiously mediated 
political disconnection – one between ‘the state’ (as an apparatus 
of government) and ‘society’, here conceived as the expression of 
autonomous collective organization, beyond externally imposed 
jurisdictions.18 In other words, religious utopian and messianic 
ideals acted here against a hierarchical colonial system that had 
been imposed as a ‘totalization’ with no epistemological, political 
and moral alternative.19 This emerged in a specific historical mo-
ment of political transformation in the African continent towards 
independency, through which the forces of production of the state 
were irrevocably undermined by grassroots mobilizations of di-
verse order: social, cultural, intellectual, political, military, reli-
gious, etc.20 These processes of ‘refracted governmentality’, where 
a political, ideological and epistemological distinction is produced 
between the state and the will of its citizens, and also and ulti-
mately implied a problem of (individual, collective, national) sov-
ereignty and opened the ground for the consequent circulation of 
ideals of freedom and liberation.21
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As a result, through such movements of contestation, specif-
ic ideas of sovereignty were being tested against a given socio- 
political order that was in a permanent process of self-construction 
as crystallized and unquestioned.22 From this perspective, in their 
revolutionary mind-sets they conveyed a very ‘Proudhonian’ re-
jection of the state.23 After the political transition into the postco-
lony, most of them, however, resulted in new socialist formations 
and political regimes that proved to be more totalitarian than the 
previous colonial regimes (Angola being a case in point). Likewise, 
movements such as Kimbanguism also evolved into complex, 
hierarchical state-like endeavours.24 In the process, while many 
religious movements embarked successfully in the new political 
orders, others, like the Tokoist Church, remained until very re-
cently marginal and ambiguous.
Spiritual and political formations
Considering the socio-political setting described above, one can 
imagine that it would be difficult to live in a place like 1940s 
Léopoldville and ignore its political effervescence. However, the 
emergence of Tokoist mutualist prophetism was also imbued with 
a theological formation, informed by the protestant covenantal 
ethos, by which the relationship between God and the believer is 
one of direct ‘alliance’, thus dispensing hierarchizing mechanisms 
of mediation. When Simão Toko arrived to Léopoldville in 1943, 
he was a young man (25 years old) with a pedagogic and spiri-
tual training in the Baptist missions, where he began as a student 
and empregado (service boy) at the missionaries’ houses. Due to 
his outstanding performance as a teenage student, he had been 
granted the possibility of moving to Luanda to obtain secondary 
education, sponsored by the missionaries. Upon its completion, he 
returned north, and was hired as a teacher in the Bembe mission – 
his last stop before his migration to the Belgian Congo.
However, after consecutive disagreements with the Baptist 
leaders, Toko began a process of estrangement that culminated 
in the irreversible emancipation and autonomization observed in 
Léopoldville. He disagreed on cases such as the salary received by 
indigenous teachers in the missions, and the fact that the students 
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could not progress beyond a certain point in the study of the 
Bible. In a letter he wrote to the missionaries of the mission, he 
eventually asked to be released from the mission work: “When 
consciousness talks, let it be truly heard. Here is my question: 
when someone offers a shirt or a loaf of bread to a beggar, what is 
his goal, and why? I’m not the one to tell you, but I think that it 
is to do the beggar good. (When consciousness speaks…)” (circa 
1942; my translation). Although his separation would only occur 
a few years later, one could observe how the process of moral and 
political detachment was already taking place.
From this perspective, Toko’s political consciousness stemmed 
from a progressive acknowledgement of an unjust hierarchized 
system that was in itself contradictory with the notions of spir-
itual liberation taught by the Baptists; shortly before leaving to 
Léopoldville, Toko decides to organize a farewell party, inviting 
students, local elders and mission leaders. In the party, he appears 
wearing a sisal bag and singing a kikongo hymn that said: “The 
turncoat has worn a bag, the turncoat has worn a bag, the turn-
coat has worn a bag”.25 This was seen as an announcement of 
a future inversion of the state of affairs. It is said that by that 
time Toko also sang hymns in Kikongo where he summoned the 
Africans to “open their eyes”26– in what can be understood as a 
progressively public contestation to the work of the missionaries.
Once in Léopoldville, Toko would nevertheless continue his 
collaboration with the Baptist missions, teaching in the Itagar 
mission’s Sunday school. As some elder Tokoists I interviewed in 
Luanda recall, his dominical classes were cramped with eager stu-
dents, while the Baptists’ church remained almost empty in their 
services. This situation provoked discomfort and growing suspi-
cion in the Baptist leaderships. In parallel with the choir activi-
ties, he led an autonomous group of Bible students, known as the 
Anciens Élèves, who spent their free time reading and translating 
the Bible into the local language, kikongo, as well as learning other 
languages (namely English). During these meetings, Toko would 
introduce and discuss literature from other movements, such as 
the Jehovah’s Witnesses and Watchtower (their proselytist branch) 
publications, a book called Luz e Verdade (“Light and Truth”) that 
Toko had found in the rubbish bin in his previous visit to Luanda. 
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There was also another book known as Vita Velela (“Holy War”), 
used by the elder members of the group. Furthermore, in the 1946 
missionary conference he met and engaged with representatives 
from different protestant churches, exchanging publications such 
as the Watchtower’s Sentinel – engagements that progressively 
undermined his loyalty to the Baptist missionary endeavour and 
pushed him towards an independentist, liberationist movement.
This plural inspiration was, from a theological point of view, 
fundamental for the development of a utopian project, very much 
inspired by the Jehovah’s Witnesses millenarian restorationist es-
chatology, in particular their belief in God’s Kingdom as a liter-
al government in heaven. This, therefore, implied a rejection of 
worldly government. As a Tokoist elder who followed him in the 
days of Léopoldville told me (February 2012), Toko would always 
tell them to be “prepared to work their own land” in the future, 
anticipating a new governmentality. But Toko also always called 
for a peaceful form of resistance to colonial oppression, which 
was simultaneously obedient with the established authorities but 
refused any form of externally imposed subjection, while explicitly 
denying any kind of involvement in violent resistance or guerrilla 
actions in the subsequent years.27 This form of ‘obedient resis-
tance’, however paradoxical as it may seem, was in fact rooted in 
two dispositions: an exegesis of Jesus’ gospel as an essentially pac-
ifist and love-informed preaching that prefigures a different image 
of God other than the old covenant autocratic, violent one28 and 
simultaneously a strong sense of utopian expectation, a personal 
conviction of an imminent change that would proclaim their mes-
sianic victory over the soon-to-be defunct worldly government. In 
the first stance, one can appreciate a similar interpretation to that 
of Leo Tolstoy in The Kingdom of God is Within You, in which he 
points out the centrality of non-violent resistance in the Christian 
gospel, which he configured as a ‘new theory of life’.29 In the sec-
ond, we observe a process de-totalization of the colonial system, 
the recognition of its fallibility, mediated by the inauguration of 
an expectation that questioned the ‘victorious history’ imposed by 
the colonial regime.30
One example of the irrevocability of the Tokoists’ sover-
eign positioning can be found in the moment of their arrest in 
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Léopoldville. Upon the emergence of the choir members’ door-to-
door proselytism in the city, soon enough the Belgian authori-
ties were tipped off by the Baptist missionaries concerning the 
dangers involved in their activities. A complaint filed in the local 
police station concerning an alleged robbery on behalf of one of 
these students/preachers gave the Belgian authorities the pretext 
to arrest Toko and the group of dozens of followers. As they were 
arrested, several other dozen followers voluntarily turned them-
selves in to the authorities, in order to remain closer to their lead-
er. The police then conducted interrogatories to identify and build 
the case for a subsequent deportation. Every single interrogation 
followed the same script as this dialogue held by the interrogating 
official and 18-year-old G. Pierre:
Q.- Do you understand that you have been arrested for carrying 
the insignia of the Kibokolo choir?
R.- Yes, because I am a member of that choir led by Simão 
Gonçalves Toko.
Q.- Were you aware that that sect was forbidden?
R.- Yes I was.
Q.- Why then did you continue to be a part of that illegal move-
ment, despite the interdiction?
R.- Because it is about the will of God, to which I must submit 
myself.
Q.- So one could say you follow firstly Toko’s orders, and then 
those of the Government, is that right?
R.- Yes, that is correct.
Q.- Are you willing to give up on the Kibokolo choir movement?
R- I am arrested, but I will never give up.
(Archives Ministère des Affaires Étrangères Bruxelles) 31
As becomes clear, the arrested Tokoists would not recognize an 
authority that did not stem from Toko or God, and were willing 
to pay the price, suffering prison and deportation. And in fact, as 
Tokoists in Luanda recall, not only were these hundreds of sing-
ers arrested and expelled, but up to thousands of zombo volun-
tarily turned themselves in to the Belgian authorities, subjected 
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themselves to prison and returned to Angola, inspired by Toko’s 
liberationist message.32 This refusal of allegiance to ‘worldly gov-
ernment’ brings us back once again to a critical point in the his-
tory of Christian Anarchist thought, from Tolstoy to Adin Ballou 
and Jacques Ellul: the problem of allegiance and subjection to 
‘authority’.33 However, what cases like the Tokoist and others de-
scribed by these authors show us is that the notion of subjection 
must be bracketed and considered in terms of how such move-
ments understand and experience God – if as an autocratic source 
of domination or as an egalitarian source of ‘love’.
Other examples of resistance would follow, namely during the 
subsequent decades in Angola. After being deported from the 
Belgian Congo in January 1950, Toko and his followers were sub-
ject to several measures of repression and control on behalf of the 
Portuguese authorities, which became increasingly suspicious of 
their political motivations. In order to exert control, they decided 
to separate the group into smaller teams, which would be dispersed 
into different labour camps, prisons, detention compounds or ‘resi-
dence fixation’ areas throughout the territory34. One such case took 
place in the colonato (plantation) of Vale do Loge (Uíge, northern 
Angola), to where a group of about one hundred Tokoists was sent 
to serve as enslaved labour for the construction and development 
of a coffee plantation. They sojourned in the plantation for about 
ten years, before fleeing into the bushes and the Congo at the out-
break of the independence war in 1961. Many of the survivors I 
interviewed described how they were able to establish a particular 
form of collective organization in which they would carry out the 
orders of the plantation chiefs in their own terms, where the fittest 
would cover for the weakest in the heaviest work, apparently with 
the complacency of the authorities that watched over them, allow-
ing for their autonomy as long as the work was completed. Grenfell 
also describes how they refused to take up work that they deemed 
inhuman, and were encouraged by Toko to seek specific job train-
ing that would allow them to gain future economic autonomy. In 
any case, due to the relatively peaceful and orderly situation of 
the plantation, it became a model for the local authorities, who 
invited the Angolan General Governor, Silva Carvalho, in 1954 for 
a visit to appreciate the success of the agricultural venture.35 But 
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other episodes that took place in the plantation confirmed their 
irreducible autonomism. For instance, in 1955, they refused to ac-
cept the authorities’ order of removing the symbols they invariably 
wore on their lapels (a red star), and confronted them, comparing 
their symbol with the official ranks the military and police wore in 
their own uniforms.36 Another example took place in 1957, when 
a small Catholic church was built, to serve the local populations 
and the Portuguese colonists. The Bishop of Luanda was invited for 
the inauguration, and the Tokoists were summoned to attend the 
ceremony and sing Christian hymns. But they refused to take part 
of the event and escort the Bishop’s vehicle.37
Mutual and solidary organization, resistance and 
liberation
The spiritual formations revealed above elicit a coupling of a 
utopian Christian eschatology and specific stances of resistance 
that enhanced their agency vis-à-vis the colonial states. But in his 
Léopoldville days Simão Toko had also engaged in several oth-
er social and political associations. While working as a portrait 
painter in the streets of Léopoldville and also as an apprentice 
of watchmaker, he also dedicated his time to the creation of a 
mutual self-help organization for the Zombo community, known 
as Nkutu a Nsimbani (“Mutual Help Fund”), in 1946.38 This or-
ganization, located at number 41 of Luvua street in Léopoldville, 
congregated some members of the Coro, as well as other Zombo 
who worked in commercial activities. Their goal was to create a 
system of periodical donations for collective enterprises, which in-
cluded helping new Zombo migrants arriving in the city, building 
houses, schools or medical facilities, or starting small commercial 
enterprises. Toko, who was constantly sought by newly arrived 
Zombo at his house for help, acted as chairman and treasurer of 
the association, collecting donations and organizing group meet-
ings. The mutualist venture was very successful in its early stages, 
and acted as a hub for the Zombo community; but eventually a 
conflict broke between two groups, concerning the disappearance 
of part of the money collected, and led to the dissolution of the 
association by Toko himself in 1948.
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This kind of mutual activity was not unheard of at the time. 
On the one hand, the Bakongo familial and kinship structure 
often engaged in similar collective enterprises. As many Zombo 
in Angola told me, migration from rural Maquela do Zombo 
to places like Léopoldville or Luanda were often covered by the 
collection of money through an extensive network of village and 
clan members.39 But also in the urban, metropolitan setting of 
Léopoldville one could observe the influence of movements such 
as the Amicalist project, described above, and Kitawala (the au-
tochthon version of the Watchtower). From this perspective, mu-
tualism was in many ways engrained in Bakongo culture. But this 
specific project appeared as an expression of Christian mutualism, 
equally based in an ideal of religious communitarianism and liber-
tarianism. This ideal in turn stemmed from a double, concomitant 
recognition of the inherently hierarchical and unjust version of 
Christianity imposed by the Western missionaries in the region, 
and the remembrance of a ‘original’ version of Christianity – that 
of the time of the apostles –, based on communality and solidarity.
Despite the failure of this specific mutualist project, Toko did 
not give up on his collectivist projects, and continued to push for-
ward an agenda of a dignified, peaceful resistance. And, as many 
Bakongo in Luanda told me, Nkutu a Nsimbani in fact became 
a ‘seed’ out of which several other grassroots projects emerged. 
Toko’s encouragement of “communal solidarity, discipline in work 
and the learning of new skills” had a considerable impact, and 
several former members of the Nkutu a Nsimbani engaged in new 
ventures.40 Such was the case, for instance, of the ASSOMIZO 
(Asociation Mutuelle des Ressortissants de Zombo), a Zombo 
mutual aid society organized in 1956 by Emmanuel Kunzika and 
André Massaki which would eventually transform into a polit-
ical party known as ALIAZO (Alliance Zombo) and later into 
the PDA (Partido Democrático de Angola) which, along with an-
other paramilitary movement, the UPA, would form the FNLA 
(National Liberation Front of Angola, led by Holden Roberto). 
From this perspective, many Bakongo in Angola today see Nkutu 
a Nsimbani as a precursor of Angolan nationalism, at least in 
what concerned the capacity of creating a collective venture 
that disconnected from and fought against any state sponsored 
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initiative of control. From this perspective, one could argue that 
this form of associativism implied a ‘model for liberation’, based 
simultaneously on religious notions of communality and tran-
scendence, and on political ideals of autonomy and transforma-
tion.41 However, as stated above, despite the common liberationist 
aspiration, the subsequent political transitions transformed many 
of these movements into socialist, Marxist-Leninist, communist 
and in many cases totalitarian endeavours. Furthermore, just like 
as I suggested above movements such as Kimbanguism engaged in 
similar processes of transformation that introduced hierarchy and 
inequality, Tokoist mutualism was also and eventually substituted 
by vertical forms of organization.
Refiguring vertical and horizontal organization  
in the post-colony
As a prophetic movement, Tokoism reflects forms of leadership 
that can be easily interpreted as prime examples of hierarchical 
ecclesiastical organization. It is not hard to agree with this, es-
pecially when one considers the moral, epistemological, political 
and spiritual ‘dependence’ that is detectable between Toko and his 
followers and is reproduced even today, decades after his physi-
cal passing. In fact, after the moments described above, the sub-
sequent decades of demographic growth of the Tokoist Church 
witnessed a process of bureaucratization and administrative com-
plexification that introduced particular steps towards a hierarchi-
zation of the entity, often against the will of the prophet founder 
himself. Considering that the following of Simão Toko began to 
transcend several ethnic and political boundaries, different ad-
ministrative entities were created to address such processes. For 
instance, in the late 1950s, an internal organization of the church 
into “tribes”, which implied the integration of an intermediary 
entity between believers and the leadership, was created, divid-
ing them according to their original ethnicities.42 Likewise, the 
creation of multiple entities with intermediate leaderships, such 
as counsels of elders, youths, etc, added to the complexity. This 
process of bureaucratization culminated after Toko’s death in 
1984, which implied, for the first time in the church’s history, a 
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process of political succession. This process was all but successful, 
as many different sectors of the church were not able to agree 
on who represented the legitimate authority, and, amidst sever-
al different kinds of mutual accusations, began a process of in-
ternal dismemberment. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, what 
was a single entity was consecutively divided into several different 
Tokoist groups, some of which were able to obtain legal recogni-
tion (in 1992). Thus today one can no longer talk about a Tokoist 
Church, but instead of Tokoist Churches in plural.
This situation lasted roughly until the year 2000, when a se-
ries of events dramatically changed the church’s political situa-
tion. One of the sectors began to be led by a man, Afonso Nunes, 
who claimed to have been visited and ‘inhabited’ by the spirit of 
Simão Toko and, after taking office, undertook a movement of 
reunification and transversal transformation – to the point that it 
is today one of the most successful churches in post-war Angola.43 
Apart from the dramatic reforms undertaken in the sector under 
Nunes’ leadership, he also introduced a bureaucratic novelty: the 
inauguration of a bishopric, as a mechanism to solve the critical 
problem of leadership. Despite the contestation of many groups 
that remain somewhat marginal, Nunes’ proposal can be consid-
ered a success, from an economic and political point of view, as he 
was also able to enact an almost complete reunification. Thus to-
day, this sector appears in Angola as hegemonic in what concerns 
the public perception of Tokoism. Bishop Nunes and the Tokoist 
Church appear almost daily in the Angolan media, in a constant 
display of success and wealth – of which the majestic “Universal 
Cathedral”, inaugurated in the summer of 2012 in eastern Luanda 
and congregating dozens of thousands of followers every week, is 
the ultimate example.
However, despite these processes of heightened hierarchization, 
through certain dimensions of the remembrance of Toko today 
we can see that the principles of mutuality and anti-hierarchical 
organization are still active to this day. One example is the way 
Toko is remembered as an individual and leader in the church by 
those who met him in person: like a humble person, consistently 
refusing any kind of moral, political or economic superiority vis-
à-vis his own followers. For instance, he refused to be called pai 
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(“father”, a common form of deference to seniority or superiority 
in Angola and the Congo), preferring the term dirigente (“direc-
tor”), and never distinguished among his followers through age, 
gender, socio-economic status, etc. Likewise, he would not accept 
as his own the recurrent offers that his wealthier followers would 
give him (cars, houses, etc.), and preferred to consider them collec-
tive property of the church. This portrait of Toko as an egalitarian 
leader is often conveyed as a critique of the church’s current hege-
monic version and the hierarchical structure it has imposed with 
the bishopric. Such is the case of one specific group known as the 
Twelve Elders, who are composed by survivors and descendants 
of the zombo who were expelled or voluntarily deported from the 
Belgian Congo, and who also sojourned in the Vale do Loge plan-
tation. Frontally opposed to Nunes’ leadership, they rely on this 
memory, as well as on the original mutualism and solidarity cul-
tivated during the first years of the colony, in their contestations.
Another example can be found in the plural organizations that 
remain demographically marginal but proactive in the Tokoist 
universe. One such case is a small group based in Luanda, known 
as the Casa de Oração (“House of Prayer”). This group emerged 
in the late 1970s, a few years before Toko’s death, as a group of 
youngsters (na ngunza, the “sons of the prophets”) who circu-
lated around the leader’s residence and conducted daily prayer 
sessions. They became close to the leader and watched from a 
distance as the Tokoist movement began its process of internal 
combustion with the struggles for power occurring within. Today, 
they combine their weekly prayer meetings with their commit-
ment to work for the reunification of the church. However, in 
contrast with other sectors of the church, they reject leadership as 
a way out of the conflict, and advocate a collegial solution, with 
no given leader, but a council of representatives who would decide 
upon the church’s destiny. This form of political organization can 
also be understood as a form of horizontal organization that at-
tempted to break through the hierarchical stratification developed 
on the meantime in the Tokoist venture. So far, they have not been 
successful in their attempts.
In any case, their critique, as that of the Twelve Elders, not only 
contests the hierarchization of the church’s political organization, 
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but also the moral implications of such transformations, which are 
seen as configuring a deviation from Simão Toko’s preaching, thus 
implying a corruption of the egalitarian and mutualist principles.
Conclusion: liberation and freedom in Christian cultures
The apparent opposition between anarchism and religion has 
been historically construed as an irreconcilable one, especially 
considering the comments set forth by Mikhail Bakunin on the 
tyranny and coercion of theology and the idea of God as ‘phan-
tom’, against the conviction of the intrinsic freedom of man.44 
Bakunin, who is seen as one of the most influential figures of an-
archist thought, was also a self-proclaimed anti-theologian who 
deconstructed the ‘absurd tales’ of the doctrines extracted from 
the Bible in the history of Christian thought.45 However, one 
could also argue that Bakunin’s critique was ultimately directed 
not to the Bible or the idea of God per se, but rather to the pos-
terior political construction that reduced, through control and 
exploitation, believers and citizens to ignorance and intellectual 
reduction.46 From this perspective, throughout most of anarchist 
thought, church and state were the same agents of exploitation – 
and thus the anarchist aspiration of ‘abolishment’ must concern 
extrinsic government and God alike. This classic positioning, as 
Paul-François Tremlett has pointed out, has historically placed the 
debate of religion in anarchist thought into the fringes.47
However, as several authors mentioned in this chapter point 
out, the contradiction only emerges in the process of political ex-
egesis and translation into religious institution; and in fact, both 
religion and anarchism share, more often than not, a utopian am-
bition. Thus, the problem with the debate was not so much the 
lack of ability (or will) to surpass the epistemological conundrum 
between God and anarchism, but instead perhaps a concentra-
tion of understanding of ‘religion’ as ‘institution’ on behalf of 
particular strands of anarchist thought and the consequent lack 
of interest in surveying the implications of religious experience 
in the believers, both in spiritual and political terms. Likewise, a 
similar position has been assumed on behalf of a clear majority of 
theologians who refused to accept the possibility of an anarchist 
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political framing in their own conceptions, also due to a restrict-
ed, biased understanding of its implications.
In this chapter, I attempted to describe one such movement of 
a religious configuration that is self-conceived as political, collec-
tivist, egalitarian and liberationist. In many ways, its historical 
emergence revealed the confluence of ideals and practices that are 
equally shared by anarchistic thought and activity. Namely: the ini-
tial association under the framework of mutualist organization; the 
development of a utopian, idealist spirit based on ideas of freedom; 
the practice of ‘obedient resistance’ against colonial domination; 
and the establishment of a ‘horizontal’, communal leadership. In a 
way, Toko’s initial activity in Léopoldville, both in religious and po-
litical terms, shared Bakunin’s will of rebellion against subjugation 
against the ‘empire’ (political, epistemological, philosophical). The 
developments which occurred after his passing in 1984 implied a 
process of revision that ultimately corrupted the initial ideals by 
introducing hierarchizing processes. In this respect, if in the first 
years of the movement egalitarianism was a practical principle 
through which Toko and his followers devised an autonomist proj-
ect, today it seems to have become a somewhat marginal moraliz-
ing statement deployed as a tool of contestation against processes 
of ideological and institutional innovation. The contestation that 
emerged against such processes of innovation and hierarchization, 
stemming from the memory of the egalitarian past, illustrates the 
dilemmas of the coupling of religion (Christianity) and anarchism.
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this text significantly.
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Why Anarchists Like Zen? A Libertarian 
Reading of Shinran (1173–1263)
Enrique Galván-Álvarez
Universidad Internacional de La Rioja (UNIR), Spain
Most attempts to formulate a Buddhist anarchism in the West take 
Zen Buddhism as their reference point, often disregarding other 
Buddhist traditions and their anarchic/libertarian potential. In re-
sponse to these early Western formulations I propose an alternative 
pathway for Buddhist anarchism based on a radically different 
Buddhist tradition, that of Shinran Shonin (1173–1263). Shinran’s 
thought can arguably contribute to contemporary Buddhist anar-
chism some of the elements that it seems to be lacking: a self-critique 
that is not devoid of social criticism, a deconstruction of Buddhist 
power and an historical awareness. For this purpose, I will first 
outline some of the anti-authoritarian traits in Shinran’s writings, 
which have so far not been read from an explicitly anarchist angle. 
Then I will look closely at Shinran’s critical view of humanity and 
human relations through his concept of mappo, drawing out the 
egalitarian and subversive implications of Buddhist eschatology. In 
so doing I show how Shinran’s radical re-reading of the Buddhist 
canon, and the self-understanding it yields, bring into question 
some important narratives that legitimize and construct the estab-
lished, politico-religious order.
1. Why Anarchists Like Zen –Introduction.
Most attempts to formulate a Buddhist anarchism in the West 
take Zen Buddhism as their reference point, often disregarding 
other Buddhist traditions and their anarchic/libertarian potential. 
This is partly to do with the way in which Zen has been presented 
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to the West, by individuals such as D.T. Suzuki or Alan Watts, and 
also due to a relative ignorance about Asian anarchisms and their 
links with various forms of (both Zen and non-Zen) Buddhism.1 It 
is not uncommon to read that Gary Snyder was the first Buddhist 
anarchist, a view that despite being popular does no justice to the 
longer history of Buddhist anarchism.2 Although Snyder is likely 
to have been the first to have used the term ‘Buddhist anarchism,’ 
in his homonymous 1961 essay (he is certainly the first one to use 
the term in English), the first self-identified Buddhist anarchists are 
to be found in the turbulent histories of early 20th century Japan, 
Korea and China. Buddhist anarchism first emerged as a Buddhist 
response to colonial domination (Korea), industrialization, war 
and the totalitarian state (Japan) and the various authoritarian 
regimes that followed the fall of the Qing dynasty (China).3 Many 
participants in the North American Counterculture had an inter-
est in both Buddhism and anarchism, but they were largely obliv-
ious to the fact that the two traditions had already been brought 
together in Asia.
Snyder’s rhetoric of “[t]he mercy of the West [being] social rev-
olution” and “the mercy of the East [being] individual insight into 
the basic self / void,” hints that not only he is setting himself up 
as a pioneer by merging the two “mercies” but also that the West 
lacks “insight” and the East “social revolution”.4 Although Snyder 
has long moved away from this orientalist discourse, some of the 
problematic aspects of his Buddhist anarchism still haunt many of 
the representations of Buddhist anarchism in the West. Although 
Zen is certainly not incompatible with anarchism (in fact one 
of the first self-identified Buddhist anarchists was the Japanese 
Soto Zen monk Uchiyama Gudo, 1874–1911), the way in which 
Zen and anarchism have been combined in the West often lacks 
a thorough critique of Buddhist power, historical awareness and 
the willingness to confront authoritarian aspects within the Zen 
tradition.5 Furthermore, Suzuki’s conception of “pure Zen”, still 
popularly accepted in most Western countries, as a “rational” 
practice completely devoid of rituals, doctrine or philosophy, is 
not only “ahistorical [and] formless”; it is also crafted in a politi-
cal context that is far from libertarian.6 Suzuki’s “pure Zen” is an 
attempt to marry Zen exceptionalism to state-sponsored Japanese 
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nationalism and to offer “an exceptional gift of the Japanese peo-
ple to the world”, especially to an ailing West, “overtly determined 
by its rationalistic materialism”.7
Although Suzuki’s Zen is a perfectly valid formulation within 
the Zen tradition, to claim that all historical manifestations of Zen 
are ‘pure Zen’ or that Zen is the most rational form of Buddhism 
and therefore the one closest to radical thinking, is  problematic. 
At best such a claim is a misguided bow to Zen narratives of 
self-legitimation and at worst a colonial ordering of Buddhist 
traditions according to European criteria and needs, which mir-
rors the British discovery of Buddhism in the 19th century.8 The 
discovery and construction of (Theravada) Buddhism by early 
British orientalists reflects an analogous pattern to the modern 
construction of Zen in so far as it tries to identify a “pure” and 
“original” Buddhism that is palatable for the rational ethos of the 
post-enlightenment. By stripping this “original” Buddhism from 
“irrational” and “religious” elements, Buddhism is rendered ab-
stract, philosophical and ahistorical, thus fulfilling the needs of a 
certain European consumer.
The aim of this chapter is to propose an alternative pathway 
for Buddhist anarchism based on a radically different Buddhist 
formulation, that of Shinran Shonin (1173–1263). Shinran’s 
thought can arguably contribute to contemporary Buddhist 
anarchism some of the elements that it seems to be lacking: a 
self-critique that is not devoid of social criticism, a deconstruc-
tion of Buddhist power and some form of historical awareness. 
For this purpose, I will first outline some of the anti-authori-
tarian traits in Shinran’s writings, which have so far not been 
read from an explicitly anarchist angle. Then I will look close-
ly at Shinran’s critical view of humanity and human relations 
through his concept of mappo, drawing out the egalitarian and 
subversive implications of Buddhist eschatology. In so doing I 
show how Shinran’s radical re-reading of the Buddhist canon, 
and the self-understanding it yields, bring into question some 
important narratives that legitimize and construct the estab-
lished, politico-religious order. Finally, I explore the ethical and 
political implications of Shinran’s actions, assessing what Jodo 
Shinshu (i.e. Shinran’s Buddhism) can contribute, not just to 
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the deconstruction, but also to the articulation of a Buddhist 
 anarchist project.9
2. Rebellion Beyond Zen: Shinran’s Buddhism
The most significant and central feature of Shinran’s thought is 
the logic of tariki, often translated as other-power.10 Whereas in 
most Buddhist traditions, including Zen, the individual is meant to 
strive through some form of disciplined practice regime in order to 
reach a given soteriological goal, Shinran formulated a Buddhism 
based on a radical negation of self-effort and self-reliance as a 
means to insight. In fact he harmonized means and ends by argu-
ing that if the end (becoming a Buddha) is a state of naturalness 
and spontaneity (Jp. jinen, Ch. ziran) the means (the path towards 
Buddhahood) must also reflect and be guided by those qualities. 
Shinran’s formulation of tariki represented a significant departure 
from the more conventional and established forms of Buddhism 
and, consequently, had important social implications. Shinran 
lived during the turbulent Kamakura period (1185–1333), at a 
time when other Japanese Buddhist ‘reformers’, such as Shinran’s 
own teacher, Honen (1133–1212), as well as Dogen (pioneer of 
Japanese Soto Zen, 1200–1253) or Nichiren (1222–1282), were 
often critical of the established socio-religious order and substan-
tially reformulated existing ideas about Buddhist practice, social 
relations and hierarchy. In order to explore the anarchic potential 
of Shinran’s thought I will first discuss how Zen has been (mis)
construed as the most anarchist of Buddhisms.
Paraphrasing Christmas Humphreys and John Clark, Peter 
Marshall refers to Zen as “the apotheosis of Buddhism” and the 
Buddhism that “developed its libertarian potential to the fullest”.11 
The libertarian thrust of Zen lies in its iconoclastic statements and 
the often playful, absurdist and rhizomatic dynamics that animate 
many of the narratives of the Zen lore.12 However, most Zen an-
archists or anarchists with Zen Buddhist sympathies present Zen 
in an ahistorical, uncritical and decontextualized fashion, some-
times enshrining meditation as an inherently revolutionary tool 
for social change.13 The self-legitimizing discourse of Zen is also 
often taken at face value leaving unquestioned the histories of the 
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Zen tradition and institutions in a context of competition with 
other Buddhist schools and discourses.14 The lack of self-criticism 
and the adoption of an absolutist Zen discourse renders these at-
tempts at formulating a Buddhist anarchism self-referential and 
unconvincing.
Thus, formulations of Zen anarchism, such as Max Cafard’s 
(a.k.a. John Clark) Zen Anarchy or Kerry Thornley’s Zenarchy 
often present Zen as being “more anarchic than anarchism” or 
“hold Universal Enlightenment a prerequisite to abolition of the 
state”.15 The complete identification of Zen and anarchism leads 
to a dismissal of authoritarian elements in the Zen tradition, 
which are either ignored or explained away by using Zen’s own 
self-legitimating narratives. An example of this tendency can 
be found not only among Zen anarchists but also in Marshall, 
who presents Zen’s disciplinary regime of practice in a mildly 
sympathetic fashion by using much of Zen’s own discourse. The 
authority of the teacher is justified because students need some-
one “to help them break out of their everyday perceptions and 
intellectual habits”.16 Analogously, the strict discipline of Zen 
monasteries, including the ritual of using the keisaku for hitting 
the shoulder, is presented as “ways of shaking people out of their 
habitual way of seeing” and as a method to “develop the pupil’s 
character from within and increase his or her moral sense”.17 
Although Marshall acknowledges that these forms of authori-
ty and externally half-imposed, half-consented discipline are 
“aimed at creating self-disciplined freedom, not dependence on 
masters” he does not question the seeming dissonance between 
means and ends.18 Many of these formulations take as premise 
the anarchic nature of Zen, which if left unquestioned result in 
celebratory discourses that lack a reflective and critical self-as-
sessment. Whereas the Zen tradition does not lack elements of 
self-reflection and self-deconstruction, it is true that those ele-
ments are very rarely engaged with in Western Zen anarchist 
writings. Hence, Shinran’s understanding of Buddhism through 
the logic of tariki and the self-critical awareness it yields, can 
contribute a thorough critique of Buddhist histories of power, 
which is essential to any Buddhist anarchism. In order to make 
Shinran’s anarchic potential explicit I now turn to outline the 
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antiauthoritarian implications of tariki in the context of the Pure 
Land tradition.
3. The Liberative Promise of Tariki
An important task in the formulation of any Buddhist anarchism 
is to examine the social relations that a given set of Buddhist ideas 
 inspires or produces. The fact that most Buddhist institutions 
throughout history have tended to mimic and adopt the authoritari-
an patterns present in their societies does not mean that all formula-
tions of the Buddhist teachings automatically lead towards oppres-
sive social formations. Moreover, institutionalization is unequally 
regarded in the various Buddhist traditions; it might be seen as an 
essential and necessary feature enshrined as part of the doctrine (e.g. 
the role of the teacher in Tantric Buddhism) or it might be concep-
tualized as a historical and situational development that is somehow 
useful but also contingent (e.g. the institutions claiming to preserve 
Shinran’s legacy), with a broad range of positions in between.19 
Any Buddhist anarchism would favour more decentralized forms 
of organization that do not consider social hierarchy as a requisite 
for Buddhist practice. Arguably, the teachings of Shinran or Jodo 
Shinshu lean towards the more libertarian side, despite being used, 
after his death, to create highly hierarchical and rigid systems of au-
thority.20 In his radical reformulation of Buddhist doctrine Shinran 
demolishes many of the premises that legitimated the Buddhist au-
thorities and hierarchies of his time. The debunking of established 
Buddhist rituals, moral and meditative disciplines and the monastic 
regime is accomplished through the logic of tariki.
The tariki principle involves, in Shinran’s own words, “entrust-
ing ourselves to the Primal Vow and our birth becoming firm-
ly settled; hence it is altogether without one’s working”.21 The 
“Primal Vow” refers to the 18th among Dharmakara Bodhisattva’s 
48 vows, who promised not to attain enlightenment (and there-
fore become Amida Buddha) unless all beings could be born in 
his Pure Land by simply calling his name with a trusting mind. 
“Birth”, the soteriological goal of Shinran’s Buddhism, is thus ac-
complished by trusting the Buddha’s vow and not through the 
practitioners “own working”, that is her or his efforts, designs or 
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meritorious practice. The practical implication of this principle is 
a cancellation of the polarity of good and evil: “on one hand, you 
should not be anxious that Tathagata [Amida Buddha] will not 
receive you because you do wrong […] On the other hand you 
should not think that you deserve to attain birth because you are 
good”.22 The irrelevance of moral or spiritual abilities for attain-
ing the soteriological goal renders the institutions, disciplinary re-
gimes and authority figures that act as guiding examples of moral 
or spiritual accomplishment also irrelevant. In fact, Shinran does 
not stop at considering good and evil people equal in regards to 
realizing entrusting to the vow, but goes as far as enshrining the 
evil person, as the true object of the Buddha’s promise: “Amida 
made the Vow, the essential intent of which is the evil person’s 
attainment of Buddhahood”.23
In this way, Shinran does not only transcend the established 
Buddhist morality but also subverts its implicit hierarchy, arguing 
that the “good” person is likely to rely on her or his own abilities 
to achieve Buddhahood and therefore is less likely to entrust to 
the vow, whereas “evil” people are more receptive to the vow since 
they are more aware of their limitations. In this new framework 
the notions of good and evil are relativized and redefined, affect-
ing the social relations based on their polarity. “Good” people are 
those who think of themselves as good and do not realize their 
“evilness”. The logic of Amida’s vow makes both good and evil 
contingent, rendering the authority figures associated with good 
unnecessary and preventing a clear-cut hierarchy based on the de-
liberate cultivation of good acts or states of mind. Therefore, hi-
erarchical institutions devised for the purpose of cultivating good 
and avoiding evil (e.g. the monastic community) can also be made 
redundant. Although new institutions could be created to promote 
“entrusting to the Primal Vow”, such institutions can never be 
said to mediate or cultivate the experience of entrusting. Shinran’s 
strong emphasis on tariki characterizes entrusting or shinjin as 
spontaneous experience that cannot be achieved through practice, 
therefore any religious institution is rendered contingent.
The traditional authority of the master over the disciples is also 
redefined if not dissolved altogether. Though Shinran regarded 
Honen as his master, and the presence of Amida in the world, he 
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claims to have not had “even a single disciple”. There were many 
who looked up to Shinran as an example to follow, but Shinran’s 
logic is based on his understanding of tariki: “if I brought peo-
ple to say the nembutsu [Amida’s name] through my own efforts, 
then they might be my disciples. But it is indeed preposterous to 
call persons ‘my disciples’ when they say the nembutsu having 
received the working of Amida”.24 Consequently, Shinran regards 
the idea that “going against a teacher” mars one’s path to enlight-
enment as both “arrogant” and “absurd”.25 Students and teach-
ers meet and part because of their conditions and conditionings 
(in Sanskrit: karma), and gratitude is a spontaneous feeling, not 
something to be cultivated by the student or to be used as a form 
of controlling mechanism on the part of the teacher. By shifting 
the focus to an individual relationship between the practitioner 
and the Buddha, the traditional disciplinary regime of Buddhist 
practice is dismantled and translated to a subjective and personal 
realm, which does not necessitate social relationships of authority. 
Shinran preserves some of those relationships (e.g. his regard for 
his teacher and leadership before his students, his loose monastic 
identity) in a symbolic way but their original hierarchical content 
is emptied or radically redefined.
Shinran’s ideas are a development within Pure Land Buddhism, 
a stream of Buddhism focused on the goal of birth in the Pure Land 
of Amida Buddha, the realm of effortless enlightenment, through 
a variety of devotional and often non-monastic, non-meditative 
practices. Unlike other forms of Buddhism, which prescribe med-
itative exercises and a monastic lifestyle in order to achieve the 
Buddha’s enlightenment in this life, Pure Land Buddhism aims to 
create the necessary conditions for emerging in a realm where en-
lightenment will naturally happen after death. However, as I will 
argue later, the transcendent/inherent nature of the Pure Land as 
a post-mortem/this life realm varies greatly in different Pure Land 
Buddhist contexts. Pure Land Buddhism originated in India and 
later developed in various ways in China, Tibet, Korea, Vietnam 
and Japan. Pure Land Buddhism was first organized as a separate 
tradition or school in 13th century Japan, through Honen’s move-
ment and the many lineages established by his disciples. However, 
Pure Land practices and ideas pervade Mahayana Buddhism in all 
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its manifestations across South, Central and East Asia. The Pure 
Land movement represented a simplification of Buddhist practice, 
making its eventual goal accessible for lay people who had no 
time for meditation or a contemplative lifestyle. It is based on the 
idea that everybody can be reborn in Amida’s Pure Land (under-
stood differently across the Buddhist world but generally equated 
with Buddhahood or the effortless attainment of Buddhahood) 
by doing a variety of relatively simple practices that differ slightly 
depending on historical and geographical setting, but that all have 
in common the recitation of the Buddha’s name (in Japanese: nen-
butsu). This practice is based on the story of the Buddha Amida 
who promised to bring all beings to his realm if they call the 
Buddha’s name and aspire to be born in the Pure Land.
However, the Buddha’s vow and his joyous realm have been 
interpreted in myriad ways across the Buddhist world, from sym-
bolic interpretations that equate the Pure Land with enlightenment 
and refer to it as the practitioner’s pure mind (Zen) to readings 
of the Pure Land as a realm reached fully only after death (com-
mon among most Pure Land Buddhists) or as a visionary display 
that can be accessed through meditation (Tibetan and Chinese Pure 
Land meditative-visionary traditions).26 Analogously, within Pure 
Land Buddhism, interpretations of the practical implications of the 
Buddha’s vow range from the requirement to adhere to (monastic 
or lay) precepts and arduously engage in constant recitation of the 
nenbutsu up to the crucial moment of death (most Chinese and 
some Japanese traditions) to an emphasis on the mind that calls the 
nenbutsu and understands recitation as an expression of mindful-
ness or gratitude towards the Budhha (Shinran).
Over and above being central to Pure Land Buddhists, the Pure 
Land narrative also pervades all forms of Mahayana Buddhism. 
It can be said to be a Buddhist utopia or ideal world, as it rep-
resents the social application of the Buddha’s insight. In so far as it 
stands for the world that unfolds from a Buddha’s enlightenment 
it expresses the Buddhist virtues of compassionate detachment, 
equality and all-inclusiveness and, consequently, has a history of 
being construed as heterotopia, an alternative social order.27 The 
Pure Land of Amida Buddha is sometimes described in the Sutras 
in ways that lend themselves to a radical egalitarian reading. As a 
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realm of egolessness, all beings share in the same qualities and 
have only nominal status, their wishes are fulfilled and their needs 
are met.28 Also, the absence of greed, hatred and ignorance in-
volves the lack of property or possession, violence, war and, in-
deed, government.29 Though the Buddha is often referred to as the 
lord or king of the land, he does not seem to rule it in any way 
and appears more as a primus inter pares in a society of Buddhas. 
Neither the sutras nor Shinran elaborate on the Pure Land in the 
explicitly political way described above, however, the latent anti-
authoritarian potential of the Pure Land narrative can contribute 
a utopian referent to any Buddhist anarchist imagination.
Though never overtly political, Shinran’s reading of the Pure 
Land is not devoid of social implications. Emphasizing compassion, 
the Pure Land is not seen as the ultimate destiny of the practitioner, 
but as a transformative stage leading to his or her return to the 
realm of suffering to liberate all beings. Thus, the world ought to 
be first escaped, but only for the purpose of being later revisited 
and transformed. Shinran’s spacio-temporal conception of the Pure 
Land is a complex and debated matter within Jodo Shinshu which 
falls beyond the scope of this chapter. Suffice to say that interpreta-
tions of Shinran’s thought range from an otherworldly Pure Land 
located in a mythical West and reached only after death to an im-
manent Pure Land that interpenetrates, irrupts and transforms our 
world.30 This diversity of readings is enabled by Shinran’s reluc-
tance to accept there were living Buddhas among his fellow humans 
but also his certainty that “There is no need to wait in anticipation 
for the moment of death, [since] at the time shinjin [entrusting] be-
comes settled, birth too becomes settled”.31 This means, paradoxi-
cally, that the person who entrusts in the Buddha’s vow is “equal to 
Tathagatas” and “is in the rank of succession to Buddhahood” and 
yet they remain “foolish beings possessed of blind passions”.32 This 
double awareness (in Japanese: nishu jinshin, literally “two kinds of 
deep confidence”), involving both assurance and self-criticism, con-
stitutes the structure of liberative entrusting, rendered in Shinran’s 
writings as shinjin (true or trusting mind) or anjin (peaceful mind).
Shinjin plays a key role in Shinran’s thought, as the expression 
of realization of the Buddha’s vow which assures the practitioner 
unfailing enlightenment. It is the mind of shinjin what makes 
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nenbutsu, or the calling of the name, effective, as it accomplishes 
birth in the Pure Land. Thus, Shinran deemphasizes any inherent 
magical power in the name (Namu Amida Butsu, as pronounced 
in Japanese) and focuses on the mind that leads one to recite the 
name. This is a mind that understands the paradoxical nature of 
the human condition (both steeped in defilement and assured of 
enlightenment) and expresses itself by the verbal act of entrusting 
in the Buddha. Most importantly, this is not a mind that could be 
cultivated or brought about through a prescribed method, it is a 
mind that comes about through tariki or jinen (naturalness, spon-
taneity).33 In this way the practitioner is liberated from a strict 
regime of practice, in which the only requirement is the sponta-
neous recitation of the name, understood not as the practitioner’s 
but as the Buddha’s practice. This approach to practice reflects the 
naturalness or spontaneity of the Pure Land, implicitly modelling 
the lifestyle of the person of shinjin in the free and effortless life 
of the Pure Land. When translated to the discourse of anarchism 
this mirroring offers an example of prefiguration or harmonizing 
means and ends. The duality running through Shinran’s thought 
enables this awareness to be at once (self-)critical and (self-)confi-
dent, providing a valuable model for any utopian project.
Furthermore, the centrality of spontaneous tariki, and the absence 
of anxiety about “performing good acts” or “despair[ing] of the evil 
they commit” allows the practitioners to act with a large degree of 
freedom.34 The ethics emerging out of this logic can be neither le-
galistic nor finalist, since the violation of any given code represents 
no hindrance and there is no goal that has not been accomplished 
in the mind of entrusting.35 Not surprisingly, the open-ended for-
mulation of ethical behavior became a highly controversial issue in 
the early Jodo Shinshu communities, who often used this new dis-
covered freedom in ways that transgressed conventional moralities. 
Although Shinran admonished his followers against “excusing acts 
that should not be committed, words that should not be said and 
thoughts that should not be harbored” he never mentions what those 
acts might be.36 Similarly, he does not regard any bad deed as pow-
erful enough to outdo the liberating effectiveness of the Buddha’s 
vow and considers wrongdoing the norm among “foolish beings 
possessed of blind passions”.37 Paradoxically again, Shinran’s vision 
Why Anarchists Like Zen? A Libertarian Reading of Shinran (1173–1263) 89
of human defilement and radical evil enables, in Fabio Rambelli’s 
words, “radical Amidists […] to offer an alternative vision –an 
 essentially egalitarian one”.38 Although Rambelli does not consid-
er Shinran a “radical Amidist” per se he acknowledges him as an 
intellectual bridge that enables subversive Pure Land Buddhists to 
deconstruct and mock the established politico-religious order.39
Consequently, Galen Amstutz calls Shinran “one of the most 
shrewdly and profoundly rebellious individuals in East Asian his-
tory” since his reinterpretation of Buddhist doctrine issues “a chal-
lenge to the mythos of monastic Buddhism and its authority”.40 
This is accomplished largely through tariki, which posits a pri-
mordial, enlightened agent (the Amida Buddha) who acts directly 
on the practitioner without mediation or validation from religious 
authorities. In this way, by regarding the Buddha as the primor-
dial and ultimate agent, the practitioner becomes, in a complex 
and paradoxical manner, empowered as one assured of enlighten-
ment, freed from religious institutions and disciplines but deeply 
indebted to the Buddha. By entrusting practitioners’ autonomy 
over practices that involve training, skill and learning, the social 
framework of Buddhist practice can be dismantled or radically 
redefined, since there is no need for spiritual hierarchy. However, 
a flexible conscience ordered according to Buddhist sensibilities is 
not altogether absent, though shifted to the individual’s subjective 
sphere, as I will discuss in the fourth section of this chapter. The 
libertarian implications of this peculiarly Shinranian notion offer 
a paradigm of Buddhist individuality and freedom that can be 
developed in an anarchist direction as a basis for self-reliance and 
non-conformity. Nonetheless, tariki is embedded and needs to be 
seen within the narrative of mappo, the degenerate last days of 
the Buddhist teaching (dharma) in which beings are incapable of 
being morally good or accomplishing Buddhist practices.
4. Egalitarian Hopelessness, Collective Transformation
Shinran’s revered teacher Honen (1133–1212) was a pioneer in 
advocating exclusive reliance on the nenbutsu as the only effective 
practice in the age of mappo.41 However, Honen was not guided 
by a teacher but by reading the Buddhist scriptures over and over, 
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eagerly seeking a path to enlightenment that could be available 
to all, not just the intellectual, moral, contemplative, economic or 
social elites. Honen was the first Buddhist in Japan to regard the 
Pure Land teaching as a doctrine that could stand on its own; its 
practices and motifs had always been part of larger systems or the 
chosen personal practice of certain individuals or small groups. 
Following his egalitarian concern Honen attracted people from 
all the social classes, who despite largely retaining their social po-
sitions were linked by a new religious consciousness that made no 
distinctions among them. Honen’s exclusive focus on an easy prac-
tice that was available to anyone is deeply rooted in the narrative 
of mappo, since it is in the latter days that beings need more than 
ever a simple means to Buddhahood. An idea rooted in Buddhist 
eschatology with distinctly negative teleological implications can 
be engaged for opening up an egalitarian and liberative horizon. 
As history moves away from the time the Buddha appeared in 
the world, beings also move away from the possibility of becom-
ing enlightened. It is this deeply relational notion of mappo that 
allows Shinran to challenge the political and Buddhist authori-
ties of his time, and to re-conceptualize all sentient beings in a 
horizontal relationship to each other in relation to the Buddha’s 
compassion. Horizontality is founded in interdependence among 
deluded beings and between beings and their times. If all beings 
are the product of their times and the times are corrupt, there 
is no room for positing a spiritual vanguard that transcends its 
zeitgeist. Rambelli further spells out the subversive possibilities 
of this idea:
There is no distinction between the enlightened, morally pure elites 
and their ignorant and corrupt subordinates: in the final period 
only evil, common folk exist. Those who think that they are better 
than others are actually worse than the worst criminals because 
while sinners are aware of being sinners, elites delude themselves 
by believing in their innate goodness […] Evil became the essential 
characteristic of all beings: the kenmitsu’s [established Buddhism] 
lowest are now the anthropological paradigm.42
Shinran’s conception of mappo is also intensely personal, and 
what is sometimes interpreted as a negative self-image is in fact 
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Shinran’s self-awareness of being a product of his time. The dis-
covery of the degenerate age is primarily existential in Shinran’s 
writings, and it expresses a given historical consciousness through 
personal insight. From a Buddhist philosophical standpoint, it is 
impossible to separate the subjects living in a given context and 
the context itself, since they both create each other. Thus, living 
in mappo is being mappo. Shinran discovers this reality in himself 
and declares: “This self is false and insincere; / I completely lack 
a pure mind”.43 Although most of the time Shinran expresses this 
critical awareness in relation to himself, he is not oblivious to the 
fact that others are equally a product of the corrupt times: “Each 
of us in outward bearing, /Makes a good show of being good, 
wise and dedicated / But so great are our greed, anger, perver-
sity and deceit / That we are filled with all forms of malice and 
cunning”.44 This severe perception of humanity complicates any 
attempt to claim religious or moral authority. Shinran undermines 
his own authority in an un-self-legitimizing way when he exposes 
his position as religious leader or teacher as a farce: “I am such 
that I do not know right and wrong / And cannot distinguish false 
and true, / I lack even small love and small compassion, / And yet, 
for fame and profit, enjoy teaching others”.45
Self-reflective statements such as this along with the tariki-in-
fused claim “I do not have a single disciple” further complicate 
Shinran’s identity as a teacher.46 However self-deprecatory his 
rhetorical self reveals itself to be at times, this perception did not 
stop Shinran from sharing his ideas and writing until the end of 
his life. Neither did it stop him from occasionally using his loose-
ly defined form of authority when he felt his message was com-
promised, sometimes in a hierarchical or authoritarian fashion.47 
Although the narrative of mappo can lead to a quietist acceptance 
of the established order, its highly relational nature also entails a 
subversive promise. The interdependent relation between beings 
and their times can be applied politically to yield a Buddhist, rela-
tional analysis of domination, which can be disrupted if the rela-
tional agents shift.48 Social relations are also reflections of the age 
and beings’ mindsets and so can be imagined to be governed by 
the same relational principles. Moreover, it should not be forgot-
ten that even in the dark latter days, even if traditional (and more 
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hierarchical) Buddhist disciplines are no longer available, the 
(horizontal) tariki way is still available to all. Therefore, the dys-
topian reality of mappo can be disrupted, exited or transformed.
Against the empty authorities of mappo, based on greed and 
deception, Shinran posits the community of those who have en-
trusted themselves to Amida, who are in a sense awake but who 
also remain entangled in the vicissitudes of their era. In a posthu-
mous biography Shinran is recorded renouncing again his teacher 
role because of its incompatibility with tariki and further arguing 
that “As we are all the disciples of the Tathagatha, all of us stand 
on a par as “fellow seekers [ondobo ondogyo]”.49 Ondobo ondo-
gyo, often rendered in English as “fellow practitioners”, “Dharma 
friends”, “fellow companions” or “fellow travelers”, is imagined 
by Shinran as a body of equals galvanized by a common purpose: 
that of journeying together towards the Pure Land. Though never 
developed in explicitly socio-political terms by Shinran, this hori-
zontal model can be said to fulfil a double purpose: to mirror the 
Pure Land, the realm where all beings are equal, and to offer a lib-
erative alternative to the hierarchical and corrupt world of map-
po. In this sense, ondobo ondogyo represents a prefiguration of 
ideal equality like the undisciplined and “natural” lifestyle of the 
entrusting person. The community of fellow practitioners exists 
in between a hierarchical world and an egalitarian ideal, a posi-
tion that could potentially turn them into a transformative agent. 
The egalitarian ideal of the Pure Land does not only provide a 
“principle of social criticism” but can also shape non-hierarchical 
formations in a hierarchical society.50
This model resembles, structurally, Shinran’s negotiation of the 
paradox of defilement and assurance as one of opposition but also 
of dialectic transformation. Thus, while practitioners remain “in 
this [defiled] world” their shinjin or entrusting heart is “equal to 
the hearts and minds of all Buddhas”.51 Assurance of enlighten-
ment presumes a transformative and liberative process that un-
folds with the awakening of shinjin, since “Through the benefit 
of the unhindered light [tariki], / We realize shinjin of vast, ma-
jestic virtues, / And the ice of our blind passions necessarily melts 
/ Immediately becoming the water of enlightenment”.52 Although 
the particular signs of this transformative process remain a 
Why Anarchists Like Zen? A Libertarian Reading of Shinran (1173–1263) 93
contested issue within Jodo Shinshu, it seems clear that Shinran’s 
view of mappo is not ultimately fatalistic as it entails the promise 
of liberation or transformation. Another phrase commonly used 
by Shinran to refer to assurance of Buddhahood is “the stage of 
no-retrogression” implying that people of shinjin are on a contin-
uous journey forward towards enlightenment.53 From a Buddhist 
anarchist perspective, the dialectic of self-criticism / transforma-
tive assurance offers a paradigm of critical progression that never 
stops questioning itself, as I will elaborate at length later.54
Furthermore, in social terms, ondobo ondogyo or the people 
of shinjin can become an embodied space of transformation and 
resistance to the empty hierarchies of mappo. The fellow practi-
tioner’s heart-minds are already beyond the control of both state 
and monastic authority, being equal with the Buddhas and hav-
ing received assurance of reaching the Pure Land. Consequently 
the actions flowing from such hearts, despite being often filtered 
and expressed through selfish delusion, can introduce a disruptive 
and spontaneous element within a network of hierarchical rela-
tionships. Gustav Landauer’s insight into the relational nature of 
the state is very relevant to this analysis, along with his idea that 
revolution comes from within and moves expansively outwards.55 
The same principle is expressed in the poetical formulation of the 
Spanish anarchist Buenaventura Durruti, who when asked about 
the ruins that a destructive revolution would leave behind replied: 
“Llevamos un mundo nuevo en nuestros corazones y ese mundo 
está creciendo en este instante” [We carry a new world in our 
hearts and that world is growing right now].56 Although the world 
in Durruti’s heart is different from the Pure Land, his utopian 
imagination runs parallel to Shinran’s imagining of the relation-
ship between the Pure Land and the person assured of birth in the 
Pure Land.
The strong relational quality that animates Shinran’s conception 
of mappo and the interplay between the realms of enlightenment 
and delusion has structural similarities to certain formulations of 
anarchist thought and if translated to the realm of politics can be 
read in an anti-authoritarian direction. Because of these features 
Shinran’s thought has the potential to contribute to Buddhist an-
archist discourses a model for a community of equals and some 
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form of blueprint for imagining the interaction between a dys-
topian consciousness and a utopian one. As confidence is ever 
coupled with severe self-criticism and an aspiration for ongoing 
transformation, any project modelled in Shinran’s thought ought 
to remain self-questioning and suspicious about its owns claims 
and authority. This critical spirit is an important element missing 
in many current Buddhist anarchist discourses. While not fully 
anarchist, Shinran’s political statements and social identity also 
contain many subversive elements that offer a number of inter-
pretive possibilities.
5. Neither Monk Nor Layman: An Ethic of Resistance?
In 1207 Honen’s exclusive nenbutsu movement was banned by 
the imperial court, at the request of the state-supporting and state- 
supported Buddhist institutions. In the banning petition against 
Honen and his followers, the established Buddhist orders argued 
not only over contentious points of doctrine but also warned of the 
undesirable social implications of letting the Pure Land movement 
grow unchecked. The popularity of Honen’s movement posed a 
threat to the status of the traditional schools, in terms of social and 
financial support from the laity, but it was also an implicit threat to 
the larger socio-political order.
Two of the accusations levelled against the Pure Land move-
ment concerned the imperial order (in)directly. The first involved 
setting up a new Buddhist school without imperial permission 
and the second charged the movement with being disrespectful 
or neglectful towards the kami, the native deities of Japan whose 
worship is intimately connected to the cult of the emperor57. These 
alleged crimes set a dangerous precedent: Buddhist institutions 
could exist without state control and might, directly or indirectly, 
challenge its authority.
A few members of the Pure Land movement were executed, 
and others like Shinran or Honen were exiled and / or disrobed. 
The ban and the diaspora it created seems to have strengthened 
the movement in two fundamental ways: on one hand, it allowed 
Honen’s ideas to spread to remote areas of Japan far from Kyoto, 
and on the other it reinforced the nonconformist attitudes of those 
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punished. As an exile stripped of his monastic status, Shinran found 
himself in an in-between position which he playfully appropriated 
through the term hiso hizoku (literally, neither monk nor layman). 
This term has been read in myriad ways by both sectarian and 
non-sectarian scholars; however, it seems unquestionable that the 
phrase denotes a gesture of resistance towards the state who dis-
robed him. By being hiso hizouku Shinran can be seen as denying 
both state and Buddhist authority. By claiming he is not a layman 
he resists the state’s forceful disrobement, while by claiming he is 
not a priest or monk he refuses to submit to the monastic commu-
nity and its hierarchy. Shinran’s self-proclaimed marginality thus 
becomes an exilic space, a space of resistance to various entangled 
and established orders.
The phrase hiso hizoku also appears in the postscript of the 
Kyogyoshinsho, Shinran’s opus magna, in which he openly criticizes 
the emperor and his ministers. In his (in)famous diatribe he accuses 
them of “acting against the dharma and violating human rectitude” 
when they become “enraged and embittered”.58 This dystopian por-
trayal of the political authorities resonates with the rhetoric of map-
po, which, needless to say, also applies to the rulers of the latter age 
(mappo). If the emperor and his ministers act against both Buddhist 
and Confucian principles, which are meant to legitimize their rule 
in the first place, how can they use those same principles to justify 
their rule? Shinran does not ask such a question directly, but his 
invective implicitly hints at the rulers’ hypocrisy. Even if Shinran 
does not develop this criticism to encompass all forms of political 
authority, his message seems to be that rulers can be challenged and 
held to certain standards. Furthermore, as Shinran finds in his rul-
ers the same “blind passions” and duplicity he finds in himself and 
others around him, the implicit legitimacy of the rulers as moral 
examples or superior beings is seriously compromised.
Despite Shinran’s relatively few explicit pronouncements about 
political issues, many scholars have explored the political implica-
tions of his message. Thus, the “shrewdly” and “rebellious” individ-
ual whom Amstutz sees using “the masks of technical interpretation 
and his own self-deprecation” Christopher Goto-Jones construes 
as “stretching way off the ‘permissive’ end of Shotoku’s political 
constitution” into some “kind of anarchism”.59 Shinran stretches 
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some of the more liberal aspects of the Japanese politico-religious 
tradition but he also sets himself apart from it by refusing to pres-
ent buppo (i.e. the Buddhist teaching) and obo (i.e. the law of the 
king) as necessary or inherently complementary. This separation is 
put forward in a letter in which Shinran’s disavows his son Jishin-bo 
for misrepresenting his ideas:
If you accept what Jishin-bo is saying –that I have instructed peo-
ple to spread the nembutsu by relying on outside people as power-
ful supporters, which I have never said- it will be an unmitigated 
error. […] You must not in any way design to spread the nembutsu 
by utilizing outside people for support. The spread of the nem-
butsu in that area must come about through the working of the 
revered Buddha.60
By refusing any kind of interference or help from “outside people” 
or “powerful supporters”, which referred to government officials, 
Shinran can be said to resist the cooptation of his community. 
However, by using the principle of tariki once again he disrupts 
an old Japanese concept: the mutual or necessary dependence be-
tween buppo and obo. The coupling of buppo and obo goes back 
to the introduction of Buddhism in Japan and served to provide 
a symbiotic relationship for state and Buddhist institutions. Thus, 
the monks protect the state through rituals and in turn the state 
protects them through naked power.61 This relationship enabled 
the rulers to be legitimized by Buddhist ideology and to be able 
to use that ideology to rule their subjects; on the other hand the 
Buddhist teachings were officially endorsed and spread by the 
rulers. Shinran explicitly challenges the logic of this model when 
refusing external support.62 Although he does not reject the idea 
that practicing the nenbutsu might benefit the nation in some 
sense, Shinran is firmly opposed to provide or receive the “bene-
fit” the state expected from Buddhist establishments.
The possibility of benefiting the nation, and others at large, is 
expressed in another letter to Shoshin-bo, a follower who was 
about to undergo litigation because of his involvement with 
Shinran’s movement. In it Shinran identifies as part of a persecut-
ed community, “people of the Pure Land nembutsu”, and shares 
his experience as an exile. Towards the end he also encourages the 
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community to say the nenbutsu “not with thoughts of themselves, 
but for the sake of the imperial court and for the sake of the 
people of the country”. He also recommends people whose shin-
jin is settled to say it “with the wish, ‘May there be peace in the 
world, and may the Buddha’s teaching spread’”.63 This fragment 
has been used to imply that Shinran paid homage to the emperor 
and implicitly endorsed the obo-buppo ideology.64 However, the 
wish for the teachings to spread and the saying of the nenbutsu 
“for the sake of the imperial court” are not explicitly connected 
in the letter. Moreover, saying the nenbutsu for the court is an act 
of ambiguous devotion. As much as it could signify a bow to the 
emperor’s authority, we should not forget that Shinran frequently 
encouraged his followers to say the nenbutsu for their enemies 
(e.g. those obstructing the nenbutsu).
Using a language that resembles that of his diatribe against the 
emperor and his minister, Shinran speaks of those authorities who 
persecuted his movement as “people lacking eyes” and “people 
lacking ears” because they “perform deeds that will bring about 
the suppression of the nembutsu and act out of malice toward 
people of the nembutsu”.65 Shinran’s advice on how to deal with 
nenbutsu opponents is thus articulated for his followers: “without 
bearing any ill toward such persons, you should keep in mind the 
thought that, saying the nembutsu, you are to help them”.66 The 
fact that Shinran encourages his followers to say the  nenbutsu for 
a given individual does not necessarily mean that homage is paid 
to that individual, as the second instance clearly shows. Far from 
paying respects or accepting the authority of “people lacking ears” 
and “people lacking eyes”, Shinran’s response is a clear gesture of 
resistance couched in the all-inclusive language of Buddhist com-
passion. The reference to the imperial court does not necessarily 
signify an implicit relationship of mutual dependence or cooper-
ation, but an expression of the Buddha’s compassion, which em-
braces friends and enemies alike.
By drawing this basic separation between buppo and obo, 
Shinran can be said to on one hand preempt the emergence of 
a Jodo Shinshu fundamentalist politics with aspirations to take 
over the state, and on the other resist state interference aimed at 
turning the religious teachings and community into a mechanism 
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of social control. Shinran’s refusal to entrust the spreading of his 
religious ideas to the state is also rooted and legitimated through 
the logic of tariki. Since no person can make or train another to 
entrust to Amida, how can anybody claim the role of spreading 
the teaching?
The logic of tariki does not only affect the relationship between 
the community and the state but Shinran’s self-perception and re-
lations within and across the religious community. In a manner 
that resembles the Buddha of the Kalama Sutta Shinran is record-
ed saying in the Tannisho: the “Vow of Amida […] was entirely for 
the sake of myself alone” and addressing his audience: “whether 
you take up and accept the nembutsu or whether you abandon 
it is for each of you to determine.”67 The first statement should 
not be read as an ontological assertion of Shinran’s specialness, 
but as an experiential appraisal of the individual experience of 
entrusting to the Buddha. Shinran can only speak for himself and 
therefore, as far as he is concerned, the vow is for himself alone. 
Although he shares the teaching and his interpretation of it with 
others he cannot speak for others or impose his beliefs on them. 
This non-coercive and individualistic approach further confirms 
why a coercive and homogenizing structure like the state could 
never be in charge of spreading or propagating the teaching.
A laissez-faire attitude towards divergence from his teachings 
is also observed in his letters, except when certain individuals 
claim Shinran’s authority while misrepresenting his message for 
their own purposes (e.g. his son Jishin-bo). This attitude of non- 
interference can be found in statements such as “I cannot accept 
what your fellow practicers are saying, but there is nothing to 
be done about it”.68 Shinran’s tone is more severe when he con-
demns slandering of parents, teachers or fellow-practicers, as in 
the case of Zenjo-bo from whom Shinran takes distance: “I had 
no close feelings for him and did not encourage him to come and 
see me”.69 In other letters, Shinran advises his followers to “keep 
a respectful distance and not become familiar with those given to 
wrongdoing”.70 Although this can be read as an informal kind of 
excommunication, Shinran systematically refused to take back 
the sacred objects given to his followers (the very procedure that 
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signifies excommunication in Japanese Buddhist communities) 
denying that he has any power over the objects or the students.71
It is impossible to determine the exact power relations at work 
in the many disputes that took place in Shinran’s community, 
however there seems to be a difference in the way he deals with 
difference of opinion in doctrinal matters and the way he address-
es aggressive or deceitful behaviour that compromised Shinran or 
disrupted the community. Furthermore, the advice to not become 
familiar with “wrongdoers” ambiguously reads in context both 
as an informal excommunication and as a refusal to impose his 
views on those antagonizing them.72 Among fellow practitioners, 
the slander of the three treasures (teacher –freely used to refer to 
Honen, Shinran or the Buddha– the teachings and the community 
of fellow practitioners) is likely to have been regarded as express-
ing the wish to leave the community and Shinran’s “respectful dis-
tance” can thus be read as a tacit acknowledgment of that wish. In 
any case, the correspondence recording these disputes never goes 
into detail as to what specific acts or words entailed “slander” or 
were deemed beyond the pale.
Shinran is at his most severe when he disowns his son, who had 
been claiming his father’s authority to seemingly create his own 
power base in the Eastern provinces. In this case, Shinran resorts 
to his social authority as a father, rather than his loosely defined 
authority as a teacher, to curtail his son’s attempt to speak on his 
behalf. However, neither in Jishin-bo’s case nor in the other in-
stances that involve conflict, Shinran issues any form of spiritual 
condemnation. No pronouncement is made about his opponents’ 
future destiny, although he at times rationalizes their behaviour 
in the following manner: “such thoughts arise because they fail 
to entrust themselves to the Buddha dharma”.73 Ultimately, how-
ever, Shinran seems to regard relations with his loosely defined 
followers as ruled by karmic conditions, which escape both the 
student and the teacher’s conscious will: “We come together when 
conditions bring us to meet and part when conditions separate 
us. In spite of this, some assert that those who say the nembutsu 
having turned from one teacher to another cannot attain birth. 
This is absurd”.74
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An analogous use of the tariki logic for deconstructing social 
relationships of authority and obedience can be found in the thir-
teenth chapter of Tannisho, in which Shinran first assumes the 
mask of authoritarianism to later debunk it by offering a radical 
critique of obedience. The chapter opens with an unusual request 
of obedience from Shinran to Yuien-bo: “Yuien-bo, do you accept 
all that I say? […] Then you will not deviate from whatever I tell 
you?” -Yuien-bo swiftly promises to comply.75 However, the un-
usual request for obedience is followed by a further bizarre com-
mand: “Now, I want you to kill a thousand people. If you do, you 
will definitely attain birth”.76 Yuien-bo’s response is again swift, 
but negative: “Though you instruct me thus, I’m afraid it is not in 
my power to kill even one person”.77 To which Shinran ironically 
retorts: “Then why did you say that you would follow whatever 
I told you?”78 Shinran then elaborates on how hard it is to act 
according to our wishes, since we are often at the mercy of our 
karmic histories, and how the “good” or “evil” in our hearts has 
no weight in our attainment of birth in the Pure Land. In this way, 
not only “good” and “evil” are once again relativized when seen 
from the all-inclusive and non-discriminating compassion of the 
Buddha, but the very possibility of obedience (whether to one’s 
own will or to another’s) is revealed to be an illusion.
By adopting the mask of authoritarianism Shinran demon-
strates the absurdity of obedience and implicitly sets a prece-
dent for questioning authority. As his own unreasonable request 
shows, the fact that we respect or agree with certain people does 
not mean that we should or could blindly follow their instruc-
tions.79 Although the focus of Shinran’s argument is our inability 
to act coherently and, consequently, how no behavioural require-
ments (including social or religious compliance) should be add-
ed to shinjin, the implication of his exchange with Yuien-bo also 
implies that compliance is both irrelevant and irrational. Even 
though this brief exchange needs to be understood as part of a 
Buddhist polemic, it offers a paradigm and logic of nonconfor-
mity that can be engaged in a subversive manner. However, by 
making obedience illusory and not just irrelevant or unnatural, 
Shinran implicitly equates deliberate conformity and conscious 
nonconformity as absurd designs. In other words, one might 
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argue that obedience is an illusion but complying with it while be-
ing aware of its illusory nature does not present a problem. Seeing 
the absurdity of authority does not necessarily involve rebellion, 
as one might choose to cynically or playfully comply with it. After 
all, obedience is deconstructed along with free will or the ability 
to act according to our wishes and, since we are prisoners of our 
karmic histories, neither rebellion nor compliance are really our 
choice.80 Thus, whereas Shinran’s playful debunking of his own 
authority could be interpreted in an antiauthoritarian direction, 
it can also be used for justifying an ironic and self-aware form of 
compliance.81
In fact, this problem has long haunted the political history 
of Buddhism and the formulation of any kind of Buddhist an-
archism. The relativistic character of most Buddhist thought, in-
cluding Jodo Shinshu, can produce a sort of cynical passivity that, 
despite being critical of government, also lets governments rule. 
The paradigmatic example of the Buddhist-influenced Daoist text 
Wu Nengzi (9th century) in China demonstrates how Buddhist 
relativity can lend itself to an ironic acceptance and collaboration 
with the government.82 Although there might be a critical and self- 
cynical element in collaborating with authority, such approach, far 
from destabilizing or disrupting that authority, ensures its smooth 
functioning. Suzuki (in)famously wrote about Zen, and Buddhism 
at large I would argue, can be “wedded to anarchism or fascism, 
communism or democracy”.83 The history of Jodo Shinshu cer-
tainly confirms that Suzuki’s statement also applies to the teach-
ings of Shinran, which have been interpreted from a broad range 
of ideological perspectives from socialism to liberalism and from 
Japanese imperial nationalism to eco-pacifism.84
To claim that Shinran is inherently anarchistic is as anachronis-
tic and misleading as claiming Zen philosophy and discourse as 
being “more anarchistic than anarchism”. However, Shinran, like 
Zen philosophy, can be read anarchically and provide a Buddhist 
foundation to an anarchist project. Furthermore, Shinran’s critical 
and historical awareness and his critique of both Buddhist and 
state authority can help contemporary Buddhist anarchisms to 
critically examine their own history and the history of Buddhism 
at large. Whether seen as reformist or revolutionary, Shinran’s 
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attempts to redefine his own authority in a decentralizing way, 
and his nonconformist attitude towards what he perceived as cor-
rupt secular and religious powers, can inspire a fruitful reflection 
about the social relations at work in Buddhist anarchist commu-
nities and their relationship to their larger societies. Moreover, 
as Buddhist anarchism grapples with its own relationship to the 
state, the history of Buddhists who wrestled with the state and 
kept a respectful but resistant distance can yield many poetical 
and political lessons. In these ways, the critical and rebellious side 
of Shinran can be extrapolated and re-engaged for resisting other 
and more recent practices of domination and oppression.
6. Concluding Thoughts
This discussion of the libertarian potential of Shinran fulfills a 
dual purpose: to reveal the more anarchistic aspects of Shinran’s 
teaching, using them for formulating a Jodo Shinshu Buddhist an-
archism; and to offer some of his insights as a counterbalance 
to the privileging of an orientalist and ahistorical conception of 
Zen in recent Buddhist anarchist rhetoric. Offering an alternative, 
though not necessarily incompatible, Buddhist foundation for 
forging a different Buddhist anarchism, could enable the Western 
Buddhist anarchist tradition to question its own assumptions and 
histories of power. Furthermore, Shinran’s emphasis on trust and 
devotional language destabilizes Buddhist anarchist orientalist 
imaginings of Buddhism as exclusively meditative, non-religious 
and, in a post-enlightenment sense, rational. However, a Shinran-
based anarchism shows how Buddhist anarchism need not be 
couched in the language of exceptionalism that regards Buddhism 
as “the religion of no-religion”.85
A clear example is the logic of tariki, which is grounded in 
Buddhist rationality and philosophy, but which sits awkwardly 
with a purely meditative Buddhism stripped of “religious” ele-
ments. Nonetheless, tariki frees up the Buddhist practitioner from 
traditional Buddhist regimes of practice, which often involved hi-
erarchical and disciplinary elements. Since the unmediated agency 
of the Amida Buddha acts directly on the practitioner it might be 
said to be a Buddhist “right of private judgment”, enabling the 
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practitioner to discern in relation to his or her experience of 
 tariki. As William Godwin’s work proves, the notion of a “private 
judgment” can be developed into a critique of state authority and 
authority at large. Also, tariki accomplishes the equalization of 
all beings, since in the last days of mappo no one can be said to 
not need the Buddha’s help. These parallel equalities, which offer 
complementary visions of entanglement and liberation, enable so-
cial criticism and can be engaged for militating against hierarchy. 
Most importantly, the notion of mappo has a strong relational fla-
vor that identifies the dark age with the dark minds of the  beings 
living through them, which are equally and mutually entangled in 
darkness. Thus, the relational awareness of being deeply involved 
in the oppressive realities of mappo can trigger the wish to rebel 
and transform.
If we were to apply Shinran’s insight into the ruler’s corrup-
tion, following the same historical logic that makes him imagine 
the nenbutsu as the most central and universal Buddhist practice 
and also the most appropriate for mappo, it could be argued that 
in the latter days’ hierarchy has become corrupting and ineffec-
tive and ought to give way to an alternative social paradigm. The 
alternative could be inspired in Shinran’s ondobo ondogyo, the 
community of fellow travelers, which resists hierarchical forma-
tions and the ethos of mappo. The horizontal social formation 
embodied in the equal discipleship to the Buddha can, thus, be 
construed, like the nenbutsu, as the most fundamental Buddhist 
social model and in the latter age of mappo, the only viable one. 
This model can add to the Buddhist anarchist project a focus on 
historical suitability and sensitivity, which does not need to be 
rooted in Buddhist eschatology, to balance the emphasis on the 
philosophical and ahistorical similarity between Buddhism and 
anarchism. Though Shinran’s view of history is rooted in Buddhist 
teleological narratives, his critical awareness of his zeitgeist and 
attention to historical context and suitability (rooted also in 
Buddhist ideas of causation) are helpful tools that can be translat-
ed to other conceptions of history.
The interaction between the age of mappo and the Pure Land 
is Shinran’s formulation of the basic Mahayana doctrine of the 
mutual dependence of samsara and nirvana, however it can also 
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be engaged for negotiating notions of dystopia and utopia in a po-
litical context. At the heart of the relationship between mappo and 
the Pure Land lies a concern about harmonizing means and ends. 
In so far as the corrupted self of mappo cannot affect liberation, 
any more than the state can orchestrate its own vanishing, release 
comes from a radically different realm and is expressed in actions 
that mimic or instantiate the utopian end. By decentralizing the 
Buddhist community and freeing it from traditional regimes of dis-
cipline, the Pure Land can be said to be prefigured in the age and 
world of mappo. However, such a prefigured community ought to 
remain extremely cautious about its own motives, as it is still un-
der the influence of mappo. The fact that Shinran sees both mappo 
and the Pure Land at work within himself introduces a critical 
element of self-questioning accompanied by self-confidence and 
assurance. This dual awareness provides a paradigm for articulat-
ing the interplay between a critical or dystopian consciousness and 
a hopeful or utopian one. Shinran’s complex notion of birth in the 
Pure Land, as something that is at once fully settled in the middle 
of ordinary life and also only entirely realized in the future, pres-
ents a living utopia that can irrupt and affect our present world 
while being ever deferred to the future. These dynamics offer a 
model of constant progression that can never look at itself in a 
self-satisfied manner, claiming to have achieved the final goal.
Furthermore, the temporal and simultaneous immanence and 
transcendence of birth in the Pure Land introduces a critical gap 
between the utopian ideal and the embryonic awareness that 
embodies it absent in formulations of Buddhist anarchism that 
see anarchy already fulfilled in the realm of Zen rhetoric or the 
practice of meditation. However, the main problem in Shinran’s 
thought is agency or, more precisely, a rebellious agency that can 
transform the dystopian realm of mappo. Such an agency is nev-
er articulated by Shinran, but his actions, which can be read as 
an extension of his teachings, show that neither the tariki logic 
nor the teleology of mappo, rendered him submissive or passive. 
Even though he calls into question his own ability to discern be-
tween good and evil, Shinran acts in accordance to his relative 
judgment, which at times includes vehemently contesting what 
he regarded as unacceptable behavior (e.g. the ban on nenbutsu). 
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Thus, Shinran’s example proves how an awareness of the ultimate 
relativity of morality does not involve a necessary bow to the es-
tablished order, but can also be used to challenge it and, arguably, 
transform it. In the same way that Shinran stands up against what 
he judges to be injustice, the Jodo Shinshu anarchist can use her or 
his relative judgment to articulate strategies of resistance.
Following the analogy of the Christian “right of private judg-
ment” the relative judgment of Shinran or the practitioner is 
informed or infused by the subjective experience of tariki. A sub-
versive agency ought to come about as an interplay of both the 
enlightened design of the Buddha and the relative and contingent 
design of the practitioner. Shinran’s actions can be said to pro-
vide an instance of that interplay of wills or agencies. Whereas his 
relationships reflect a freer and more decentralized spirit found-
ed in tariki, he also considers pragmatic implications and acts in 
relation to an implicit and culturally received moral sensibility. 
The particular content of this moral sensibility is not crucial to 
the formulation of a Shinran based anarchism as it belongs to the 
realm of provisional judgment, to which Shinran refuses to con-
fer any ultimate validity, and could be replaced or  reformulated. 
However, this interplay of agencies offers a model for trying to 
live in the spirit of an ideal world while having to deal with a 
dystopian one.
Most importantly, Shinran’s refusal to enter a symbiotic rela-
tionship with the state can trigger a Buddhist anarchist reassess-
ment of the long history of Buddhist cooptation and collaboration 
with the state, to which the Jodo Shinshu tradition is no exception. 
If Buddhism is not inherently authoritarian, its long history of en-
tanglement with government across the Buddhist world needs to 
be acknowledged and critically explored. In order to articulate a 
Buddhism that can be anarchist, it is essential to first understand 
how Buddhism has not, by and large, been anarchistic. Further, 
by exploring oppressive histories many instances of resistance can 
be discovered and creatively re-appropriated. Shinran’s historical 
awareness and his creative re-engagement of the Buddhist textual 
tradition extend an invitation to re-interpret and re-read. Such 
re-reading, which is understood as one of the Latin etymologies 
of the word religion (re-legere, literally read again), is central to 
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any Buddhist anarchism that aims to religiously re-read the world 
and itself. Thus Shinran contributes a thorough and critical mod-
el for re-reading Buddhist history, the Buddhist canon and the 
(Buddhist) readers themselves.
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Notes
1. Perhaps the best example of a Buddhist anarchist who did not 
rely (exclusively) on Zen ideas in order to construct his Anarcho-
Buddhism is that of the Chinese monk Taixu (1890–1947). Taixu’s 
main Buddhist practice was connected to the millenarian tradition 
of Maitreya and it shares many of the devotional aspects of Japanese 
Pure Land thinking discussed in this chapter. For a thorough discus-
sion of Taixu’s thought see Justin Ritzinger, Anarchy in the Pure Land: 
Tradition, Modernity, and the Reinvention of the Cult of Maitreya in 
Republican China (Ann Arbor, Michigan: ProQuest, 2010).
2. An example of the tendency to consider Gary Snyder the first 
Buddhist anarchist can be found in this blog entry by Ian Mayes, 
which constitutes one of the more articulate contemporary formu-
lations of Buddhist anarchism in the West: “Envisioning a Buddhist 
Anarchism” in The Implicit & Experiential Rantings of a Person 
(http://parenthesiseye.blogspot.co.uk/2011/11/envisioning-buddhist- 
anarchism.html, 2010)
3. Gary Snyder, “Buddhist Anarchism”, in Bureau of Public Secrets, 
(http://www.bopsecrets.org/CF/garysnyder.htm, 2002 [1961]).
4. Ibid.
5. An account of Gudo’s work and some of his manuscripts can be 
found in Fabio Rambelli. Zen Anarchism. The Egalitarian Dharma of 
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Uchiyama Gudo (Berkeley: Institute of Buddhist Studies, 2013). Also, 
instances of the tendency to present Zen as an inherently anarchist phi-
losophy separated from its history can be found in the writings of John 
Clark, Kerry Thornley, Brad Warner and to some extent Gary Snyder.
6. For Suzuki’s own account of the Zen tradition see Daisetz Suzuki, 
Zen and Japanese Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1993), pp. 3–18. Griffith Foulk, ‘Ritual in Japanese Zen Buddhism’, in 
Zen Ritual. Studies of Zen Buddhist Theory in Practice, ed. by Steven 
Heine and Dale Wright (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 36.
7. James Brown.“The Zen of Anarchy: Japanese Exceptionalism 
and the Anarchist Roots of the San Francisco Poetry Renaissance”. 
Religion and American Culture: A Journal of Interpretation, 19.2 
(Summer 2009) p. 214.
8. For a brief discussion of this historical tendency see Rachelle 
Scott, Nirvana for Sale. Buddhism, Wealth and the Contemporary 
Dharmakaya Temple in Contemporary Temple (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2009), pp. 8–11.
9. Shinran uses the term Jodo Shinshu (literally ‘the true Pure Land 
way’) to refer to his own doctrine, which in his view is a restate-
ment of what his teacher Honen taught. However, Shinran developed 
Honen’s thought and substantially reinterpreted and enriched it in a 
number of ways, as Alfred Bloom discusses at length in “Honen and 
Shinran: Loyalty and Independence”, in Shindharmanet (http://www.
shindharmanet.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/pdf/Bloom-Loyalty.
pdf, 2012). Throughout this chapter, I will be using the term Jodo 
Shinshu as synonymous with Shinran’s thought and not as referring 
to any specific institutional denomination.
10. To make clear that the term tariki, literally “other power”, is not 
meant to imply a power completely external to the individual but 
simply other to her or his conscious self, Mark Blum offers these sug-
gestions for the translation of the term: “Tariki, also called butsuriki 
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change” and ethics of moderation and mutuality. Sokunyo Ohtani 
Koshin. “Immesurable Light and Life -2008 New Year’s Message from 
the Monshu” in Manitoba Buddhist Temple. (http://www.manitoba 
buddhistchurch.org/blog_files/1cbf020d5e607cce8a4ce4a2c63b8c11– 
46.html).
85. The phrase, widely used to describe Buddhism in popular culture, 
can also be found in the title of Alan Watts’ Buddhism the Religion 
of No-Religion (Boston: Tuttle Publishing, 1999).
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Was the historical Jesus an anarchist? 
Anachronism, anarchism and the 
historical Jesus
Justin Meggitt
University of Cambridge, UK
The claim that Jesus was an anarchist has been made by a variety 
of individuals and movements throughout history. Although there 
have been significant differences in what has been meant, it is pos-
sible to determine the validity of such a judgement. Once initial 
questions about historicity, methodology, and definition have been 
addressed, it is apparent that there are a number of recurrent, dom-
inant, motifs within our earliest sources about the figure of Jesus 
that can legitimately be judged anarchist. The ‘Kingdom of God’ 
for example, a concept that pervades the earliest data, includes the 
active identification and critique of coercive relations of power, 
and the enactment of new, egalitarian and prefigurative modes of 
social life, as well as a reflexive, undetermined, and self-creative 
praxis. The pedagogy of the historical Jesus also appears to have 
been predominately prefigurative and non-coercive. Although the 
picture certainly is not uniform, and there are early motifs that can 
be judged authoritarian and hierarchical, claims that the historical 
Jesus was an anarchist are legitimate, defensible and valuable.
It is true that if we could follow the precepts of the Nazarene this 
would be a different world to live in. There would then be no 
murder and no war; no cheating and lying and profit-making. 
There would be neither slave nor master, and we should all live 
like brothers, in peace and harmony. There would be neither poor 
nor rich, neither crime nor prison, but that would not be what the 
church wants. It would be what the Anarchists want.1
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1. Preliminary issues
The claim that Jesus was an anarchist is one that has been made by 
a variety of individuals and movements since the term “anarchist” 
itself first began to be commonly used from the 1840s onwards.2 
Nietzsche,3 is probably amongst the most culturally significant 
to have given Jesus this label, though other prominent figures 
have made more or less the same claim, including Berdyaev,4 
Tolstoy,5 and Wilde,6 as have a host of lesser known figures. It has 
been most common amongst groups and networks that are overt 
in their espousal of some form of Christian anarchism, such as the 
Catholic Worker Movement,7 the Jesus Radicals,8 the Brotherhood 
Church,9 and the Union of the Spiritual Communities of Christ,10 
but could also be said to be implied in movements that have been 
identified as containing implicit anarchist characteristics, such as 
those associated with some forms of liberation theology11 and 
related contextual theologies.12 The anarchist potentiality of the 
historical Jesus was even recognised by classical anarchist think-
ers, most prominently Proudhon,13 but also, to varying degrees, 
Bakunin,14 Kropotkin,15 and Stirner.16
Of course, what exactly is meant when someone calls Jesus 
an “anarchist” is not self-evident and there is sometimes little, if 
anything, that such claims have in common. Authors assume a 
range of different interpretations of the figure of Jesus and also 
of anarchism itself in making their judgments. This paper is not a 
criticism of any such estimations of Jesus but rather an attempt to 
bring a little more clarity to the subject and to see if, historically 
speaking, there is any analytical value in talking in such a way 
about Jesus. More specifically, I would like to examine whether 
the historical Jesus can legitimately be called an anarchist.
By using the expression “the historical Jesus” I am assuming a 
distinction, common in Biblical scholarship since the nineteenth 
century,17 between the historical figure of Jesus and the Christ of 
Christian faith, a distinction that assumes that the two are not 
necessarily the same (a distinction that not all the writers that 
might be labeled Christian anarchist would share). My concern is 
not whether the Christ of Christian faith, that believers claim is 
known from the Christian Bible, doctrine and experience was (or 
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indeed, for them, is) an anarchist but whether the man called Jesus 
of Nazareth, who lived and died about two thousand years ago, 
could usefully be called such.
I should also make it clear that I am specifically interested in 
whether Jesus can be called an “anarchist”. This is not neces-
sarily the same as saying that he simply had anti-authoritarian 
tendencies nor that he was a violent insurrectionist of some kind – 
something that received considerable attention some decades ago 
and which has recently been revived.18 Nor is it the same as decid-
ing that he was a “revolutionary” of some other kind, something 
that has been a particular interest in contemporary scholarship, 
especially amongst those concerned with trying to demonstrate 
that the historical Jesus was an “inclusive” figure of some sort.19 
Ideas about what might constitute “politics” have become increas-
ingly nuanced, under the influence of such things as postcolonial 
and gender theory,20 and the ideological contexts of both the his-
torical Jesus and New Testament scholars themselves have come 
under extensive scrutiny.21
However, before we can attempt to answer the question we 
have posed, there are a number of preliminary matters that 
need to be addressed. In asking whether the historical Jesus can 
be usefully labeled an anarchist I am conscious that many an-
archists may be familiar with material, academic and otherwise, 
which maintains that Jesus of Nazareth never existed,22 and they 
may think that my question is a pointless one to try to answer. 
Although no questions should be ignored in the critical study of 
religion, the arguments of those who doubt the existence of the 
historical Jesus are unpersuasive.23 None of the opponents of early 
Christianity, although they found numerous grounds for criticis-
ing the life and teaching of Jesus, doubted his existence,24 and, to 
put the matter concisely, the existence of Jesus of Nazareth is by 
far the most plausible way of explaining the traditions we have 
about a first-century, charismatic, Jewish peasant of that name. 
Traditions that, culturally speaking, cohere with what we know 
about the religious and cultural environment of Palestine at the 
time and which combine to form a picture of a specific and dis-
tinctive individual within it – not a banal and fanciful composite. 
Of course, these sources need to be handled with critical caution, 
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as they have been since the Enlightenment, as most are composed 
by followers of Jesus.25 However, this in itself is not surprising: 
the poor in the Roman empire – and pictures of Jesus from an-
tiquity are universal in placing him in this category26 – like the 
poor in most of history, had little and left less behind. Very few, 
mostly through accident rather than design, left anything, so thor-
oughgoing has been what E. P. Thompson called “the enormous 
condescension of posterity”.27 Jesus’ significance, to those other 
than his immediate followers, was only evident in retrospect and 
so we should not be surprised that there is little in the way of 
non-Christian documentary or literary evidence for this life and 
that our analysis will have to rely on extensive and diverse but 
largely Christian sources.28
However, having accepted that it is possible to talk about a his-
torical Jesus, how should we go about determining whether it is 
reasonable to label him an anarchist or not? The current litera-
ture that has touched on this is of little assistance. Many of those 
claiming that Jesus was an anarchist are often doing little more 
than constructing a mythology to give authority to a movement, 
as Woodcock has suggested.29 Some have arrived at their interpre-
tation of Jesus through a more critical, ostensibly historical ap-
proach to the sources; Tolstoy’s anti-supernaturalist reading of the 
gospels, which had no place for the miraculous “rotten apples”30 is 
perhaps the most famous example. However, there has been little 
systematic or coherent engagement with critical scholarship con-
cerned with the study of the historical Jesus and the problems it 
has tried to address, and most readings by those who want to label 
Jesus an anarchist are characterised by rather literalistic and her-
meneutically naive approaches to Biblical texts,31 as the analysis of 
Christoyannopoulos has recently demonstrated.32 The teachings 
of the historical Jesus are, for example, often assumed to be easily 
accessible. For some, this is just a matter of rescuing Jesus from 
Paul (and often, by implication, the later church), but however 
rhetorically appealing it is to many Christian anarchists for whom 
Paul can be a rather uncomfortable figure,33 this is not a defensible 
approach as Paul is the author of the earliest Christian literature 
that we possess and provides us with data about the historical 
Jesus, which, limited though it is, actually predates the gospels.34 
128 Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume 1
A number solve the conundrum by giving priority to the Sermon 
on the Mount (Matthew 5.3–7.27), seeing it as the authoritative 
epitome of Jesus’ teaching,35 but in so doing they ignore its re-
dactional character; it is, to a large extent, the construction of the 
author of the gospel in which it is found and cannot be said to 
go back to the historical Jesus.36 Even if the sermon is composed 
of elements that early Christians thought originated with Jesus, 
many of which are paralleled in the so-called Sermon on the Plain 
(Luke 6:20–49), and can also be seen in the epistle of James and 
the early Christian text, the Didache,37 there is much about its 
structure and content that clearly owes itself to the author of the 
Gospel of Matthew and those who brought together and trans-
mitted the sources from which he created his final text. Of course, 
there has been a handful of scholars who have been practitioners 
of critical biblical scholarship and who have also shown an inter-
est in Christian anarchism, most notably Vaage38 and Myers,39 but 
these are relatively few and, to date, there has been no critical and 
programmatic attempt to answer the question we have asked. In 
the light of this it is necessary to sketch, in a little detail, a valid 
 method for scrutinizing the sources we have for the historical Jesus 
that might provide us with some plausible results.
But before I do this, I should add some caveats about my own 
historical approach here. I am very conscious that in asking ques-
tions about the historical Jesus I might well be doing something 
that strikes some as epistemologically naive – even if a lot of peo-
ple do it – and I could be accused, along with others who engage 
one way or another with the “Quest”40 for the historical Jesus, of 
making oddly positivist assumptions about the nature of histori-
cal knowledge and how it can be arrived at.41 However, my aims 
are quite modest: I am not claiming to uncover the “real” Jesus,42 
nor even a useful one, but to make some provisional but, I hope, 
plausible suggestions about how this figure could be understood 
if examined in the light of the assumptions, aspirations, and prax-
is characteristic of anarchism. In asking this question I am not 
assuming anything about the significance of what follows or its 
implications: my interest in the historical Jesus is not in uncover-
ing a figure, or an aspect of a figure, that is somehow determina-
tive for Christians or anyone else. The shifting sands of historical 
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reconstruction are not really a very useful foundation for anything 
much that matters – though many biblical scholars enjoy their 
time in the sandpit and make quite remarkable claims about the 
ephemeral edifices that they fashion.43
Before I turn to the question of historical method it is also im-
portant to address an initial objection to the question this paper 
tries to answer, which might, in the eyes of some, like the ques-
tion of Jesus’ existence, prevent them proceeding any further: the 
problem of Jesus’ theism. I am conscious that it might be argued 
that the theism of the historical Jesus precludes him from being 
considered an anarchist. Most of the words or actions ascribed 
to him, in one way or another, either reference or are predicated 
upon belief in God.44 For example, the arrival of God’s rule and 
its implication for humans seems to have preoccupied him and is 
at the heart of whatever socio-political vision he may have had, as 
we shall see.45 However, it is not the case that anarchism necessar-
ily implies atheism. Atheism is central to many forms of classical 
anarchism. One need only think of Bakunin’s famous God and the 
State, Faure’s Les douze preuves de l’inexistence de dieu46 or the 
infamous anti-clerical massacres carried out by anarchist units in 
the Spanish Civil War.47 Such atheism is often predicated upon the 
need to reject the tyranny assumed to be inherent in the idea of 
an omnipotent God (powerfully expressed in Bakunin’s famous 
remark, “If God really existed, it would be necessary to abolish 
him”).48 However, it is also driven by the desire to oppose the 
oppression that is thought to result from the social consequences 
of belief in God, both that oppression caused by religious insti-
tutions themselves and the power that they exert, and also the 
oppression which results from the support such religious institu-
tions, in turn, provide to the state, the prime focus of the anarchist 
critique of exploitation (Bakunin famously called the state, “the 
Church’s younger brother”).49 Indeed, the apparent demise of 
religion – even if anarchism has often been rather premature in its 
claims about this – has been taken by some anarchists as evidence 
of the likely demise of the state:
The history of religion is a model for the history of government. 
Once it was thought impossible to have a society without God; 
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now God is dead. It is still thought impossible to have a society 
without the state; now we must destroy the state.50
The atheism of anarchism can be so intense as to spill over into 
misotheism, not just a denial of the existence of God but an active 
hatred of God.51 However, as the influential chronicler of anar-
chism, Peter Marshall has noted, “Anarchism is not necessarily 
atheistic any more than socialism is.”52 And it is clear from the ex-
istence of religious anarchists of various kinds, some of which we 
have already mentioned, that this is the case.53 However eccentric 
they might appear, religious anarchists are not normally consid-
ered outside the anarchist fold in studies of the field (unlike, for 
example, anarcho-capitalists54 or far-right national anarchists55). 
It would be, for example, an unusual history of anarchism that 
did not make at least some mention of Tolstoy or the Catholic 
Worker Movement.56 Therefore the theism of Jesus should not 
preclude him from being labelled an anarchist.
These observations aside, let us now turn to the question of 
historical method.
2. Constructing the historical Jesus
Until recently there was a general agreement on the historical 
method used by most of those studying the figure of Jesus.57 There 
was a rough consensus on the range of historical-critical tools that 
should be employed and the sources that were deemed relevant.58 
In addition, most scholars also agreed on the need to apply so-
called “criteria of authenticity” to the data in order to distinguish 
between “authentic” and “inauthentic” traditions about Jesus.59 
Five criteria were given particular weight in reconstructions: em-
barrassment, dissimilarity, multiple attestation, coherence and 
crucifiability, and these, explicitly or implicitly, have underpinned 
most of the critical studies of Jesus that have appeared in the last 
few decades.60 However, the field is now experiencing something 
of a crisis. Consensus on historical method has not produced 
agreement on the results61 and we have, instead, seen a prolifera-
tion of widely divergent reconstructions of the historical Jesus.62 
There is a growing recognition that, despite attempts to rectify 
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their weaknesses,63 some of which have long been noted,64 the 
criteria of authenticity are inadequate for the task, and should be 
abandoned. The discipline is now (or perhaps, once again) much 
more alert to the challenges posed by such things as memory65 
and has a greater awareness of the problems inherent in talking 
about “authenticity”. A recent essay by Dale Allison, a leading 
historical-Jesus scholar, in which he chronicled his own growing 
disillusionment with the way in which the subject has been ap-
proached, is emblematic of the current state of the field.66
My own position is similar to that at which Allison has recent-
ly arrived.67 There is much about Jesus that remains impossible 
to substantiate if we treat it with the same kind of scepticism that 
one would responsibly use if you were, for example, trying to es-
tablish the details of the life of other figures who were significant 
in antiquity, such as Socrates,68 Apollonius of Tyana,69 or Rabbi 
Akiva,70 and to say with any certainty what they may have said 
or done or what ideas that they might have had. Only a limited 
amount of information can be ascertained about the historical 
Jesus with anything approaching confidence, and that, for the 
most part, is of a general rather than specific kind. The significant 
creativity evident amongst those who first repeated and recorded 
traditions about Jesus, and the lack of evidence that the early 
Christians were discerning in their transmission of stories about 
him,71 makes such a position unavoidable. Most of the data we 
have about Jesus can only provide us with impressions of the 
man but these impressions are relatively trustworthy and reflect 
the enduring effect he had upon his earliest followers. They re-
main valid irrespective of the historicity of any particular unit of 
tradition, regardless of the abbreviation, elaboration, conflation, 
embellishment and fabrication evident within the sources.72 So, 
for example, as I have noted elsewhere, when we look at the rel-
evant texts:
The virtues that Jesus exhibited in the face of death, of both fore-
bearance and submission, and his refusal to return violence with 
violence, seem to have been recurring motifs in the pictures of Jesus 
that emerge from these traditions and tell us something about the 
enduring impression his personality made on his followers.73
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And there are, I believe, many larger patterns evident in the sourc-
es, patterns that are sufficiently robust so as to still hold true even 
if the data that they are derived from includes material that was 
invented. Indeed, as Allison has said, even “fiction can bring us 
facts … some of the traditions about Jesus which are, in the strict 
sense, not historical, surely give us a faithful impression of the 
sort of person he was or the sort of thing he typically did.”74 The 
temptation narratives, for example, despite being highly legend-
ary depict Jesus as someone who shows disdain for personal polit-
ical power, a motif that recurs a number of times in our sources.75 
And so I would go along with Allison, albeit for slightly different 
reasons, and say:
So, in the matter of Jesus, we should start not with the parts but 
with the whole, which means with the general impression that the 
tradition about him, in toto, tends to convey. The criteria of au-
thenticity are, for this endeavour, simply in the way.76
It is the working assumption of this text that beyond a small clus-
ter of incidents – such as his crucifixion – the details of the life 
of Jesus are historically elusive although the general picture, and 
recurrent motifs, are discernible and historically reliable.
It follows, therefore, that I am not going to engage in detailed 
exegesis of specific texts, even those that look particularly rele-
vant to our theme. For example, the “Render unto Caesar” inci-
dent,77 something central to most studies of the politics of Jesus,78 
will not be the focus of detailed scrutiny because the best that can 
be said about individual traditions of this kind is that they were the 
kind of thing Jesus’ followers79 thought Jesus might have said. Our 
business is about seeing the patterns and determining what was 
characteristic of the figure, not to be too concerned with the his-
toricity of the details. Such an approach also has the advantage of 
resembling the way that ancient biographies – which to a large ex-
tent the gospels are80 – would have been understood in antiquity.81
3. The meaning and utility of the term “anarchist”
If we want to determine whether the historical Jesus can be 
termed an “anarchist” we need to determine not only how we can 
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arrive at knowledge about the figure than might allow us to make 
such a judgement but also what we mean by the term “anarchist” 
when we attempt such an evaluation. In addition, we will need 
to address two potential criticisms of the business of determining 
whether the term “anarchist” is a fair one to apply to Jesus: that 
the term “anarchist” is anachronistic and ethnocentric.
Any attempt to define anarchism has to deal with the prob-
lem of its popular image. The notion that anarchism is about the 
absence of order rather than the absence of government, that it 
is synonymous with chaos and senseless violence, has persisted 
since the Victorian period82 and was made famous by such works 
as Joseph Conrad’s The Secret Agent.83 Of course, there are 
some forms of insurrectionary anarchism that appear to fit this 
stereotype – one needs only think of the recent activities of the 
Federazione Anarchica Informale84 – but counter to the popular 
image, the use of violence85 is, for most anarchists, subject to con-
siderable constraints, and most would eschew anything that could 
be deemed to be coercive violence against persons, even if outright 
pacifism is a minority position.86 Far from being senseless and 
destructive, most anarchists would consider themselves engaged 
in a constructive project consisting of “reconstructive visions, pre-
figurative politics and self-organisation”.87
But once we move past the problem of the popular image of 
anarchism, and try to define anarchism more accurately, we still 
face a number of acute challenges. There are, for example, a range 
of terms commonly used to qualify the word “anarchist”, such as 
collectivist, communist, individualist, liberal, life-style, mutualist, 
poststructuralist, primitivist, social, and syndicalist, the diversity 
of which seems, at first sight, to indicate something that is so pluri-
form that it resists definition. But whilst such labels, and more, 
are clearly significant, it is possible to have what has been called 
“an anarchism without adjectives”,88 some kind of anarchism 
that is roughly representative of what most forms of anarchism 
have in common and true to its varied but essentially ecumen-
ical character.89 Although it is customary to begin such funda-
mental definitions with an etymological point about the Greek 
word anarchos, from which the term anarchism is derived,90 and 
to point out that it means “without a ruler”, this does not get us 
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very far, and saying something more is challenging, not least be-
cause anarchism is profoundly anti-dogmatic.91 Nonetheless, the 
definition of the anthropologist Brian Morris is one that is helpful 
for our purposes, encapsulating both its critical and constructive 
programme.
Anarchists are people who reject all forms of government or co-
ercive authority, all forms of hierarchy and domination [...] But 
anarchists also seek to establish or bring about by varying means, 
a condition of anarchy, that is, a decentralised society without co-
ercive institutions.92
However, it might also be helpful to keep in mind, in what fol-
lows, the suggestion by David Graeber, that any definition of 
the term anarchist has to encompass a range of interrelated and 
overlapping meanings. He notes that generally speaking, people, 
ideas or institutions are labelled anarchist if they endorse an ex-
plicit doctrine, display a particular attitude, or engage in specific 
practices. That is, anarchists include those who are heirs of the 
intellectual tradition that began in the nineteenth century which is 
characterised by “a certain vision of human possibilities”;93 those 
that display a particular “attitude” which “reject[s] government 
and believe[s] that people would be better off in a world without 
hierarchies”;94 and those that engage in practices and forms of so-
cial organisation that are broadly egalitarian in ethos95 (seen, for 
example in what Evans-Pritchard called the “ordered anarchy” of 
the Nuer).96 No definition of “anarchist” will ever be satisfactory 
but Graeber’s remarks remind us that whilst we should be care-
ful not to make our understanding of the term so broad as to be 
meaningless (it will not do, for example, to label anyone who is 
anti-authoritarian an anarchist) we should be aware that the term 
is an expansive, dynamic and necessarily malleable one.
However, having briefly explored the question of what an “an-
archist” might be usefully said to be, we now need to address 
whether it is anachronistic or ethnocentric to ask if the historical 
Jesus can be usefully described in this way.
The charge of anachronism seems, at face value, a damning one. 
To many anarchism may seem clearly wedded to a specific histor-
ical moment, its character determined by its formal origins in the 
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nineteenth century, or the brief periods of prominence it enjoyed 
with the Maknovists in Ukraine,97 the CNT-FAI in Republican 
Spain,98 its prominence in events in France in May 1968,99 or its 
more recent re-emergence within anti-capitalist and anti-globali-
sation movements, and anarchist volunteers contributing to the 
defense of the Rojava revolution in north Syria/West Kurdistan.100 
All these are a long way from first-century Palestine and so it 
seems legitimate to ask whether it is just downright anachronistic 
to even pose the question whether the historical Jesus was an an-
archist. If it is then we are wasting our time.
However, the problem of using contemporary terminology to 
describe and elucidate past realities is not a new one and obviously 
not limited to the study of the historical Jesus (although scholars of 
the historical Jesus often behave as though they were engaged in a 
unique endeavour). Given the opprobrium that has faced those who 
have maintained that the historical Jesus can be usefully described 
as a Jewish Cynic,101 a not unreasonable suggestion given the clear 
resemblances between Jesus and the philosophical movement of 
that name active in the early Roman empire, and a suggestion that 
at least had the virtue of applying to the historical Jesus a term that 
was current in the first-century world,102 to ask whether Jesus could 
usefully be called an “anarchist” seems unwise. However, it is a term 
that is, generally speaking, particularly amenable to being used of 
a figure in the past. As Graeber has noted, the founding ideologues 
of anarchism, such as Proudhon, “did not think of themselves as 
having invented anything particularly new. The basic principles of 
anarchism – self-organization, voluntary association, mutual aid 
– referred to forms of human behaviour they assumed it had been 
around about as long as humanity.”103 It is certainly a less problem-
atic term to use than, say, “Marxist”. The latter has always been 
associated with high theory and the fundamental project of analy-
sis begun with Karl Marx, whilst anarchism is, again in the words 
of Graeber, “more a moral project”104 and the only thing that really 
changed in the nineteenth century was that it acquired a name.105 
Such thinking lies behind, for example, Robert Graham’s recent 
documentary chronicle of anarchism, which begins at 300CE,106 
or Peter Marshall’s Demanding the Impossible, a substantial and 
influential history of anarchism that traces the origins of anarchism 
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back to Taoism and the sixth century BCE, and, like Graham, con-
tains extensive discussion of pre-nineteenth century movements. 
Indeed, not just historians of anarchism but historians working in 
other fields have believed that anarchism can have analytic pur-
chase when talking about the past. Patricia Crone, for example, 
a key figure in the study of Islamic origins, has argued that some 
Mu’tazilites and members of the Najadāt sub-sect of Khārijites, 
should be termed anarchists and included in histories of anarchism 
as they believed that society could, indeed should, function without 
a government or what we would call a state.107 Similarly, Norman 
Cohn used it to describe various millenarian movements in medi-
eval Europe, most notably Taborites of Bohemia.108 Likewise, the 
anthropologist James C. Scott has used the term in his history of 
the peoples of Zomia, a region of upland Southeast Asia which 
has, until relatively recently, resisted the “internal colonialism” of 
state-making in the area and whose inhabitants had successfully 
practiced the art of not being governed for centuries.109 And simi-
larly, fellow anthropologist Brian Morris has considered it an ap-
propriate designation for Lao Tzu.110 We should not, therefore, be 
reluctant to use the term “anarchist” to describe the figure of Jesus, 
if he merits such a designation.
Nonetheless, the problem of anachronism is not necessarily 
dealt with so easily: for much of its history anarchism has been 
associated with opposition to both capitalism and the state, which 
are usually seen as inseparable objects that mutually re-enforce 
one another, are irredeemably coercive,111 and neither of which 
might strike someone as obviously present in the first-century, 
pre-industrial world; something that might undermine its utility 
for our purposes. However, anarchists have not always seen capi-
talism and the state as the sole causes of inequalities of power and 
creations of hierarchy,112 and critiques of all forms of domina-
tion, whatever their source and in whatever domain, are common, 
something particularly evident in the articulations of anarchism 
that have come to the fore in recent years. It is also the case that 
the terms “capitalism” and “state” can have some explanatory 
power for making sense of antiquity and the world within which 
the historical Jesus lived. First, it has proven useful for those en-
gaged in the study of antiquity to characterise the economy of 
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the early Roman empire as one of political capitalism,113 in the 
Weberian sense, an economy that consisted of “the exploitation 
of the opportunities for profit arising from the exercise of politi-
cal power”;114 it may have been a market economy of sorts115 but 
profit-making was in the hands of the political elite within the em-
pire and its retainers. Secondly, whilst there was little analogous to 
the modern state in antiquity, the Roman government did monop-
olise ultimate military, fiscal, legislative and judicial power within 
the regions it ruled (even if also allowed considerable autonomy). 
Although the Roman empire of the first century CE was relatively 
light on administrative functionaries116 and military personnel,117 
given the extent of territory controlled,118 it certainly meets a min-
imal definition of a state where a state is understood as a social 
organization “capable of exerting a considerable degree of power 
[...] over large numbers of people, and for sustained periods”.119 
Indeed, the Rome empire fulfilled the classic definition of the state 
as that which “lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical 
violence within a territory”.120
We also need to address the related problem of ethnocentrism. 
If we call Jesus an “anarchist” are we employing a term that 
has no interpretative value outside of the modern European or 
North American context within which anarchism first emerged 
as a self-conscious movement, employing a concept that impedes 
rather than assists our understanding of a figure from a differ-
ent cultural and historical context?121 One that might be said to 
 carry with it the superior presumptions of Western modernity (or, 
indeed, post-modernity) within which anarchism was born and 
thrives? Not only would such a judgment be wrong because an-
archism itself has a long history of formal existence outside of 
Europe or North America (one thinks, for example, of the histo-
ry of formal anarchist movements in Africa,122 China,123 Korea, 
Japan124 and elsewhere),125 but also because, as we have noted, it 
has been used by those engaged in the description and interpreta-
tion of non-European cultures, famously by Evans-Pritchard but 
also by other anthropologists acutely aware of such criticisms.126 
Harold Barclay has made perhaps the most thoroughgoing de-
fence of the use of the term cross-culturally. He recognises that it 
the use of the term “anarchy” might be viewed as:
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Ethnocentric and confuses ideology with social classification. It is 
to take a highly emotionally charged word, one with a very clear 
ideological connotation, identified with Euro-American cultural 
traditions, and to apply it cross-culturally, when those in other 
cultures would clearly lack the ideology and values of the anar-
chist. Thus, not only is the word distorted but also is the meaning 
of those cultures.
But quite rightly he notes that:
If this is true of the word ‘anarchy’, it applies equally to the use 
of such words as ‘democratic’, ‘government’, ‘law’ [...] and a host 
of others employed daily by social scientists, yet derived from or-
dinary speech. Social sciences is full of terms in common usage 
which are applied to social contexts in other cultures. There are 
certainly dangers to such a procedure. It is easy to carry extrane-
ous ideological baggage along with the term. On the other hand, 
if we cannot at all make such cross-cultural transfers, we are left 
with a proliferation of neologisms which become pure jargonese, 
enhancing obfuscation rather than clarification.127
So the question of whether the historical Jesus was an anarchist is 
one that can be asked and one to which we can expect a meaning-
ful answer of some kind. Let us now sketch a response.
4. Was the historical Jesus an anarchist?
As we discussed earlier, any attempt to talk about the historical 
Jesus will need to concern itself with impressions and motifs rath-
er than detailed exegesis of specific traditions. Even within these 
constraints there is much that could be said but for the purpos-
es of this essay I would like to focus a prominent motif present 
within a large quantity of traditions associated with the figure of 
Jesus: the kingdom of God. A “kingdom”, of whatever kind, does 
not, of course, sound a very anarchist thing but it should be noted, 
from the outset, that the Greek term basileia, which is translated 
into English as “kingdom”, can be understood as having a territo-
rial or geographical meaning but it can also refer to royal power 
or sovereignty; it can be understood as “reign” or “rule” as well 
as “realm”. This is also true of the Hebrew and Aramaic word 
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malkūth which probably underlies the use of the Greek term.128 
So, although we shall use the expression “kingdom of God”, as 
this phrase remains the best-known rendering into English of the 
Greek phrase basileia tou theou found in early Christian sources 
and associated with the figure of Jesus, it can also be thought of 
as the “reign of God” or “rule of God”.
In our sources, references to the kingdom of God saturate 
not just Jesus’ teaching but his activity too.129 The phrase, or 
the term “kingdom” by itself, is prominent in the canonical gos-
pels of Matthew, Mark and Luke (customarily referred to as the 
Synoptic gospels) and the non-canonical gospel of Thomas,130 
a text which is considered by most scholars in the field to con-
tain early traditions about Jesus comparable to those of the 
Synoptics131 (the gospel of John is usually judged to be somewhat 
later and of little value in the study of the historical Jesus).132 The 
“kingdom” is all pervasive. It appears at the outset of accounts 
of the life of Jesus, as the subject of his preaching, and remains a 
preoccupation throughout his ministry. For example, at the be-
ginning of his public activity, according to Matthew and Mark, 
Jesus proclaims:
The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God has come near; re-
pent, and believe in the good news.133
And, it remains a preoccupation to the end, a subject of discussion 
at his final meal134 and even his words from the cross.135 It was 
determinative of the content and character of his ethics. For ex-
ample, renunciation of wealth appears a prerequisite for entrance 
to the kingdom.
It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle that for 
someone who is rich enter the kingdom of God.136
The kingdom is also directly linked to Jesus’ role as a healer and 
exorcist, something that is a particularly prominent characteristic 
of his portrayal in our sources (and although unusual, not excep-
tional, in the cultural context of the early empire and first-century 
Judaism).137 He is presented, for example, as declaring that his 
exorcisms are proof of the kingdom’s arrival:
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But if it is by the Spirit [finger] of God that I cast out demons, then 
the kingdom of God has come to you.138
The theme of the kingdom is also present in a range of forms of 
tradition from which our sources about Jesus are composed, in-
cluding aphorisms, apocalyptic sayings, pronouncement stories, 
miracle stories, legends and parables.139 Indeed, parables, “the 
characteristic form of Jesus’ teaching”,140 seem particularly associ-
ated with this idea. Not only are we told that the interpretation of 
the parables requires hearers to know “the secret of the kingdom 
of God”141 but a number of parables are introduced with direct 
reference to the kingdom and most function to explicate some as-
pect of its character.142 The Gospel of Thomas, for example, regu-
larly presents the parables it contains as concerned with the nature 
of the kingdom. In a tradition that does not have a direct parallel 
with anything in the Synoptic tradition, the reader is told:
(97) Jesus said: The kingdom of the [Father] is like a woman, car-
rying a jar full of meal and walking a long way. The handle of the 
jar broke; the meal poured out behind her on the road. She was 
unaware, she knew not her loss. When she came into her house, 
she put down the jar (and) found it empty.
Whilst the introductions to the parables, which tie them so clearly 
to the theme of the kingdom, might well be redactional and not 
go back beyond the final composition of the gospels themselves, 
they are so commonplace that it seems fair to conclude that the 
parables – or at least most of them – were central to whatever 
Jesus wished to convey about the kingdom of God.
So we seem on safe grounds in saying that the kingdom or reign 
of God reflects the main concern of the historical Jesus, as most 
historical Jesus scholars agree, even if they disagree quite sharply 
about what exactly this might imply.143 As Markus Bockmuehl 
puts it, “The favourite and important subject of Jesus’ teaching is 
clearly the Kingdom of God.”144
What exactly the historical Jesus may have had in mind when 
he spoke of the kingdom is notoriously difficult to determine de-
finitively not just because close antecedents to this idea are not 
easy to identify, even if it clearly draws upon concepts common in 
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the Hebrew Bible and later Jewish literature,145 but also because 
the form of teaching used by Jesus to talk about the kingdom of 
God, the parable,146 is both terse and figurative – most parables 
appear to be extended metaphors or similes147– and, as a result 
their meaning is, to an extent, open and polyvalent (though clear-
ly not arbitrary).148 Their meaning cannot be crudely reduced to 
a single referent or point;149 the symbol of the kingdom in the 
parables of Jesus is allusive, tensive and experiential.150 But the 
meaning of the kingdom in the teaching of Jesus has also been 
hampered by the preoccupations of scholarship. Discussion of the 
theme of the kingdom in the study of the historical Jesus is of-
ten effectively constrained by questions of chronology that are 
often rather narrowly conceived. Did he believe its arrival was 
imminent?151 Or that it was already present?152 Or both?153 Or are 
such temporal judgments predicated on culturally inappropriate 
assumptions about the nature of time and language?154 This is 
not the place to rehearse such debates which have preoccupied 
scholars of the historical Jesus since the inception of the so-called 
“Quest”,155 though I would say that both tendencies can be found 
throughout the data, and so it seems unreasonable to deny that 
one or other did not go back in some form to the figure of Jesus, 
as has recently been the fashion.156 Rather, I am here more inter-
ested in the question of the character of the reign of God envi-
sioned by Jesus (although I am aware that this is deeply entwined 
with the question of eschatology).157 That is, I would like to make 
some observations about what the historical Jesus is likely to have 
understood by the rule of God and the nature of human response 
to it, and in particular, a number of motifs that may legitimately 
and usefully be described as anarchist – although what follows is 
not a comprehensive analysis of the possibilities but an indicative 
treatment of the subject.
a. The kingdom of God is characterized by the active identification 
and critique of coercive relations of power, and the enactment of 
new, egalitarian modes of social life.
This is seen, perhaps most acutely, in the recurrent, general motif 
of reversal which is typical of traditions associated with Jesus. The 
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theme of reversal is more than a rhetorical characteristic of his 
teaching. As the leading scholar of New Testament ethics, Richard 
Hays, has noted:
The theme of reversal seems to have been pervasive in his thought 
[…] This reversal motif is built into the deep structure of Jesus’ 
message, present in all layers of the tradition […] a foundational 
element of Jesus’ teaching.158
The socio-political nature of much of this reversal159 is obvious 
to a modern reader without knowledge of the specific political, 
religious and cultural context of first-century Palestine – though 
such knowledge is necessary for a fuller exploration of its im-
plications.160 In Jesus’ vision, the kingdom belonged to the poor, 
not the rich;161 to the hungry, not those who were full;162 to the 
tax-collectors and prostitutes not chief priests and the aristo-
crats;163 to children not adults;164 to sinners and not the righ-
teous.165 Its values were exemplified by foreigners,166 beggars,167 
and impoverished widows not the religiously, politically and eco-
nomically powerful.168 We find this theme in aphorisms,169 com-
mandments,170 and sayings171 ascribed to the historical Jesus, but, 
perhaps above all, in the parables. For example, in the Parable of 
the Wedding Feast,172 the eventual guests at the banquet are those 
that one would least expect to be there – in Luke’s version it is 
“the poor, the crippled, the blind and lame.”173 In the Parable of 
the Rich Man and Lazarus, it is the beggar Lazarus who “longed 
to satisfy his hunger with what fell from the rich man’s table” 
who goes to be with Abraham and the angels, whilst the rich man 
who has “dressed in purple and fine linen and who feasted sump-
tuously every day” is in Hades.174 In the Parable of the Sheep and 
the Goats, the manner in which someone has treated the “least” 
in society, those who are hungry, thirsty, naked, imprisoned, sick, 
or foreign, provides the criterion by which their life is ultimately 
judged.175 In the Parable of the Rich Fool, the selfish accumulation 
of wealth during his life leaves the rich man impoverished when 
he dies.176 But perhaps the most compelling evidence of socio-po-
litical reversal in traditions associated with Jesus is the recurrent 
portrayal of his own praxis, as someone who lived with the out-
casts and the socially marginal,177 and in an almost constant state 
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of conflict with those who were not.178 The theme of reversal func-
tions not just to expose a number of inequitable relationships, but 
also to make visible and valorise the powerless within them, and 
their needs and their desires.
In addition to the theme of reversal we can see a significant 
cluster of traditions in which exploitation, whether economic,179 
legal,180 theocratic,181 military,182 or medical,183 is exposed and 
condemned, and responses advocated or made available that af-
firm both the agency of the oppressed and their capacity to resist 
such oppression. An example of this is seen, for example, in the 
tradition of how one should respond to being pressed into ser-
vice by the occupying forces in Judea to carry their equipment.184 
The command that the victim carry the equipment further than 
was demanded, if acted upon, would have resulted in striking and 
unexpected behaviour that could function not just to restore the 
power of agency to the victim but also to non-violently undermine 
the assumption, on the part of the soldier, that he, and the colonial 
regime which he represented, had ultimate authority – a response 
that could be seen to enact the command to love enemies,185 an 
idea particularly associated with Jesus in our sources.186 The con-
cern to restore agency to those deprived of it can also be seen, 
though in a rather different way, in the stories in which individu-
als gain healing from Jesus by actively demanding it from him or 
even seizing it for themselves – tactics which he seems to not just 
to have tolerated but to have encouraged.187
New models of social relationship are enacted that present al-
ternative, largely egalitarian ways of living. For example, there are 
a number of traditions associated with historical Jesus that con-
tain sharp criticisms of familial relationships and obligations,188 
and whilst it would be wrong to see these as part of a program-
matic attack on patriarchy (significant numbers of women were 
drawn to the movement but there is no evidence of a “critical 
feminist impulse” in traditions about Jesus),189 the traditional 
form of the family is eclipsed and a much more inclusive, fictive, 
family, where membership is not conditional on ties of marriage 
and blood, but on shared purpose, is advocated and comes into 
being amongst Jesus’ followers.190 Social relations and obliga-
tions are no longer structured according to reciprocity, whether 
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symmetrical or asymmetrical, which requires someone to have the 
means to “repay”191 but instead an ethos of generosity is expected, 
where debts are forgiven and those with resources are told to be 
free with them and not to keep account.192
Traditions of Jesus’ teaching and praxis also regularly involve a 
distinctive approach to dining, something that was central to the 
literal and symbolic maintenance of inequitable relationships of 
power in antiquity, and also, in the case of first-century Palestine, 
created significant, inequitable divisions.193 He advocated and 
demonstrated what Crossan calls “open commensality”,194 that is 
“eating together without using table as a miniature map of soci-
ety’s vertical discriminations and lateral separations.”195 This was 
a significant motif in Jesus’ practice,196 so much so that he was 
mocked as “a glutton and a drunkard”197 and someone who ate 
with “tax collectors and sinners”,198 but it is also present in the 
teaching traditions ascribed to Jesus,199 particularly the parable 
traditions,200 as well as miracle traditions,201 and is even in an 
apocalyptic vision of the future kingdom: “I tell you, many will 
come from east and west and will eat with Abraham and Isaac 
and Jacob in the kingdom of heaven”202 – something that indi-
cates that the aspirations and concerns of the kingdom envisaged 
by the historical Jesus were ultimately universal203 and could even 
be said to come close to a form of cosmopolitanism,204 a concept 
central to anarchism.205
The historical Jesus also appears to have modelled a form of 
social interaction that ignored expectations of deference,206 prob-
ably rooted in the expectation that the behaviour of those in the 
kingdom should reflect the character of God, and God was for 
Jesus, and other Jews of the time, “no respecter of persons”.207 
This was something both egalitarian in itself but also revealed 
and challenged the structures and presumptions of power sym-
bolised by such deference; to those who were beneficiaries of 
stratification and hierarchy, it presented a disruptive rhetoric of 
impoliteness.208
However, whilst there are sufficient clusters of data to make 
it plausible to see the historical Jesus as a figure known for con-
fronting coercive and hierarchical relationships, and advocating 
alternative models of social life, there are aspects of the teaching 
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and actions of Jesus that do not easily fit with this picture, are 
equally prominent in our sources, and need to be addressed.
First, it is quite clear that although the figure of Jesus is charac-
teristically associated with the powerless, he enjoyed the support 
of those who facilitated and benefited from political and econom-
ic exploitation, supported by the largess of the rich and socializing 
with the agents of imperial rule, such as tax-collectors and the 
military – something sufficiently prominent in our sources that 
it cannot be dismissed as redactional, an invention of Christians 
who were comfortable within the empire and wished to legitimate 
their experience.209 Such a picture is difficult to reconcile with a 
figure engaged in a thoroughgoing and confrontational response 
to non-egalitarian forms of social life. Was he, perhaps, so inclu-
sive that this somehow transcended, or less positively, undermined 
the political vision we have observed? This seems unlikely. As 
Bockmuehl quite rightly notes, Jesus was not an inclusive figure. 
“Jesus of Nazareth includes a remarkably wide diversity of the 
marginalized, yet he also marginalizes an uncomfortably diverse 
range of the religiously or socio economically included.”210 It is 
probably best to explain this apparent tension by reference to the 
theme of repentance, something regularly associated with the no-
tion of the kingdom of God. Repentance was not concerned with 
contrition but rather the idea that individuals should return to 
God211 and do what God expects of those who wish to be righ-
teous.212 In our sources those responding to the call of Jesus, who-
ever they are, are expected to imitate Jesus’ praxis, including such 
things as open commensality, and there is also evidence, from the 
story of Zaccheus, the tax collector but also in the story of the 
rich ruler, that the rich were also expected to make restitution and 
return what they had extracted by exploitation.213
Secondly, it should be noted that the historical Jesus does not 
appear straightforwardly or consistently anti-authoritarian or 
anti-hierarchical. It would be unfair to ignore the considerable 
range of data where Jesus is presented as either claiming an au-
thoritative or pivotal role,214 or where it is implied,215 and this 
observation stands regardless of other questions about Jesus 
self-estimation and “Christology” which have attracted so much 
attention because of their obvious theological consequences.216 Of 
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course, anarchists have not been averse to leaders, albeit often for 
tactical reasons, one thinks of the prominence of Nestor Makhno, 
Errico Malatesta, or Emma Goldman, but this claim appears to 
be of a rather different kind. The historical Jesus initiated a hi-
erarchical organisation through the appointment of twelve dis-
ciples, something which he did not envisage as temporary217 and 
his own authority was predicated upon coercion through the pro-
nouncement of future judgement upon those who rejected it.218 It 
is usually assumed that where leadership exists within anarchism 
it is “a continual exchange of mutual, temporary, and, above all, 
voluntary authority and subordination”219 but evidently the type 
of leadership modelled and advocated by the historical Jesus was 
somewhat different.
In response to this it could be said that the nature of the lead-
ership shown by Jesus and expected of the Twelve was, somewhat 
paradoxically, an inversion of hierarchical expectations, epito-
mized in the repeated motif that leaders must be servants and the 
deliberate contrast of the model of power within the communi-
ty with that which was characteristic of the empire, indeed, on 
which the empire was built and sustained, to the detriment of the 
latter.220 And so, in Mark, chapter ten, we read:
42 So Jesus called them and said to them, ‘You know that among 
the Gentiles those whom they recognize as their rulers lord it over 
them, and their great ones are tyrants over them. 43 But it is not 
so among you; but whoever wishes to become great among you 
must be your servant, 44 and whoever wishes to be first among 
you must be slave of all.221
It could also be said – though this is perhaps a little less evident – 
that in choosing twelve disciples the historical Jesus was using a 
symbol of a pre-monarchical Israel, when it existed as a confed-
eration of tribes, to represent his vision of the kingdom, some-
thing that Ched Myers has said “bears some resemblance to 
‘anarcho-syndicalist’ vision in modernity”;222 recalling a time be-
fore the people of Israel decided to be like other nations and have 
a king, rejecting God’s direct rule.223
The activities of healing and teaching that are so characteristic 
of the representation of Jesus in our sources also have little to do 
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with authoritarian forms of kingly, messianic leadership that were 
dominant at the time.224 Indeed, given that the historical Jesus 
seems to have expected those around him to be empowered to 
carry out similar actions,225 it might not be too fanciful to agree 
with Gerd Theissen that the historical Jesus may well have envis-
aged his followers collectively taking on messianic tasks, enacting 
a kind of group messiahship. If this is the case, it would have 
meant that the historical Jesus effectively played down his own 
significance and so could be seen as advocating a kind of distrib-
uted, non-authoritarian form of leadership.226
Similarly, the traditions about his death are uniform in present-
ing a figure who remained consistent in not using or endorsing 
violence against enemies and for whom physical violence by hu-
mans against humans was anathema.227 It was not a form of lead-
ership in which authority was equated with a superior sense of 
personal value. Indeed, it appears to have been the opposite.
b. The kingdom of God is prefigurative.
As we have noted, the kingdom motif is not just associated with 
judgement but also with new forms of social life, and these are 
not just advocated but practiced. It can therefore be usefully un-
derstood as prefigurative and, more specifically, prefigurative in a 
way that resembles anarchist ethics. In most forms of anarchist 
ethics, the means are consistent with the desired ends, that is “the 
outcomes are prefigured by the methods”.228 The practice of anar-
chists is assumed to have immediate consequences and to resem-
ble the outcome that is desired. As James Guillaume, a colleague 
of Bakunin, said, in his famous critique of statist socialists, “How 
could one want an egalitarian and free society to issue from au-
thoritarian organisation? It is impossible.”229
The ethics of Jesus could be seen as analogous to this and in 
many ways this helps makes sense of the notion that the king-
dom is already present, and being enacted, even if in an initially 
insignificant way, in a manner that resembles and is related to its 
final form. One thinks, of example, of the Parable of the Mustard 
Seed230 or the practice of open commensality we have touched 
upon.
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Indeed, I do not think it is pushing things too far to speak of the 
prefigurative ethics of the kingdom as necessitating a form of di-
rect action, something characteristic of anarchism and something 
that involves “acting as if the state’s representatives have no more 
rights to impose their views of the rights or the wrongs of the sit-
uation than anybody else.”231 A number of the activities of Jesus 
seem to have this characteristic, whether it is the tradition of his 
action in the Temple,232 or his response to the question about the 
payment of taxes to Caesar,233 or his behaviour at his trial,234 in 
all of which he appears to show no concern for the consequences 
of his actions. Indeed, just as direct action is sometimes “playful 
and the carnivalesque”,235 so, often, are the forms of behaviour as-
cribed to Jesus or advocated by him.236 As Peter Marshall rightly 
observes, Jesus consistently “held political authority up to deri-
sion”,237 demystifying and mocking the power it claimed.
c) The vision of the kingdom is not utopian but reflexive, 
undetermined, and self-creative
It is surprisingly difficult to describe, with any detail, the forms of 
social life expected within the new reality enacted and proposed 
by the historical Jesus. Although, as we have noted, it can be char-
acterised by certain practices, such as open commensality, there is 
much that is not spelled out. There certainly is no obvious utopian 
blueprint, and despite the arguments of Mary Ann Beavis, it is 
not useful to characterise the vision of the kingdom held by the 
historical Jesus as utopian.238 As we have noted, the main mode 
of teaching employed by Jesus, the parable, is figurative and by its 
nature allusive, resisting simple explanation and allowing a range 
of indeterminate, experiential responses. Parables do not com-
municate a specific plan. Indeed, it seems more helpful to think 
of Jesus as anti-utopian, a quality that resonates with anarchist 
thinking even if anarchists are popularly assumed to be driven by 
utopian visions. Although utopias can have their uses – they can 
inspire, encourage, provide a pleasurable escape239 – they can also 
be coercive and that is why, on the whole, they have been resist-
ed by anarchists; utopianism enforces others to live in a certain 
way, and a utopia envisaged as a single, totalising endpoint will 
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necessitate manipulation to fit a predetermined plan. As Marie 
Louise Berneri demonstrated in her analysis of utopian thought 
from Plato to Huxley, they are inherently authoritarian.240 For an-
archists, the details of such social order need to be determined by 
those that that are dominated. Their ethics are:
Reflexive and self-creative, as they do not assess practices against 
a universally prescribed end-point, as some utopian theorists have 
done, but through a process of immanent critique.241
Some might feel uneasy about this alleged similarity between the 
historical Jesus and anarchism because it is often assumed that 
the historical Jesus had a clear idea of his intentions and under-
standing of the implications of the kingdom of God from the out-
set. However, such thinking is an imposition upon the records of 
subsequent doctrinal assumptions. Our sources indicate a figure 
open to reflection and revision in the light of events and encounter 
with others. An example of this is the story of the Syrophoenian 
woman in which a gentile argues a reluctant Jesus into healing 
her daughter,242 and the incidents at Nazareth243 and Caesarea 
Philippi244 which likewise seem to indicate moments which were 
critical in his self-understanding.245 The possibility that the histor-
ical Jesus’ own life was one characterised by reflexivity and a mu-
table understanding of his mission, should not come as a surprise 
even if it may be surprising to some. As Henry Cadbury observed 
many decades ago:
Probably much that is commonly said about the general purpose 
of Jesus’ life and the specific place in that purpose of detailed inci-
dents is modern superimposition upon a nearly patternless life and 
upon nearly patternless records of it.246
d. The pedagogy of the kingdom is prefigurative and non-coercive.
There are also significant parallels between the distinctive pedago-
gy associated with the kingdom and the non-coercive, prefigurative 
pedagogy of anarchism. Although the latter is, as Judith Suissa has ar-
gued, surprisingly under theorised,247 pedagogy has been something 
of considerable significance in anarchism. This is largely, as Justin 
Mueller has suggested, because unlike other political philosophies 
150 Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume 1
aimed at social transformation, “education has never been simply 
the means to achieve a new social order”248 but rather part of the 
prefigurative practice that is central to all forms of anarchism, 
a prefigurative practice characterised by non-coercion, and the 
inculcation of solidarity and fellow-feeling, rather than competi-
tion and domination, the encouragement of active empathy and 
identification with others.249 Some of Jesus’ teaching does seem to 
have taken the form of commands, such as the command to love 
enemies250 or the prohibition on divorce,251 but by far the largest 
quantity of his teaching comes in the form of parables, which are 
figurative and affective, a form that does not compel the hearer 
to arrive at a narrowly predetermined understanding of what is 
being conveyed. Many parables could also be said to function in 
some way to directly encourage empathy and identification with 
others,252 and most could be said to contribute to this indirectly 
by, amongst other things, intensifying the significance placed upon 
the praxis of the kingdom. 
However, before we conclude our discussion it is important to 
note that some grounds on which Jesus is often considered an an-
archist should not be part of any attempt to answer the question, 
despite their popularity. For example, some might be surprised 
that there has been no mention of Jesus’ death in the preceding 
analysis. As Christoyannopoulos has noted, this is often seen as 
the climax of Jesus’ ministry, as confirmation of the character of 
his mission:
For most Christian Anarchists, Jesus is the saviour precisely be-
cause he accepted the cross – that is the revolution. He is the mes-
siah because he consistently responds to injustice with unwavering 
love, forgiveness and non-resistance. He does not seek to lead yet 
another revolutionary government, but instead points to the true 
kingdom beyond the state. Therefore the crucifixion is indeed the 
glorious climax of Jesus’ messianic ministry.253
For many, there is something “inevitable” about this conclusion 
to the life of Jesus, it is “the concrete consequence” of his teaching 
and practice.254 Christian anarchists and others who believe that 
Jesus deserves the label of anarchist, are not so unusual in seeing 
Jesus’ death as a necessary consequence of his teaching. In modern 
Was the historical Jesus an anarchist? 151
historical-Jesus scholarship, as we have mentioned, one of the cri-
teria used to determine which traditions are likely to go back to 
the historical Jesus is the criterion of ‘crucifiability’255 – that is, if 
a tradition can explain Jesus’ execution then it is judged likely to 
be “authentic”. However, given the ubiquity of crucifixion in the 
empire, and the casual manner in which it could be imposed on 
the poor and inconsequential, it is likely that the Roman authori-
ties did not give the killing of Jesus much thought and he need not 
have done anything much, in their eyes, for them to put him to 
death. For example, as A. E. Harvey plausibly suggested:
Jesus could have been one of those innocent victims who are 
picked up by police action at a time when peace-keeping has be-
come difficult and the forces of law and order are over-stretched, 
and then arbitrarily put to death.256
The titulus,257 placed on the cross by the Romans, which seems to 
indicate that Jesus was killed because of a kingly claim of some 
kind, might well be no more than evidence that, from the perspec-
tive of the Romans, they were executing a deluded madman who 
talked of invisible kingdoms – something that would be in keep-
ing of what we know about their treatment of others they believed 
to fall into this category.258
5. Conclusion
To return to our question: was the historical Jesus an anarchist? 
Any answer depends upon the definition of “anarchist” used and 
how much room such a definition has for anarchism to be judged 
to exist outside of a formal political movement composed of 
self-declared anarchists. It would, however, be an inadequate defi-
nition that limited itself solely to the likes of Proudhon – and one 
that would not be true to their own understanding of the perenni-
al nature of the doctrine they espoused. Instead, the suggestion of 
Graeber, that definitions of anarchism should also be inclusive of 
those who display anarchist attitudes and practices, as well as those 
who endorse a specific ideological position, has far more merit.
However, if we decide that Jesus might well meet the rather 
broader definition of “anarchist” of the kind offered by Graeber, 
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we will need to accept some things that, at least to many con-
temporary anarchists, appear incompatible with anarchism. For 
example, as Kathleen Corley has noted, Jesus does not appear to 
have criticised patriarchy,259 and our sources are silent about his 
thoughts on slavery, something ubiquitous in the empire. Even his 
proclamation of the kingdom of God could be seen to replicate el-
ements of the imperialism that appears anathema to it.260 But such 
problems should not preclude us using the label “anarchist” for 
Jesus. As Harold Barclay has observed in his study of ethnograph-
ic accounts of stateless and governmentless societies, we cannot 
expect contemporary anarchists to necessarily approve of such 
societies, which though highly decentralised, can, for example, be 
highly conformist, patriarchal, gerontocracies,261 yet the use of the 
term anarchist is clearly legitimate for them. So, our use of the 
term “anarchist” outside of the modern context, where individu-
als and movements may display characteristics that are similarly 
unappealing to contemporary anarchists, has to be generous.
There is enough in what we can know about the historical Jesus, 
of the impressions of the man and his vision that have left their 
mark on our sources, to reveal someone not just intensely anti-au-
thoritarian but also concerned with a prefigurative, non-coercive 
reality which would both confront existing inequity and be trans-
formative of the lives of those oppressed by it. It may be pushing 
the evidence too far to say that Jesus of Nazareth was “a major 
political thinker”,262 but it is no surprise, to return to the quote 
with which we began, that Alexander Berkman believed Jesus to 
be an anarchist. He was right.263
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164. Matthew 18.3, 19.14; Mark 10.14; Luke 10.21, 18.16.
165. See Luke 15.11–32; Matthew 18.10–14, Luke 15.3–7; Matthew 
10.6; Matthew 15.24. The term “sinner” can have a range of mean-
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(or certain interpretations of the Law), people who were effectively 
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the ‘righteous’” (James G. Crossley, Reading the New Testament: 
Contemporary Approaches [London: Routledge, 2010], p. 91).
166. Matthew 9.21–22, Luke 10.13–14; Luke 10.25–37; Luke 
17.11–19; Matthew 8.5–13, Luke 7.1–10 cf. John 4.1–42; though 
see Matthew 15.21–28, Mark 7.24–30; Matthew 6.32, Luke 12.30; 
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21.31).
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on the Gospel According to Saint Matthew. Volume III. Commentary on 
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beg you, Jesus, restore my health to me, so that I need not beg for my 
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Matthew 12.13). The free nature of the healing offered by Jesus and 
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(Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1992), pp. 102–125 (p.111).
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in Authenticating the Words of Jesus, ed. by Bruce Chilton and Craig 
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19.19, Mark 10.19, Luke 18.20; Matthew 15.4, Mark 7.10.
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critic of patriarchy, see Kathleen E. Corley, Women and the Historical 
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190. Matthew 12.46–50, Mark 3.31–35, Luke 8.19–21; Matthew 
19.19, Mark 10.30, Luke 18.30.
191. Luke 14.12.
192. Matthew 5.42, Luke 6.30; Matthew 6.12–13, Luke 11.4; 
Matthew 18.21–35; Luke 12.33; Matthew 19.21, Mark 10.21, Luke 
18.22; Luke 14.33, Matthew 6.4, 20; Luke 6.34–35.
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193. See David Kraemer, ‘Food, Eating and Meals’, in The Oxford 
Handbook of Jewish Daily Life in Roman Palestine, ed. by Catherine 
Hezser (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 403–419 
and Jewish Eating and Identity Throughout the Ages (New York: 
Routledge, 2007). However, there were always means of enabling 
commensality, however constrained. See Jordan D. Rosenblum, Food 
and Identity in Early Rabbinic Judaism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010).
194. For a description of this see Crossan, The Historical Jesus, 
pp. 261–264.
195. John Dominic Crossan, Jesus: a Revolutionary Biography (San 
Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1994), p. 69.
196. See, for example, Matthew 9.10, Mark 2.15, Luke 5.29; 
Matthew 26.6, Mark 14.3; Thomas 61.
197. Matthew 11:19, Luke 7.34.
198. Matthew 9.11, Mark 2.16, Luke 5.30.
199. Luke 14.12–14.
200. Matthew 22.1–14, Luke 14.16–24, Thomas 64; Matthew 25.10 
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15.32–39, Mark 8.1–10.
202. Matthew 8.11, Luke 13.29. It is, perhaps, unsurprising that a 
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tral rite in early Christianity and was legitimized, probably with good 
reason, by appeal to an event in the life of the historical Jesus. See 
Matthew 26.26–29, Mark 14.22–25, Luke 22.15–20; 1 Corinthians 
11.23–25. Cf. Justin, First Apology 66.3.
203. Something that owed itself to the universal tradition with-
in Judaism. See Jacob Neusner, Recovering Judaism: The Universal 
Dimension of Jewish Religion (Fortress Press, 2001). Second Temple 
Jewish literature shows a range of ideas about the ultimate fate of 
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E. P. Sanders, Judaism: Practice and Belief, 63 BCE-66 CE (London: 
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176 Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume 1
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assumed, as Allison quite rightly notes (‘Who Will Come from East 
and West? Observations on Matt. 8.11–12 = Luke 13.28–29’, Irish 
Biblical Studies, 11 [1989], 158–170) but the implication is certain-
ly there. See Michael F. Bird, ‘Who Comes from the East and the 
West? Luke 13.28–29/Matt 8.11–12 and the Historical Jesus’, New 
Testament Studies, 52 (2006), 441–457.
204. For cosmopolitanism see A. A. Long, ‘The Concept of the 
Cosmopolitan in Greek & Roman Thought’, Daedalus, 137 (2008), 
50–58; Catherine Lu, ‘The One and Many Faces of Cosmopolitanism’, 
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205. Carl Levy, ‘Anarchism and Cosmopolitanism’, Journal of 
Political Ideologies, 16 (2011), 265–278.
206. See, for example, Matthew 22.16, Mark 12.14, Luke 20.21; 
Matthew 7.21, Luke 6.46. Jesus’ initial silence when questioned by 
the high priest (Matthew 26.63, Mark 14.61), Herod (Luke 23.9), 
and Pilate (Matthew 27.11–14, Mark 15.1–4, Luke 23.2–5) could be 
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lical tradition (e.g. Leviticus 19.15 cf. Acts 10.34, Rom. 2.11) and 
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Matthew 6.14, Luke 11:4).
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Penelope Brown and Stephen C. Levinson, Politeness: Some Universals 
in Language Usage (Cambridge University Press, 1987). See also 
Richard Bauman, Let Your Words Be Few: Symbolism of Speaking and 
Silence Among Seventeenth-century Quakers (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983).
209. Luke 8.3; Matthew 9.9–13, Mark 2.13–17, Luke 5.27–32; Luke 
19.2; Matthew 8.5, Luke 7.2.
210. Bockmuehl, ‘Inclusive Jesus’, p. 14.
211. See, for example, Casey, Jesus of Nazareth, p. 200. See Matthew 
4.17, Mark 1.15; Mark 6.7, 12; Luke 15.11–32; Matthew 18.10–14, 
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Contra Sanders, Jesus and Judaism, pp. 106–113 (cf. Casey, Jesus of 
Nazareth, pp. 282–84).
212. It is related to the idea in the Hebrew Bible that a sinful Israel 
needs to return to God (Isaiah 44.22, 55.7), a common theme, par-
ticularly in traditions concerned with the Day of the Lord (e.g. Joel 
2.32)
213. See Luke 19.1–9; Matthew 19.21, Mark 10.21, Luke 18.22. For 
the expectation of restitution see Leviticus 6.1–5, Numbers 5.5–7.
214. See, for example, Matthew 12.28, Luke 11.20; Matthew 10.34–
36, Luke 12.49–56; Matthew 11.2–6, Luke 7.18–23.
215. See, for example, Luke 5.32; Matthew 9.13; Matthew 5.21, 27, 
33, 39, 44.
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Mission’, in From Jesus to John, ed. by Martinus de Boer (Sheffield: 
JSOT, 1993), pp. 21–37; Theissen and Merz, The Historical Jesus, 
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219. Bakunin, God and the State, p. 33. See Simon Western, 
‘Autonomist Leadership in Leaderless Movements: Anarchists 
Leading the Way’, Ephemera: Theory & Politics in Organization, 14 
(2014), 673–698.
220. See Richard P. Saller, Personal Patronage Under the Early Empire 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
221. Mark 10.42–44; see also Matthew 20.20–28, Luke 22.24–27; 
Matthew 18.1–5, Mark 9.33–37, Luke 9.46–48; see John 13.1–11.
222. Myers in Van Steenwyk, Holy Anarchist, p. 8.
223. 1 Samuel 8.7. 1 Samuel 8.10–18 includes a stinging critique of 
the exploitation that results from monarchy.
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224. The idea that the messiah would be identified by the healings 
he carried out, assumed in the tradition of Jesus’ answer to John the 
Baptist (Matthew 11.2–6, Luke 7.18–23) is almost entirely absent 
from our sources for Jewish messianic expectations at the time. It 
can only be found in Dead Sea Scroll 4Q521. See Lidija Novakovic, 
‘4Q521: The Works of the Messiah or the Signs of the Messianic 
Time?’, in Qumran Studies, ed. by Michael Thomas Davis and Brent 
A. Strawn (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2007), pp. 208–231.
225. E.g. Matthew 10.8, Luke 10.9.
226. Matthew 19.28, Luke 22.28–30. Cf. Psalms of Solomon 17.26. 
Gerd Theissen, ‘Gruppenmessianismus: Überlegungen zum Ursprung 
der Kirche im Jüngerkreis Jesu’, Jahrbuch für Biblische Theologie, 7 
(1992), 101–123.
227. This is most obvious in the arrest narratives. See Matthew 
26:47–56, Mark 14:43–52, Luke 22:47–53, John 18:1–11.
228. Benjamin Franks, Rebel Alliances: The Means and Ends of 
Contemporary British Anarchisms (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2006), 
p. 93.
229. Franks, Rebel Alliances, p. 98.
230. Matthew 13.31, Mark 4.31; Luke 13.18–19, Thomas 20.
231. Graeber, Direct Action, p. 203.
232. Matthew 21.13, Mark 11.15–19, Luke 19.45–48, John 2.13–17.
233. Matthew 22.15–22, Mark 12.13–17, Luke 20.20–26, Thomas 
100, Egerton Papyrus 2.
234. Matthew 26.57–27.26, Mark 14.53–15.15, Luke 22.54–25, 
John 18.12–19.16.
235. Graeber, Direct Action, p. 114.
236. See, for example, Matthew 17.19–27; Matthew 18.3, Mark 
9.15, Luke 18.17.
237. Marshall, Demanding, p. 75.
238. Justin J. Meggitt, ‘Review of Mary Ann Beavis, Jesus & Utopia: 
Looking for the Kingdom of God in the Roman World’, Utopian 
Studies, 18 (2007), 281–284.
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239. See, for example, the use of a fictional anarchist utopia in Ursula 
Le Guin, The Dispossessed: An Ambiguous Utopia (New York: 
HarperPrism, 1974).
240. See the classic anarchist critique Marie Louise Berneri, Journey 
Through Utopia (London: Freedom Press, 1982).
241. Franks, Rebel Alliances, p. 99.
242. Matthew 15.21–28, Mark 7.24–30.
243. Mark 13.53–58, Mark 6.1–6a; cf. Luke 4.16–30.
244. Matthew 16.13–23, Mark 8.27–33, Luke 9.18–22.
245. See, for example, Bockmuehl, This Jesus, p. 86.
246. Henry Joel Cadbury, The Peril of Modernizing Jesus (New York: 
Macmillan, 1937), p. 141.
247. Judith Suissa, Anarchism and Education: A Philosophical 
Perspective, 2nd edn (Oakland: PM Press, 2010), p. 149.
248. Justin Mueller, ‘Anarchism, the State, and the Role of Education’, 
in Anarchist Pedagogies: Collective Actions, Theories, and Critical 
Reflections on Education, ed. by Robert H. Haworth (Oakland: PM 
Press, 2012), pp. 14–31 (p. 14).
249. Mueller, ‘Anarchism’, pp. 18–19.
250. Matthew 5.44; Luke 6.27, 35 (Romans 12.12–21).
251. Matthew 19.3–12, Mark 10.2–12; Matthew 5.31–32; Luke 
16.18 (1 Corinthians 7.10).
252. For example, Matthew 22.1–14, Luke 14.15–24, Thomas 64; 
Matthew 25.31–46; Luke 10.25–37; 15.11–32; 16.19–31.
253. Christoyannopoulos, Christian Anarchism, p. 118.
254. Myers, Binding the Strong Man, p. 383.
255. For the use of the term see Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God, 
pp. 86, 98.
256. A. E. Harvey, Jesus and the Constraints of History (London: 
Duckworth, 1982), p. 16.
257. Matthew 27.37, Mark 15.26, Luke 23.38, John 19:19, 21.
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258. For further discussion of this, see Meggitt, ‘Madness’.
259. Corley, Women and the Historical Jesus. Jesus’ message clearly 
appealed to some women, who were significant in the early move-
ment, but probably because it embodied the more liberative tenden-
cies visible in some forms of Judaism of the time, and elsewhere in the 
empire, or because of what it offered the poor and oppressed more 
generally.
260. A point forcefully made by James Crossley, Jesus and the Chaos of 
History: Redirecting the Life of the Historical Jesus (Oxford:Oxford 
University Press, 2015), pp. 64–95.
261. Barclay, People Without Government, p. 18.
262. Paul Chambers, ‘Review of Christian Anarchism: A Political 
Commentary by Alexandre Christoyannopoulos’, Anarchist Studies, 
20 (2012), 109–111 (p. 110).
263. For those who reject such a capacious understanding of the 
term ‘anarchist’, at the very least there is sufficient evidence here to 
say that the historical Jesus displayed “an anarchist sensibility”, and 
can legitimately be ranked alongside other figures like Aurobindo, 
Berdyaev, Blake, Gandhi and Tolstoy who are descibed in such a way 
by Brian Morris. See Brian Morris, ‘Review of Paul Cudenec, The 
Anarchist Revelation: Being What We Are Meant to Be’, Anarchist 
Studies, 23 (2015), 111–15 (p. 112).
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A Reflection on Mystical Anarchism in the 
Works of Gustav Landauer and Eric Voegelin
Franziska Hoppen
University of Kent, UK
While German anarchist philosopher Gustav Landauer and 
American political scientist Eric Voegelin have each inspired sig-
nificant scholarly comment, these two figures have not yet been 
brought into contact with one another. This paper seeks to draw 
attention to the similarities in their work, exploring Landauer’s and 
Voegelin’s mystical anarchism, the foundation of their critique of 
politics, and visions of what they describe as a true, anti-political 
community. According to both thinkers, the cornerstone for com-
munity is the essential unity between an individual’s direct, unme-
diated experience of being, and its knowledge of being, forming its 
most primary reality. Politics, they state, only becomes necessary 
when this unity is separated, functioning to maintain the separation 
by foreclosing experience and externalising knowledge. Thus, pol-
itics creates a substitutional, second reality and a particularist so-
ciety, which encompasses a people’s new self-interpretation. While 
the two thinkers have identified this substitutional reality in need of 
constant self-defence as the basis for 20th-century totalitarian poli-
tics, they also argue that primary reality can at all times be remem-
bered. Through a process which Landauer refers to as “separation” 
and Voegelin as “anamnesis”, the individual may re-access primor-
dial reality, radiating its knowledge into, and thereby transforming, 
second reality.
This paper is a personal reflection on anarchism from a mystical 
perspective, guided by the works of German anarchist philoso-
pher Gustav Landauer (1870–1919) and American political sci-
entist Eric Voegelin (1901–1985), focussing specifically on their 
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conception of community. Although seemingly little connects 
those two thinkers, an exploration of their respective critiques of 
political practice and science, both rooted in mystical philosophy,1 
reveals a significant degree of cohesion. Since their work has not 
yet been brought into contact with one another, this chapter seeks 
to articulate a comprehensive outline of the above theme. While 
there exist differences in aim, scope and argumentation between 
Landauer and Voegelin, differences that invite further investiga-
tion, the following reflections focus on the similarities and general 
coherence in their work, with the aim of thereby contributing to a 
discussion on mystical anarchism.
At the centre of Landauer’s and Voegelin’s critique of politics 
lies a theme reoccurring throughout their works: the separation of 
the experience of being from the knowledge of being, severing the 
direct link that connects the individual to the world within which 
she finds herself. Politics, both thinkers argued, emerges from this 
situation of separation to create, through a system of thought and 
practices, a second, imaginary reality that encompasses a people’s 
new interpretation of the world. Simultaneously, politics seeks to 
ensure, through its various norms, discourses and techniques, the 
foreclosure of reality so that a restoration of the link between 
experience and knowledge remains deferred. Politics thus func-
tions as a surrogate for what both Landauer and Voegelin iden-
tified as the true commune of the individual with herself, others 
and the world. Consequently, the condition of politics can only be 
overcome through deep experience of the individual’s unmediated 
relationship with reality. Both Landauer and Voegelin based this 
argument on the claim of a unity of existence, whose multiplicity of 
existents issues from a single, common source2 which reveals itself 
within each being and the world and yet extends infinitely beyond 
it. As the world is already within each being, the quest for order 
does not lead via ordering the world from the outside through 
politics, but inside the self, becoming the world. Community, from 
this perspective, is not situated in the particularity of an extrin-
sic self-interpretation, but is, rather, the situating “alliance of the 
plenty”3 originating within the cosmos.4 This chapter argues that 
anarchism in the works of Landauer and Voegelin is concentrated 
in the argument that the self is the primary reality by which the 
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individual comes to know all other realities, and that the self is 
the starting point in the struggle for change. This claim is read as 
mystical to the extent that the experience of the self involves the 
rediscovery of a primary or originary union with the world.
A short introduction to Landauer and Voegelin
At first sight, the anarchist-socialist revolutionary Landauer, 
considered to be the “most influential German anarchist intel-
lectual of the twentieth century,”5 and German born American 
political scientist Eric Voegelin, known for his philosophy of con-
sciousness, seem to have little in common. Landauer promoted 
anarchism,6 Voegelin was highly critical of it; Landauer sought 
to overcome not just the state but politics altogether,7 Voegelin 
seemingly considered it a necessary evil; Landauer participated 
in the revolutionary Bavarian Council Republic, Voegelin held 
a deep-seated mistrust of the masses and utopian ideas. There 
is no evidence of any personal connection between the two phi-
losophers, and Voegelin does not appear to have read Landauer. 
However, Voegelin might have studied Landauer’s translations 
of German mystic Meister Eckhart’s sermons, while researching 
the latter, or his translations of Bakunin, Tolstoy or Kropotkin, 
when he formulated his criticism of their anarchism. Moreover, 
Voegelin studied the works of Jewish philosopher, and friend of 
Landauer, Martin Buber8 whose work was partly influenced by 
Landauer and vice versa.9
A short summary of Landauer’s and Voegelin’s respective bi-
ographies shows how, despite their writing within different his-
torical contexts and challenging different forces of authoritarian 
oppression, a common concern and thread of investigation none-
theless emerges in their work. Beneath Landauer’s various anar-
chist projects, practical as well as literary, can be found a common 
unifying theme that “We are piteously divided.”10 Landauer re-
ferred to the division between society and politics, to the division 
between members of an increasingly atomised society and, most 
importantly, to the division of the individual from herself. This 
theme remained prominent throughout Landauer’s life, thought 
and activism, forming the centre of his work. Already as a young 
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student, Landauer felt that his desire for “purity, beauty and ful-
filment” found resonance neither in the school curriculum nor 
the political scene, but only in the world of “theatre, music and 
especially books.” Thus, he argued, “the reason for my opposi-
tion to society, as well as the reason for my continued dreams 
and my outrage, was not class identity or even compassion, 
but the permanent collision of romantic desire with philistine 
limitation.”11 As a literary Bohemian in Berlin during the early 
1890s Landauer received a Marxist education and grew aware 
of the divisions between politicians’ words and deeds. He then 
joined a radical group called Verein Unabhängiger Sozialisten 
(Association of Independent Socialists, short Die Jungen),12 wrote 
for their journal Der Sozialist, of which he would later become 
editor, and campaigned against the Social Democratic Party of 
Germany (SPD). Yet, Landauer soon grew disillusioned with what 
he perceived as a tendency amongst the workers to merely await 
a revolution led by political elites, rather than organise in the here 
and now. Simultaneously, Landauer distanced himself from fellow 
anarchists and socialists, who fought amongst each other instead 
of for the common cause. With his program of anarchism-so-
cialism, declaring that “anarchism is the goal…. socialism is the 
means…” he alienated both groups alike and began to focus on 
 consumer-producer cooperatives and the non-industrial sector, 
arguing for a return to the countryside and meaningful labour.13
After a year-long prison term in 1899, during which Landauer 
translated parts of German medieval mystic Meister Eckhart’s 
sermons into modern German14, and edited the linguist Fritz 
Mauthner’s Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache (Contributions 
to a Critique of Language), Landauer began to formulate ma-
tured, explicitly mystical texts, focussing on the possibility of 
retrieving true community through mystical access to the world 
and its natural order. Using and developing the theories of 
Mauther and, implicitly,15 Meister Eckhart, these texts include 
Durch Absonderung zur Gemeinschaft (Through Separation to 
Community, 1900), Anarchische Gedanken über Anarchismus, 
(Anarchic Thoughts on Anarchism, 1901), Skepsis und Mystik, 
(Scepticism and Mysticism,1903), Revolution (1907) and Aufruf 
zum Sozialismus, (Call to Socialism, 1911).
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After 1901, Landauer re-immersed himself in political activism, 
attempting to realise his envisioned community in various proj-
ects. Notably, he founded the Sozialistische Bund (Socialist Union) 
in 1908, seeking to create small, independent, artistic coopera-
tives and settlements as the basic cells of a new, socialist culture. 
Yet, like most of his projects, the Sozialistische Bund was dis-
solved in 1914 due to lack of commitment amongst its members. 
Landauer’s probably best known and more ambiguous activist in-
volvement was his participation in the Bavarian Democratic and 
Social Republic,16 following the German Revolution. Despite his 
Antipolitik he became the Minister of Culture and even drafted 
the constitution of the Bavarian Council Republic.17 Landauer ap-
pears to have hoped that Bavaria could become the germ cell for 
the federalised Germany he envisioned, based on grass-roots de-
mocracy and communities that would form according to historical 
and cultural background, and in which all members of the public 
could be involved in decentralised councils. Yet, his enthusiasm 
soon gave way to disillusionment when he realised that many par-
ticipants merely sought to prepare for the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat. In 1919, the SPD sent military units into Munich to arrest 
the opposition, and Landauer was assassinated on May 2, 1919.
Voegelin’s life, at first sight, appears to be antonymous to that 
of Landauer. Having lived through World War I as an adolescent, 
through Austria’s political, economic and cultural turmoil as a 
doctoral candidate under Hans Kelsen, and through the rise of 
Nazism in Germany and Austria, Voegelin tasked himself with 
the exploration of the causes of what he considered to be the 
twentieth century’s great spiritual degeneration,18 made manifest 
in the various forms of political violence and ideological mass 
movements. Decisive for Voegelin’s later work was his encounter 
with common sense philosophy during a scholarship in America 
in 1924. While political science at the University of Vienna was 
preoccupied with methodological questions about epistemology, 
common sense philosophy confirmed Voegelin’s assumption that 
the reality of experience was self-interpretive.19 He argued that 
all people share a type of rationality based on the ordinary, direct 
experience of reality without any technical apparatus, being the 
everyman’s natural ability to grasp truth and order, which is then 
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expressed in symbols. From 1924 onwards experience was at the 
centre of Voegelin’s thought, and he became occupied with ex-
ploring the trails of such symbolisms.
In 1933, the year Hitler came to power, Voegelin published 
Race and State and The History of the Race Idea, investigating 
the symbols of race science and the emergence of the Nazi ideolo-
gy’s racist idea of the state.20 Therein, he clarified that the author-
itarian state was not a theoretical concept but a political symbol 
which rested on the dogmatic reduction of the human experience 
of reality to its physical dimensions, discounting mind, spirit 
and history, thereby radically mutilating the unity of the human 
form. Unsurprisingly, the works were banned in Germany almost 
immediately.
In 1938 Voegelin fled to the United States, where he became 
a citizen in 1944. His project for the coming decades was the 
formulation of an extensive history of political ideas, as a side ef-
fect of which Voegelin developed his philosophy of consciousness, 
a maturation of his previous explorations of experience and its 
symbols. At its centre and at the heart of his future philosophical 
endeavours was the explication of the experience of consciousness 
as the first reality, one that is forever caught between immanent 
and transcendent poles of existence.21 After World War II Voegelin 
used this argument to theorise that political ideologies, especially 
totalitarian politics, were quests for an absolute reality, one in 
which the in-between state of consciousness could be overcome. 
Yet, as the search for certainty requires eliminating evidence of the 
contrary, the desire for absolute reality limits the individual’s view 
of human reality. The resulting alienation from reality can only be 
overcome, Voegelin argued, through the creation of an alternative, 
“second reality”, which would make the individual’s curtailed vi-
sion of reality appear absolute.
In 1958 Voegelin returned to Munich University, taking up 
a chair in political science. In his famous lecture series “Hitler 
and the Germans” he argued that the refusal of some Germans 
to accept their responsibility for Nazism was a dramatic example 
of such a second reality. Voegelin returned to America in 1969, 
joining Stanford University and the Hoover Institution, where he 
remained until his death.
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Voegelin’s life work was dedicated to philosophy, which he con-
sidered the critical clarification of the present disorder, bringing to 
consciousness the true order of reality and persuading others to 
join in the quest, forming communities of the spirit which may, 
eventually, achieve social effectiveness.22
At the core of both philosophers’ projects lies the attempt to 
restore order through experience of and participation in the locus 
of the world’s self-revelation within oneself. Landauer’s work was 
predominantly concerned with the political perpetuation of the 
division between the individual’s personal experience of reality, its 
desire for “purity, beauty and fulfilment” on the one hand, and the 
exterior, political circumstances with their “philistine limitations” 
on the other, with which it “permanently collided.”23 Landauer 
found, in other words, a reality within the individual, and one 
outside of it, both disconnected by (and outside reality governed 
by) political regiment. Similar to Landauer, Voegelin’s work re-
volved around the separation between two realities: the first re-
ality which society refused to apperceive (the reality in between 
whose existential poles consciousness is caught) and the second 
reality created from within this refusal with the purpose to per-
manently separate imaginary reality from reality, so that the imag-
inary could become absolute. Politics, for Landauer and Voegelin, 
is merely symptomatic of the individual’s division from reality. 
Thus, both dealt, albeit in various ways that will be explored be-
low, with the separation of experiencing reality from knowing 
about reality, and with the role politics plays in upholding that 
separation. The following section will highlight how Landauer 
and Voegelin envisioned politics, in particular the state and politi-
cal ideology, as imaginary reality and how they concluded that its 
true purpose lay in separating the individual’s experience from its 
knowledge of reality.
Politics and political science as imaginary reality:
Disappointed with the theories and practices of contemporary an-
archists, Landauer published an essay critiquing the misconcep-
tion of the state as a reified institution that can be overcome by 
violent revolution. Published in 1910 as Schwache Staatsmänner, 
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schwächeres Volk (Weak statesmen, weaker people), the essay 
contains Landauer’s most widely quoted statement:
A table can be overturned and a window can be smashed. However, 
those who believe that the state is also a thing or a fetish that can 
be overturned or smashed are sophists and believers in the Word. 
The state is a social relationship; a certain way of people relating 
to one another. It can be destroyed by creating new social relation-
ships; i.e., by people relating to one another differently. The abso-
lute monarch said: I am the state. We, who we have imprisoned 
ourselves in the absolute state, must realise the truth: we are the 
state! And we will be the state as long as we are nothing different; 
as long as we have not yet created the institutions necessary for a 
true community and a true society of human beings. 24
Landauer’s anarchist critique was not directed against the illegiti-
mate rule of the state (archein), rather it recognised that the state, 
far from being a singular centre of top-down power and domina-
tion, consists of the micro-power and network structures of each 
member. Power, for Landauer, lay in the hands of the oppressed as 
well as of the oppressors, its front line running through each indi-
vidual. It is precisely because “we are the state”, that we have the 
power to organise differently, though it requires, and is only possi-
ble if, we first recognise that it was we who have “imprisoned our-
selves”, that there is no state to be overcome, but only ourselves.25
The essential problem to which Landauer’s political struggle 
drew attention was the difference between the state as an ideo-
logical excuse on the one hand, and lived reality on the other. He 
argued that “we speak of the state without thinking. This word 
designates nothing but a definite condition of a public-legal na-
ture in which we persist with our wills. It is the reification of what 
are in fact fluid and spiritual relations; it does injury to our per-
ception because we take an expedient for naked reality.”26 What 
Landauer effectively argued was that no such thing as “the state” 
exists, that it is only language creating an illusion in which the 
state appears as a “thing or a fetish” It is a reified institution and 
central unity, constructing out of the openness and fluidity of so-
cial relationships order, norms, practices, discourses, technologies 
and essential identities.
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Yet, we “persist in this definite condition” with our will. The 
state is “no reality that exists independently from the people. 
There is no ‘state’ on the one hand, and people who live in it on 
the other. The ‘state’ much rather belongs to what people do and 
understand. People do not live in the state. The state lives in the 
people.”27 It is not the state which creates a people but a peo-
ple which create and organise symbols and ideological systems 
as their mode of self-interpretation, shaping social relationships 
accordingly. In other words, the state is the externalisation of 
the self when its internal reference points cease to have meaning, 
functioning as its substitute.28 The state is there,
to create order and the possibility to continue living amid all this 
spiritless nonsense, confusion, hardship and degeneracy. The state, 
with its schools, churches, courts, prisons, workhouses, the state 
with its army and its police; the state with its soldiers, officials 
and prostitutes. Where there is no spirit and no inner compulsion, 
there is external force, regimentation, the state. Where spirit is, 
there is society. Where unspirit is, there is the state. The state is the 
surrogate for spirit.29
It is “not a particular type of the state that causes oppression, but 
self-coercion, self-denial, and the worst of all emotions: mistrust 
towards others and oneself. All this is engrained in the notion of 
the state itself…”30 Thus, Landauer asked, “Is it not like a game of 
echo? What are the people afraid of? The people. Who obstructs 
the masses? The masses. You are your own enemy!”31 Eventually, 
Landauer argued, symbolic reality is substituted for reality itself. 
While the state is a human creation, it requires its creator’s con-
stant service in order to maintain itself, on account of not be-
ing an invention made at a single point in time, but a continu-
ous process of self-denial. Repetition, ultimately, consolidates.32 
Therefore Landauer described the state as an illusory construction 
(Scheingebilde),33 a “perfected nothingness,”34 and its politics as 
an illusion of reality (Schein der Wirklichkeit).35 His critique was 
not directed against archos, the ruler, but against arche, which, 
as Benjamin Tucker writes, “comes to mean a first principle, an 
element; then first place, supreme power, sovereignty, dominion, 
command, authority; and finally a sovereignty, an empire, a realm, 
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a magistracy, a government office.”36 Arche is the creation of a 
world of appearances, curtailing open and fluid reality with the 
aim to obliterate it. The state is merely symptomatic of arche. In 
fact, Landauer reiterated that he opposed any arche, “any fight 
that is led for or against word-constructs as if they were reality.”37
Voegelin discussed a similar problem in his 1933 work Race 
and State.38 Therein, he argued that the particular community, 
for example the racially defined community, is not constituted 
through an outside (such as the state), but that, on the contrary, 
particularity begins as an idea. Just as Landauer found that the 
state consists of social relationships, Voegelin argued that the par-
ticular community is “a thought construct in the minds of the peo-
ple sharing in it, and precisely by appearing in the subjective idea 
the community also becomes objective reality.”39 Like Landauer, 
who argued that the state emerges as a solution out of “spirit-
lessness and chaos,” arising when experience no longer produces 
meaningful knowledge, Voegelin found that the particular com-
munity emerges as an expression of a feeling of separation from 
humanity and of a lack of essential social experience. The loss 
of the unity of humanity under God,40 he argued, gave rise to 
the first institutions that sought to conserve at least partial unity 
and provide meaning under the banner of a certain particularity. 
However, as particularity always contains the experience of a loss 
of the world, each people sees their own particularity reflected in 
that of other communities, and begins to flee from this sight “by 
claiming for itself the status of the ‘world’ and regarding all others 
as ‘non world’”. Fear of the other, then, becomes “the deepest root 
of the new idea of community”, and the claim of superiority and 
uniqueness grows ever more exaggerated. 41 Only later, during his 
Hitler and the Germans lectures, did Voegelin refer to this false 
image of reality, or Ersatz-reality which eclipses genuine reality, as 
“second reality.”42 Simply put, a second reality is the construction 
of a system; but “since reality has not the character of a system, 
a system is always false; and if it claims to portray reality, it can 
only be maintained with the trickery of an intellectual swindle.”43
Voegelin’s 1936 publication The Authoritarian State discussed 
to what extent political and legal sciences were complicit in this 
intellectual swindle, when they researched the phenomenon of the 
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state. Scholarly discussion of political subjects, Voegelin argued, 
while being concerned with developing sharply defined concepts 
of their subjects, ignored the fact that their definitiveness did not 
hold in reality. Methodology, Voegelin stated, had replaced on-
tology, so that the scientific method falsely constituted the object 
of its science, guaranteeing the unity of the scientific object by 
the unity of a methodological system of categories. The object of 
research that concerned a certain segment of reality, such as the 
state, was subordinated to the method used to approach reality, 
and since methodology was a closed system of categories, so the 
object was determined by it. Hence, he urged political science to 
distinguish between political symbol on the one hand and theo-
retical concept on the other, and not simply attempt to assign to a 
political symbol an epistemologically correct meaning. Thus,
By recognising political language for what it is, we integrate it into 
the reality of the state as one of its components. Refusing to misun-
derstand the creation of a political symbol as an act of perception, 
renouncing the assumption that the political symbol has to mean 
something and not just be something, allows us to understand it 
as a symbol in the full richness and force of its expression…. The 
elements of the situation in which the political symbol has its place 
become visible only when we do not act as if the perspective of the 
concept were identical with the perspective of the symbol.44
Voegelin’s analysis of the contradictions both within Nazi race 
ideology and political science’s methodological preoccupations 
can be read, like Landauer’s analysis of the state, as a critique of 
arche, substituting imaginary reality for reality itself.
Landauer, in turn, described what he considered the original pur-
pose of science. In order to generate knowledge about the mean-
ing of its experiences, he argued, the individual has to explore the 
world, providing her senses with objective data for her soul to in-
terpret.45 Yet, being is not only experienced by the senses, but also 
by the spirit, non-linguistically and non-rationally.46 It follows that 
the world cannot be explained materialistically alone, for the emer-
gence of the spirit from material is mystery. 47 Rather, Landauer 
argued, the purpose of science is to contemplate experience so 
that practice can be meaningfully attuned to knowledge.48 This 
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type of science is an existential, lifelong process, which, despite the 
awareness that ultimate knowledge is impossible, resists escaping 
through arche. This conception of science resembles the philosophy 
of common sense which influenced Voegelin. Both are intuitive, the 
everyday person’s experience of self-reflective reality, and both seek 
order and resistance against indoctrination and dogma.
However, Landauer also argued that the purpose of modern 
science has become radically different. He dated the root of that 
change back to the Middle Ages, when the sacred texts and tra-
ditions of Christianity underwent a divorce from their symbol-
ic meaning.49 As scripture was reduced to literal meaning and 
opaque facts, the Christian community split into the Church on 
the one hand, seeking knowledge through literary interpretation, 
and into mystics and heretics on the other, seeking to protect sym-
bolism from rationalist analysis. The principle of the unity of ex-
istence and common spirit, as they were revealed through those 
symbolisms50, were thenceforth no longer valid as a communi-
ty’s ordering force. Its surrogate became a new form of science, 
focusing on the natural world to generate meaning.51 Subjective 
input was eliminated, and sciences based on the immediate datum 
of experience were declared superstition. As knowledge was ob-
jectified, producing mental abstractions and mechanical laws, the 
individual came to be viewed as an isolated body whose existence 
in the world was accidental, without further meaning or purpose. 
Humanity no longer considered itself a part of the universe it 
could only become its conqueror, transforming science into the 
method to achieve power and domination, instead of knowledge, 
to disguise its lack thereof. Landauer stated,
But they do not have you [spirit], and therefore they replace you. 
Therefore they concoct their illusory counterfeit, the surrogate 
product of their historical patch work and their scientific laws: 
they recognize only one convincing general principle that forms, 
correlates and coordinates details and connects scattered facts, 
namely: science. Indeed science is spirit, order, unity and solidarity: 
when it is science. But when it is a swindle and monkey-business, 
when the supposed man of science is only a journalist in disguise… 
when statistically formulated heaps of facts…claim to be a sort of 
higher mathematics of history and an infallible instruction-manual 
210 Essays in Anarchism and Religion: Volume 1
for future life then this so-called science is unspirit, an impediment 
to the intellect.52
This type of science, while producing facts, cannot and must not 
provide knowledge in the sense of traditional science, because it 
is, like politics, symptomatic of arche. Landauer then contrast-
ed the representative of such scientific thinking, referred to as 
“professor”, whose mind is closed to reality, with the “prophet”, 
whose spirit is fully open and who serves the creation of a future 
which raises true community from its potentiality within symbols 
to actuality.53 While the prophet warns of foreclosing reality, the 
professor does precisely that, and is, thereby, the statesman’s ally.
Both thinkers then proceeded to explain the detrimental effects 
of arche, its statesmen and professors, on the community. As the 
previous section showed, to maintain itself and the appearance of 
reality as a system, fluidity and openness, which are natural to social 
relationships, are hidden and destroyed. Society becomes an infinite 
deferral of direct engagement54 in a complex network of expedient 
reality. Its order is a collection of separated individualities, attributes 
and representations,55 coexisting within their enclosed, segmented 
spaces as, in Landauer’s words, “a mad cluster of purposes,”56 force 
and self-constraint, interacting alongside the governed nodal points 
of legislated existence. This rigidification is ultimately incompatible 
with life, for Landauer argued, “there is clarity only in the land of 
appearances and words. Where life begins, systems end”57, so that, 
“death is the atmosphere between us.”58 Because arche requires rep-
etition, society grows ever more dehumanising. Totalitarian politics 
and the ideological mass movements which Landauer and Voegelin 
encountered in Wilhelmine Germany and the Third Reich respec-
tively, appear to be not an aberration from politics, but, rather, the 
logical path of arche. To explore, in contrast to this society, the pos-
sibilities for true community, this differentiation between substitute 
and reality must be restored.
Returning to reality
The starting point Landauer and Voegelin appear to agree, is 
the individual herself and, more precisely, her spirit (Landauer) 
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or consciousness (Voegelin),59 constituting for both thinkers the 
most primary reality which generates knowledge before any inter-
mediary, such as politics, could interfere with its experience. For 
Voegelin, to break the illusion of imaginative second reality was 
possible because,
There is no imaginative oblivion without remembrance…There is, 
furthermore, no remembrance or oblivion without the existential 
consciousness to which the acts in reflective distance pertain. And 
finally, there is no existential consciousness without the reality in 
which it is conscious of occurring…60
In other words, reality can merely be hidden through oblivion, but 
it cannot be destroyed. The nature of reality is such that the fact 
of existence itself will arouse remembrance of it- usually when the 
symbols of imaginative reality, e.g. the racist state, cease to have 
meaning in the reality in which they occur, revealing the limits of 
their doctrinal truths. Reality re-asserts itself by penetrating the 
experience of being, for example through encounters or events 
whose meaning transcends the logical and fathomable realm of 
senses and reason, and, as unfathomable mystery, arouses “awe” 
within consciousness. “The total being”, Voegelin wrote, “is an 
apex of mind, animal and vegetative animation, inanimate matter. 
Death, sleep, dream, illness, fear, ecstasy, mystical submersion to 
God, spiritual self-involvement of meditation, all of which serve 
as a vantage point for speculation.”61 According to Voegelin mys-
tery, which raises questions about the “what for?”, “where from 
and to?” and “why?” of existence, is a basic every day experience 
of reality. Thus, he stated,
Man is not a self-created, autonomous being carrying the origin 
and meaning of his existence within himself. He is not a divine 
causa sui; from the experience of his life in precarious existence 
within the limits of birth and death there rather arises the wonder-
ing question about the ultimate ground, the aitia or proto arche, 
of all reality and specifically his own…this questioning is inherent 
in man’s experience of himself at all times.62
Landauer described this speculative moment and the awakening 
of individual spirit in a similar way, especially in his philosophical 
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masterpiece Skepsis und Mystik.63 While being in the world im-
plies the continuous generation of new and different sense expe-
riences, reflected in language metaphors, he argued, experience 
also transcends the grasp of senses and language. He identified 
the Seelenhafte, the “function of the endless universe”64 within 
the individual as the locus of the universe’s self-revelation and 
the individual’s non-linguistic, non-rational, mystical access to the 
world, disclosing the unattainability of absolute knowledge of the 
world. Through its Seelenhafte the individual is united with the 
world, yet only to the extent that the individual grows to know 
that it cannot know its essence. While the root of human existence 
lies within the world, the world also mysteriously transcends it, so 
that all reality can be experienced at once as being and beyond be-
ing.65 This mystical access cannot be lost, but only forgotten, for 
“the connection is never broken, but our superficial mind cannot 
remember its origins, cannot recognise the ever-present source in 
ourselves, and not allow it to flourish.”66 Spirit then creates a new 
Weltanschauung from both of these levels of experience as the 
foundation for action in the world.67
For both Landauer and Voegelin, therefore, the key to over-
coming the separation of knowing and being lies, quite simply, 
in “unprecedented, intense, deep experience.”68 According to 
Landauer experience reveals that “[e]verything that appears to us 
as separated, is in the reality of infinite space und infinite time 
only a single, large connected whole.”69 The feeling that humani-
ty is simply the sum of its individual components is but “human 
perception as it is served by the individual organs of our senses.”70 
Nothing, least of all the individual, could be summoned under the 
principle of arche. Hence, he decided that,
I leave behind the only thing that seems certain within myself; I 
now float into the uncertain world of hypotheses and fantasies. 
I reject the certainty of my I so that I can bear life. I try to build 
myself a new world, knowing that I do not really have any ground 
to build it on…Just like someone who jumps into the water to kill 
himself, I jump into the world- but instead of death, I find life.71
Instead of transforming the world “into the spirit of man, or into 
the spirit of our brain,”72 which had dragged the world down to 
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that which could be grasped by reason and the senses, Landauer 
sought to raise himself to the world. The world is “unfathomably 
rich,” he wrote, “the world is without language. Language, the 
intellect, cannot serve us in bringing the world closer. But as a 
speechless part of nature the human being transforms itself into 
everything, because it touches everything. This is where mysticism 
begins.”73 Mysticism is a deep, intense experience of being, of let-
ting oneself “be grasped and seized by it. Until now everything has 
been divided into a poor, weak, active I and an unapproachable 
rigid, lifeless, passive world. Let us instead be the medium of the 
world, both active and passive.”74 The human being does not just 
perceive the world as a reality that lies outside of it, she is herself 
already the world. This will be experienced “by all who…are able 
to recreate the original chaos in themselves and to become specta-
tors at the drama of their own desires and deepest secrets.”75
Landauer’s argument of “becoming the medium of the world” 
resonates with what Voegelin described as “participation in the 
ground of being whose logos has to be brought to clarity through 
the meditative exegesis of itself. The illusion of a ‘theory’ had to give 
way to the reality of the meditative process; and this process had to 
go through its phases of increasing experience and insight.”76 Just 
like Landauer advised not to limit knowledge of the world to that 
which the “brain” can grasp, Voegelin warned of wanting to create 
objectively verifiable theories and generically valid propositions re-
garding the ground of being,77 because its structure can only truly 
be verified experientially, through personal experience and a re-
flective-meditative process. Both Landauer and Voegelin concluded 
that the “world” or “ground of being”, implicating those realms 
that lie beyond sense experience, intellect and reason, is not some-
thing outside of the individual that can be explored from the sepa-
rated position of the observer, but that it is, rather, already within 
the individual. The experience of being the world, of participating 
in the ground of being, renders a distinction between an inside and 
outside, objective and subjective superfluous.
The deeper the individual dives into herself, becoming the 
world, the more she also separates herself from the arche of reali-
ty, with its supposedly isolated, concrete and autonomous bodies 
that form society; it is an an-archist inward movement. Landauer 
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referred to this process of re-uniting with true reality as “separa-
tion” from false reality, which constitutes, simultaneously, a form 
of self-annihilation, because the imaginative “I kills itself so that 
the world-I can live.”78 An anarchist kills only himself, Landauer 
wrote, “in the mystical sense, in order to be reborn after having 
descended into the depths of their soul”.79 An anarchist is some-
one who, through separation, becomes a nobody in the terms of 
society, moving beyond all names, race, colour, country or nation 
and who yet becomes a somebody in the highest, spiritual sense of 
the term by reconnecting to true community. The specific quality 
of the anarchist’s “world-I” is that it has no quality, because the 
annihilated soul that has become conscious to itself knows that it 
cannot know itself fully, and that no attributes can serve to char-
acterise its own or any other individual’s being. Thus,
The way to a newer, higher form of human society passes by the 
dark, fatal gate of our instincts and the terra abscondita- the “hid-
den land” of our soul, which is our world. This world can only 
be constructed from within. We can discover this land, this rich 
world, if we’re able to create a new kind of human being through 
chaos and anarchy, through unprecedented, intense, deep experi-
ence. Each one of us has to do this.80
This process of separation is reflected in Voegelin’s description of 
the re-uniting of knowing and being, to which he gave the Greek 
term anamnesis, or remembrance.81 According to Voegelin, an-
amnesis is to bring to the presence of knowledge that which has 
wrongly been forgotten, revealing it as knowledge in the mode of 
oblivion, where it has aroused such existential unrest that it had to 
be raised to knowledge through remembrance. Precisely, anamne-
sis is the remembrance of experiences that have “opened sources 
of excitation, from which issue the urge to further philosophical 
reflection”, such as experiences of transcendence in space, time, 
matter, dreams, etc. Through its recalling of truths about the im-
manent and transcendent structure of the real or about the “or-
der of reality”, anamnesis constitutes a process of unlearning and 
unknowing of the imaginative limitations of the second reality, 
recovering “the human condition revealing itself in consciousness, 
when it is smothered by the debris of opaque symbols.”82
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For both Landauer and Voegelin the process of re-connection 
is an experiential descending into consciousness, or spirit, with 
the aim of clearing out, in Voegelin’s words, “all ideological junk 
to make the conditio humana visible once again.”83 In particular, 
Voegelin proposed the method of recounting childhood or pre-re-
flective experiences that had raised questions about mind and re-
ality, moments of awareness “that cause one to apprehend some 
part of reality as opaque, as something that calls for interpre-
tation.”84 However, the interpretation of awe inducing moments 
does not remain a purely personal and individual endeavour, but 
the interpretation of consciousness also implies a re-interpreta-
tion of one’s relationships to reality. According to Voegelin, one 
remembers moments that impel
toward reflection and do so because they have excited conscious-
ness to the “awe” of existence. The nature of the irrupting experi-
ences and of the excitations they induce, together with the result 
of an “attunement” of consciousness to its “problems” seem to me 
to be the determinants on which depend the radicalism and the 
breadth of philosophical reflection.85
Hence, Voegelin considered anamnesis to be the precondition for 
philosophy, as only “recapturing reality in opposition to its con-
temporary deformation…”86 made possible a genuine, unmediat-
ed and direct reflection on reality.
It is precisely within Landauer’s and Voegelin’s theorisation of 
respectively the soul and consciousness, which, both urged, needs 
to be actively reclaimed from the influence of the second reality 
and can only be done so by the individual herself that a common, 
anarchic claim can be found. It begins with Voegelin’s insistence 
that to search for an operational definition of consciousness and 
of the experience of consciousness would defeat the purpose of 
its exploration. This is because generically valid propositions 
about the experience of consciousness cannot, by the virtue of 
consciousness being the very first reality of personal experience, 
be given from another or from the outside. By virtue of it expe-
riencing not only immanent but also transcendent, unfathomable 
reality consciousness lies beyond the reach of rational and formal 
logic.87 Hence,
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All philosophising about consciousness is an event in the con-
sciousness of the philosopher and presupposes this consciousness 
together with its structures. Inasmuch as the consciousness of 
philosophising is not “pure” consciousness, but rather the con-
sciousness of a human being, all philosophising is an event in the 
philosopher’s life history; an event in the history of the community 
with its symbolic language; an event in the history of mankind, and 
of the cosmos. No “human” in his reflection on consciousness and 
its nature can make consciousness an “object” to be confronted; 
the reflection is rather an orientation within consciousness with 
which he can push to its limits but never cross them.88
Consciousness, in other words, can only be understood through 
the experience of the person to whom it belongs, allowing only 
the individual herself direct and unmediated insight into reality 
and stepping out of the second reality. These new insights arising 
from consciousness have a fundamental impact on the concep-
tualisation of the possibilities and aims of community and are 
worthwhile to be explored in more detail.
According to Voegelin, consciousness appears situated within 
and contained by the body, functioning to make its specific ex-
ternal reality intelligible.89 And yet, the concept of body, matter, 
or corporeality itself is also already contained within conscious-
ness, so that consciousness is ultimately experienced no less real 
than reality itself. Accordingly, it is not a mere thing, but rather a 
mysterious force somehow distinguished from thingness. It both 
“intends reality” as its object and makes reality “luminous”90 by 
experiencing and philosophising about the “awe of existence.”91 
Consciousness is enclosed from the cosmos surrounding it, as 
well as being itself a cosmic principle.92 Through this particular 
“in-betweenness” consciousness experiences additional being that 
is other than the existent things and which, therefore, can only 
be known in its attributes, but not in its essence. To describe this 
peculiar structure of consciousness, Voegelin used the Greek term 
metaxy, designating an intermediary and intermediate reality.93 
Anamnesis, then, really refers to the remembrance of metaxy, of 
the lasting tension between the intelligible and the unattainable, 
“between life and death, immortality and mortality, perfection 
and imperfection, time and timelessness, between order and dis-
order, truth and untruth, sense and senselessness.”94
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When consciousness becomes explicit to itself, Voegelin argued, 
it unsurprisingly provokes fundamental bewilderment, because
At the centre of his existence man is unknown to himself and must 
remain so…this situation of ignorance with regard to the decisive 
core of existence is more than disconcerting: it is profoundly dis-
turbing for from the depth of this ultimate ignorance wells up the 
anxiety of existence.95
Moreover, “[r]eality is not a static order of things given to a hu-
man observer once and for all; it is moving, indeed, in the direc-
tion of the emergent truth.”96 Because the beyond has an indefinite 
number of meanings, revealing itself to every person differently, 
constituting, “different events in the philosopher’s life,”97 mean-
ing does not repeat itself but reality remains in constant motion. 
Thus, everyone undergoes constant change and flux as moments 
of reality’s disclosure follow one upon another, producing con-
tinuous becoming and difference. The “I” is in a constant pro-
cess of unfolding, being new in every moment of its existence, 
so that selfhood never comes to an end and ultimately cannot 
be achieved, making attempts for reification superfluous and re-
vealing multiplicity as something that not only occurs between, 
but within human beings, whose substance is essential instability. 
From the realisation that this flux of being constitutes being in 
the sense that one cannot exempt oneself from it, the belief that 
human beings are merely being added to reality, or objects that 
simply exist within reality is no longer tenable and the safety that 
came with that view dissolves.
Landauer was aware of this, too, when he stated, “I leave be-
hind the only thing that seems certain within myself. I now flood 
out into the uncertain world of hypotheses and fantasies.”98 To 
make reality luminous through consciousness or spirit is not to 
find arche, a first principle or firm ground, but it is, on the contrary, 
to realise that the “why?” and “what for?” that aroused the quest 
remain unintelligible and must do so. While the horizon of the 
beyond lures to be made intelligible, Voegelin argued, it withdraws 
itself with every step that the seeker advances.99 Hence, when 
Voegelin spoke of the luminosity of the reality of being he did not 
refer to reaching an objective fact of truth. Rather, he meant the 
movement from suffering from estrangement from the prevalent 
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order toward suffering from bewilderment about the “order of be-
ing.”100 In short, to be conscious of one’s existence is to know that 
one knows nothing at all, that no further answer is possible.101
A first implication of Landauer’s and Voegelin’s argument is 
a certain democratisation of mystical experience, which, rather 
than being an elitist affair of a few select individuals, appears to 
be a universally accessible, natural component of conscious ev-
eryday experience. Voegelin scholar Morrissey summarised the 
situation as such:
These experiences cannot be proved any more than sense experience 
can be proved. Yet there is nothing esoteric about such experiences. 
Insofar as everyone experiences reality, everyone has experiences of 
transcendence, at least on a limited level. A philosopher who experi-
ences his or her consciousness as transcending discovers the ground 
of philosophizing, and no special belief is required to substantiate 
it, for it is self-evident. To deny the self-transcending nature of one’s 
consciousness would be to deny one’s own experience. Such a denial 
is certainly possible, but then one would not be operating  rationally; 
one would be closed to the reality one is trying to investigate. One 
may arrive at a number of different conclusions but one cannot in 
good faith deny the nature of transcending consciousness.102
Thus, it can be argued that the shared anarchist element in 
Landauer and Voegelin is precisely their emphasis on both grasp-
ing one’s own life and search, one’s direct and unmediated rela-
tionship with reality as the primary instrument in the quest for re-
ality, and this relationship being accessible, theoretically, to every 
consciousness. This is also the reason why Landauer, when seek-
ing to define anarchism, strictly warned against considering it a 
system of thought and action to be brought to all of humanity. For 
Landauer this constituted an imposition of one’s own idea of free-
dom on others that was no different from the violence anarchists 
sought to oppose. Rather, he stated, anarchism was a mode of 
being, “a matter of how one lives” in the present here and now.103
While it has been argued that Voegelin was highly critical of an-
archism, his essays on the topic, dealing with Bakunin, Kropotkin, 
Tolstoy, Gandhi and Warren, reveal that he, rather, shared the same 
criticism which Landauer raised against anarchists of the deed.104 
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Both Voegelin and Landauer, though Landauer has not criticised 
the particular anarchists named above, considered naive the belief 
in the perfectibility of the human situation, which assumes that 
the destruction of the state would release a natural instinct for 
freedom and peace. According to Voegelin this belief failed to rec-
ognise that the state and its politics are symbols created to over-
come the metaxy’s tension, which, defining the human situation, 
cannot be overcome. Voegelin’s criticism thus targeted a specific 
misconception, which attached concrete problems of injustice, in-
equality and violence to an imaginary and generalised evil, rather 
than anarchism per se.105 Likewise, Voegelin’s criticism of utopian 
thought did not simply condemn radically idealistic thought, but 
the creations of blueprints which, rather than seeking luminous 
knowledge from within the metaxy, built their visions of an ideal 
society on the eradication of either pole of existence, thereby lim-
iting, rather than fostering, society’s becoming.106 Consequently, 
Voegelin’s mistrust of the masses was the fear that, rallied under 
such promises, liberation might turn totalitarian.
Yet, Voegelin did not promote political quietism. On the con-
trary, he argued,
One can, indeed, not root out traditional vices at a moment’s no-
tice; but there is a limit beyond which delay is impermissible. And 
that all men are not good and therefore all things cannot be well, 
is sound admonition to a perfectionist; but it easily can become a 
cover for condoning crimes. What makes this argument so flat is 
the renunciation of the spirit as the ultimate authority beyond the 
temporal order and its insufficiencies.107
Much in line with Landauer, Voegelin stated that genuine change 
could occur only from embracing the nature of reality in the 
metaxy and proceeding in a process of trial and error, or, as 
Landauer argued, experimentation and learning. Through failure 
one learns and fails better. According to Voegelin, axioms, princi-
ples or categorical imperatives, as they occurred, for example, in 
the sacred texts which Gandhi and Tolstoy used, had no bearing 
in reality. Rather, they exposed human imperfection and its fail-
ures that result from conscious participation in the tension of ex-
istence. Voegelin’s major criticism of Christianity, thus, concerned 
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its disengagement of the life of the spirit from the conditions of 
any particular society, resulting in political and social passivity,108 
failing to adequately address the problems of concrete, mun-
dane existence.109 In an explication of the Sermon of the Mount, 
Voegelin argued,
We have to recall that the Sermon of the Mount is not a code for 
the life in the “world”; it is addressed to men who live in between 
the worlds of eschatological expectation. In historical existence, 
entangled in the network of social obligations… If he is struck on 
the right cheek, he will not turn his left, but hit back in defence of 
his life, his family and his community. But in hitting back, he will 
do good, as a Christian, to remember the Sermon, and to be aware 
that in defence he is involved in guilt…110
Yet, the anarchists which Voegelin criticised had dealt with the 
question of change in abstraction, not from the position of a par-
ticipant in reality, but from that of a spectator, tempted by the 
unattainable “magic” of perfection.111 Like Voegelin, Landauer 
emphasised that his ideas for community creation were “little be-
ginnings, nuclei, cells,”112 because “reality lies in movement and 
true socialism is always only beginning, is always only one which 
moves.”113 He did not “… approach the absolute. A religion, 
which connects us all, is not be expected. What I call socialism is 
not perfection, perfection exists only in our words…”114 Neither 
from Voegelin nor Landauer a blueprint for community could be 
expected.
The an-archist Community:
Both philosophers conceptualised true community not as being 
situated in a particular context, it is already everywhere, but as sit-
uating. It can only be made intelligible through experience. Only 
when the link between experience and knowledge of the world is 
restored can the realisation of its natural community be attempt-
ed. According to Landauer, only when one has consciously felt 
“unprecedented, intense, deep experience”, then “anarchists and 
anarchy exist, in the form of scattered individuals, everywhere. 
And they will find each other.”115 It follows that,
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Whoever brings the lost world in himself to life – to individual 
life – and whoever feels like a true part of the world and not as a 
stranger: he will be the one who arrives not knowing where from, 
and who leaves not knowing where to. To him the world will be 
what he is to himself. Men such as this will live with each other in 
solidarity – as men who belong together. This will be anarchy.116
While Voegelin appears more pessimistic, his vision resonates with 
Landauer’s, stating that the building block for change is not the 
masses, but the individual, which, reinterpreting its relationship to 
the world, also affects social relationships. He stated,
We know what the life of reason and the good society are; we can 
cultivate the former and try, by our actions, to bring about the 
latter. We can restate the problem: the formation of the psyche by 
encouraging participation in transcendent reason… And that is all 
one can do; whether or not this offer is accepted depends on the 
Spirit that blows where It pleases. Collectively, as a society, there is 
at the moment little, if anything, we can do…117
Through experience, Landauer and Voegelin argued, the individu-
al gives up the certainty of its particular self, instead opening itself 
to the universe, or reality, and to the infinite possibilities for exis-
tence. When the “world-I” replaces the “I” bewilderment, loss of 
direction and perplexity replace the simplistic limitations and re-
ductive images which the “I” used to confine its self, others and the 
world to attune to its imagination. The more one moves inward 
the more one realises oneself and others not to be pure, undivid-
ed individuals, but rather “points of passage, electrical sparks of 
something greater,”118 namely the “unbreakable chain that comes 
from infinite and proceeds to the infinite,”119 toward the “most 
ancient and most complete community.”120 Landauer’s true anar-
chist community proceeds from this unbreakable community, that 
one finds “in the deepest depths of our selves”.121 “Our most indi-
vidual”, he continued, “is our ever most common.”122 Humanity 
is but the term for an “alliance of the plenty”.123
For Voegelin, as already established above, the tension of the 
metaxy and the continuous motion of existence constituted the 
universal structure of consciousness. “Man” Voegelin argued, 
“is man insofar as he is Imago Dei, and insofar as he is Imago 
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Dei are all men equal as participating in the reality of God…”124 
Consequently, “the existence of man becomes existence in com-
munity. In the openness of the common spirit there develops the 
public life of society.”125 In other words,
With regard to the transcendent source of order in the soul, all 
men are equal. The discovery of transcendent divinity as the source 
of order is paralleled by the discovery of mankind. ‘Mankind’ in 
this sense is not a particular group of human beings at any given 
time, but indeed the ‘open society’ of all men extending into the 
unknown future. The idea of ‘mankind’ has nothing to do with the 
idea of a ‘world-government’ established over a group of contem-
poraneously living human beings.126
Voegelin’s “open society”, influenced by Henri Bergson’s “Open 
Society,”127 is not a concrete society existing in the world, but a 
“symbol which indicates man’s consciousness of participating, in 
his earthly existence, in the mystery of a reality which moves to-
wards its transfiguration. Universal mankind [or the open soci-
ety] is an eschatological index.”128 For Voegelin the open society 
was a guideline for being in the world, shaped by awareness of 
the metaxy. It opens the individual toward transcendent reality 
and the community of universal mankind, as opposed to the par-
ticular, pathologically closed society. It is a form of order that 
is “knowable only from the perspective of participation in it” 129 
because
The experience of being activates man to the reality of order in 
himself and in the cosmos... The background of the experience 
of being is the primary experience of the cosmos in which man 
is consubstantial with the things of his environment, a partnership 
that in philosophy is heightened to the wake consciousness of the 
community of order uniting thought and being.130
Voegelin suggested a departure from the model of the polis to-
wards “the politeia in the soul, with the perspective that this 
course opens into existence in a spiritual community beyond tem-
poral organization of government”.131
Finally, then, the purpose of the an-archist community is not 
merely to transcend the rigidity of second reality and create 
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conditions that allow for multiplicity and becoming, but it is, 
rather, to increase knowledge of reality. According to Voegelin, 
“the ultimate, essential ignorance is not complete ignorance. Man 
can achieve considerable knowledge about the “order of being”, 
and not the least part of that knowledge is the distinction be-
tween the knowable and unknowable.”132 While the ultimate 
essence of reality, which has neither cause, matter, form, nor at-
tributes, cannot be known by humans, the knowledge that can 
be gained is that of seeing the world no longer as self-subsistent 
truth, but understanding that its various phenomena and events 
refer to and reflect the reality that belongs to the realm of mys-
tery.133 The thingness of the world conceals and reflects the meta-
physical truth beyond and a higher level of meaning. Voegelin’s 
Anamnesis and Landauer’s Separation are the processes by which 
these levels of meaning can gradually be unveiled, moving from 
outwardness to inwardness, penetrating into what appears as fact 
to move beyond the purely external level of meaning and reach 
inner significance. The true community, then, not only allows for 
infinite becoming in a mysterious universe, but for making it more 
intelligible through direct experience.
Conclusion
This meditation on the works of Landauer and Voegelin serves to 
suggest a common line of argumentation in two thinkers whose 
works have not yet been brought into contact with one another, 
and thereby aims to contribute to a discussion on mystical anar-
chism. The focus of this meditation was Landauer’s and Voegelin’s 
critique not just of a particular type of politics, but of politics 
as such, constituting a surrogate for true community. Initially, 
Landauer and Voegelin each sought diagnosis and therapy for the 
political ills of their respective societies. Yet, rather than finding 
a particular type of politics to be at fault, they argued that poli-
tics as such was symptomatic of a more profound disorder. Only 
when the relationship between direct experience and knowledge 
of reality was lost did politics arise with the purpose to create a 
new, imaginary reality in which this loss was hidden and, ulti-
mately, through conserving and protecting the division between 
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experience and knowledge, forgotten. Community, in reality based 
on openness and fluidity, was replaced with its rigid surrogate, 
society. Consequently, they argued, the condition of politics can 
only be overcome through deep experience of reality to restore 
knowledge of the world and unlearn the illusions of imaginary 
reality. Landauer referred to this process as “separation”, for one 
leaves behind the particular, closed society, Voegelin as anamnesis, 
or remembrance of the primary reality that had been pushed into 
oblivion. Landauer’s and Voegelin’s mysticism is their argument 
that the multiplicity of existents issues from a single source that is 
within and yet infinitely transcends the individual, allowing each 
individual access to her source, but only to the extent that she 
grows to know that she cannot know her ultimate essence. The 
potentiality for human community, then, is to be found not in 
external ordering via politics, but precisely within each individual 
herself as she becomes the world. The shared anarchic element in 
Landauer and Voegelin is their argument that only the individual 
herself has direct, unmediated access to the world with which no 
intermediary, such as politics, can interfere and therefore has the 
power, in the present here and now, to reconnect the link between 
experience and knowledge.
Notes
1. Landauer has been considered a “Jewish-Christian-Atheist” mys-
tic, Voegelin self identifies as mystical philosopher, arguably in the 
Christian tradition. Both conceive of mystery not as an object of the 
external world to be confronted with, but as something knowable 
only through participation in it. Landauer identifies spirit, Voegelin 
consciousness as the locus of reality’s self-revelation, which paradoxi-
cally experiences reality as an object intended, while also itself occur-
ring in reality. Thus, the human situation is characterised by its partic-
ipation in a reality that is a mysterious, known unknown. Landauer 
and Voegelin consider mystery existential; Philosophy is their existen-
tial project of expressing this basic experience and seeking adequacy.
2. Voegelin, rather than referring to a common source, speaks of the 
“ground”, aition, as it occurs in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. 
Accordingly, “the ground” is not a spatially distant thing but a divine 
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25. In 2010, Wolf edited two volumes entitled Antipolitik, a collection 
of newspaper articles, speeches, letters and essays dealing with the 
theme. Gustav Landauer, Antipolitik: Gustav Landauer, Ausgewählte 
Schriften, Band 3.1 (and 3.2.), ed. Siegbert Wolf (Lich/Hessen: Verlag 
Edition AV, 2010).
8. Buber is frequently cited by Voegelin, in particular his biblical stud-
ies. See, for example, Israel and Revelation (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 2001).
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The Anarchē of Spirit : Proudhon’s  
Anti-theism & Kierkegaard’s Self in 
Apophatic Perspective
Simon D. Podmore
Liverpool Hope University, UK
This essay explores the possibility of an avowedly theological an-
archē through a reading of Søren Kierkegaard’s (1813–55) theolo-
gy of “the self before God” in relation to the “anti-theism” of his 
contemporary, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–65). In doing so it 
establishes an apophatic dialectic between their two positions in 
which human idols of ‘God’ are continually un-known in the search 
for an unknowable God. Such a Wholly Other God, it is suggested, 
provides a kenotic (self-limiting) model of power which subverts 
anthropomorphic projections of Providential omnipotence, typical-
ly imagined as mastery over the other. A truly apophatic mode of 
divine power, by contrast, is one which establishes a primal and 
inviolable gift of human freedom and autonomy which is central to 
Kierkegaard’s theism, Proudhon’s anti-theism, and to the apophatic 
dialectic which continually emerges in the struggle between both im-
pulses. Reading with and against both Kierkegaard and Proudhon, 
I propose that each provides a prescient prophetic voice against the 
abuses of Divine Providence and human freedom. In concluding, I 
gesture towards an anti/theology of apophasis and anarchē which is 
inspired by the negations and antagonisms as well as the synergies 
which exist between these two great strugglers with God.
Introduction: The Anarchy of Spirit
“The wind blows where it wills, and you hear the sound thereof, 
but cannot tell from where it came, and where it goes: so is everyone 
that is born of the Spirit.”
—John 3:8
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“Spirit is the self”/ “The self is freedom”
—Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death1
The freedom of the self is an inviolable principle of possibility to 
which, in a profound and scandalous sense, even God submits. 
God surrenders to the self’s freedom out of a kenotic2 freedom: a 
divine freedom which sacrifices itself in the name of human free-
dom. This upholding of the freedom of the self—including the 
freedom to refuse God, to choose the unfreedom of despair—is 
nonetheless a source of ineffable divine sorrow. It is a wound of a 
sacred Love which gives itself in the only manner it can, without 
overpowering the freedom of the beloved.3 God does not, perhaps 
even cannot, remove from creation the possibility of saying ‘no’ to 
God, even though the sustenance of this possibility constitutes an 
“unfathomable grief” of divine love.4 In this horizon of possibility, 
in which freedom is free even to the point of negating itself, there 
emerges what Kierkegaard discerns as a struggle between faith 
and that which faith names as “despair”. This same despair is, 
nonetheless, named by itself as an expression of ultimate human 
autonomy.
However, as both Søren Kierkegaard (1813–55) and Pierre 
Joseph Proudhon (1809–65) recognise in their own diverse ways, 
even the denial of God’s existence or goodness is caught within 
a dialectical relationship towards positive assertions about God. 
Negation exists in irresolvable tension with the affirmation it 
denies. Atheism, as identified by Kierkegaard as a rejection of 
God, therefore reveals an implicit even insentient dependence 
upon the very idea of God it seeks to negate.5 It is in recognition 
of this unconscious relationship that Proudhon asserts a more 
consciously explicit negation of theism (understood as the idea 
of the existence of God) in the form of his notion of anti-theism 
(denial or negation of this idea): a perennial process of destruc-
tive antinomy (contradiction) between affirmation and denial of 
the idea of God.6
For Proudhon and Kierkegaard, theism would generally in-
clude the idea that God is somehow a creative force within 
 human history, to the problematic extent that God’s Will can be 
invoked in support of human structures remaining as they are 
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(rather than acting as a radical challenge to the world). This is 
a particular idea of a God of Providence (divine oversight and 
ordering of human order) which, as explored below, Proudhon 
rejects as unjust and Kierkegaard critiques as a convenient projec-
tion of bourgeois Christendom and a betrayal of true Christianity. 
Kierkegaard does so, I contend, by drawing a distinction between 
theistic ideas of God and the living God who is beyond and some-
times at odds with even avowed Christians’ constructions of such 
ideas. To an extent, Proudhon also proposes a distinction along 
similar lines. However, an essential departure between Proudhon 
and Kierkegaard resides in the difference between Proudhon’s 
conviction that such a God is ultimately unknowable, and there-
by irrelevant (rather than to be venerated for its mystery), and 
Kierkegaard’s belief that the unknowable God has given Godself 
in saving revelation.
This essay represents an attempt to think Kierkegaard’s and 
Proudhon’s readings of this dialectical relationship between the 
affirmation and denial of ‘God’ together in creative dialogue. 
While in this essay I will risk an experiment in thinking both 
with and against Kierkegaard7 as well as Proudhon, I suggest that 
the seeds of a dialectical reading of theistic thought in relation 
to its antagonists is already present in Kierkegaard’s own read-
ing of Feuerbachian atheism. Kierkegaard provocatively suggests 
that Feuerbach’s exposé of theology as disguised anthropology 
might serve Christianity as a critique against the all-too domes-
ticated anthropomorphic idols of Christendom’s portrayal of 
‘God’. Listening to the voice of Feuerbach is akin to receiving 
“ab hoste consilium” [advice from the enemy] even though this 
enemy may be a “malitieus dæmon” [evil daimon].8 Although talk 
of Proudhon as “the French Feuerbach” was somewhat errone-
ous,9 he stands alongside, and at times against Feuerbach10 as a 
demonic-prophetic voice opposing the theistic idol of a certain 
God of Providence: the projected God-image who supposedly en-
dorses and upholds the status quo of Christendom for the bene-
fit of those already empowered by it. In referring to Feuerbach’s 
assertion that “the true sense of Theology is Anthropology”11 as 
advice from a demon, Kierkegaard implicitly affirms the dialec-
tical value of atheism as a critical iconoclastic force against the 
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delusions of bourgeois Christendom. Feuerbach, in other words, 
exposes the theistic notion of a God who is ‘on our side’ as noth-
ing other than a dangerous projection of a decadent Christendom 
which legitimises its privileging of certain types of men: specif-
ically the men currently enjoying the power of State-sponsored 
modern Christendom. As such, this essay seeks to think about 
theism and anti-theism in light of the apophatic12 possibility of a 
God existing beyond all human idols of power and imagination: a 
God whose own kenotic (self-abdicating) relationship with power 
subverts human ideals of power and powerlessness in the name of 
Divine Love.13
This essay therefore explores the possibility of an avowedly 
theological anarchē through a reading of Kierkegaard’s theology 
of “the self before God” (coram Deo; in contrast to selfhood as de-
fined coram hominibus, “before the crowd”) in a de/constructive 
dialectic with the “anti-theism” of his contemporary, Proudhon. 
This comparison was initially proposed, though not elaborated, 
by the French Jesuit theologian Henri de Lubac who suggested 
an affinity between the divine-human antagonism of Proudhon’s 
“anti-theism” and Kierkegaard’s statement that “there is a life and 
death battle between God and man; God hates man just as man 
hates God.”14 Both Kierkegaard and Proudhon are identified by 
de Lubac as anti-Hegelians15 each opposed (albeit for conflicting 
reasons) to any Feuerbachian sublimation of the agonistic in-
finite qualitative difference between humanity and divinity.16 A 
similar comparison between Kierkegaard and Proudhon on this 
same point of divine-human enmity is also proposed by Françoise 
Meltzer:
There are affinities between Kierkegaard and Proudhon: the for-
mer’s conviction that ‘against God we are always in the wrong,’ 
for example; or Kierkegaard’s view of the either/or as ‘explosive’. 
Proudhon, however, much less radical conceptually, and armed 
with a reductio ad absurdum grasp of Hegelianism, always sees 
the synthesis as the solution (which he provides) to dangerous 
contradiction.17
Furthermore, Proudhon’s Justice in the Revolution and the Church 
(1858) is referred to by George Woodcock as:
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sired of a long line of inspiration that begins with the Jewish 
prophets and brings Proudhon into contact at more than one 
point with the personalist tradition that embraced Kierkegaard 
and Dostoevsky […] In the last resort the author of Justice has less 
in common with Charles Bradlaugh than with Kierkegaard, who 
as Father de Lubac has pointed out, called God ‘the mortal enemy’ 
and declared ‘Christianity exists because there is hatred between 
God and man’.18
Contrasting the dialectical “systematic negation” of Proudhon’s 
“practical atheism” with Kierkegaard’s un-sublated dialectic of 
the “infinite qualitative difference” between the human and the 
divine, this essay seeks an effectively apophatic theological cri-
tique of Power, established in the kenotic (self-emptying) and lov-
ing divine gift of human freedom, and realised through individual 
self-becoming as Spirit. In appealing to Proudhon and Kierkegaard, 
this essay explores the potential effectiveness of apophatic theol-
ogy and anti-theism for negating harmful ideas of divine power: 
idols of divine omnipotence which are established via the projec-
tion of human notions of power in terms of mastery and subjuga-
tion. However, as shall be seen, whereas Kierkegaard’s negation of 
power is established upon a positive (kataphatic) affirmation of a 
notion of divine omnipotence revealed through freedom as God’s 
love for creation, Proudhon undertakes a perennial negation of 
the idea of “God” as a necessary requisite for the affirmation of 
human justice.
Juxtaposing the dialectics of Kierkegaard’s agonistic “self before 
God” and Proudhon’s antagonistic “anti-theism”, I suggest that each 
might contribute towards an apophatic critique of theistic accounts 
of Divine Providence which model God’s power according to hu-
man projections of worldly power—a mundane form of power un-
derstood as mastery over “the other”. While both assert the primacy 
of human freedom in relation to God, Proudhon’s “anti-theism” is, 
I ultimately suggest, nonetheless vulnerable to a Kierkegaardian cri-
tique which views “anti-theism” as a form of “offence” towards the 
kenosis (self-negation) of the “self before God”. However, while in 
Kierkegaardian perspective Proudhon expresses the enslavement of 
“despair”, “anti-theism” nonetheless remains an inexorable “possi-
bility” divinely ensured by the inviolable and primal gift of anarchic 
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human freedom. In other words, though God may “grieve” over the 
“offense” of  anti-theism, divine power is truly manifest in God’s 
kenotic (self-sacrificial) love as the refusal to negate, or over-power, 
its possibility. As such, God’s love preserves the struggle between 
the agonistic self before God and the antagonistic anti-theistic self 
in despair.
Furthermore, insofar as it partakes in an agonistic and 
 apophatic struggle against idols of “God”, anti-theism represents 
a more vitalised—if despairingly misdirected—expression of the 
freedom of “Spirit” (Ånd) than is found in the sedative “spiritless-
ness” (Åndløsheden) of bourgeois Christendom. In this respect, 
Kierkegaard is read as implicitly valuing Proudhon’s anti-theism 
as a potential ally in the via negativa (way of negation) towards a 
more authentic understanding of the relationship between human 
freedom and divine omnipotence. Theology, by attending to the 
voice of anti-theism (even within itself), is reminded of the pro-
phetic task of speaking truth to power. Theology is also reminded 
of a God whose self-revelation is a subversion of such power, and 
one whose love connotes an unfathomable grief over the victims 
of the self-apotheosis of that power.
Kierkegaard: The Anarchy of Interpretation and the 
Untruth of Crowds
“To be spirit is to be I. God desires to have Is, for God desires to 
be loved […] ‘Christendom’ is a society of millions—all in the third 
person, no I.”
—Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers19
In proposing this reading of Kierkegaard and Proudhon, this es-
say may, from its beginning, already be guilty of a hermeneutic 
anarchy—albeit an anarchy of (mis-)reading which Kierkegaard’s 
own an-archē of authorial authority has itself made think-
able. The elliptical evasions, pseudonymous self-effacements, 
polyvalences, and ironic mis-directions of Kierkegaard’s liter-
ary styles elicit the possibilities and temptations of an anarchic 
hermeneutic. In  other words, by opening his works to be free-
ly (mis-)appropriated in the name of existential subjectivity, 
does Kierkegaard bequeath the right to (re)interpret his works, 
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even in spite of any implicit protestations to the contrary? Even 
when—perhaps precisely when—writing more “directly” about 
that which is avowedly most sacred to him, Kierkegaard con-
fesses himself to be “without authority”20 before his solitary 
readers.21 Yet while his texts permit, even at times reward, high 
 degrees of hermeneutical freedom, I am also mindful of interpret-
ing Kierkegaard’s writings within the orbit of what he avowed to 
be most central to his authorship: namely, the task of becoming 
a Christian in Christendom. As such, I read Kierkegaard as ad-
dressing the hermeneutic question of what is meant, or required, 
in becoming oneself as an individual before God; yet subjected to 
the illusory heteronomy of a State-Church which behaves as if it 
possessed the keys to the kingdom of heaven. What is required, 
according to Kierkegaard’s prophetic and Socratic discourse, is 
to disillusion oneself of this theatrical heteronomy, to become an 
individual “self before God”, to become “Spirit” within—yet not 
subject to—Christendom’s rule of “Spiritlessness”. Only in this is 
one enabled to resist Christendom’s subtle and insidious opiate 
against the very task of personally realising selfhood as individu-
alised Spirit.
I also remain mindful that I may stretch Kierkegaard’s arc of 
essential concern beyond that with which he himself would have 
been entirely comfortable. In pressing this horizon, I do not wish 
to invoke the already self-renounced authority of “Kierkegaard” 
by speaking in his name nor imposing views upon him which do 
injustice to his own autonomy. In light of this caveat, it is not 
my contention, for example, to reprise Vernard Eller’s impas-
sioned vision of Kierkegaard as an anarchist per se. I imagine 
that Kierkegaard himself would have been uneasy, on a num-
ber of levels, about being proposed as providing leadership for 
a twentieth-century “Neo-Sectarianism,” or “Kierkegaardian 
Sectarianism.” Nonetheless, I empathise with Eller’s diagnosis that 
“Not the creedal system of a Barth nor the philosophic-theologi-
cal system of a Tillich, but the free and unstructured approach of 
a Kierkegaard is the only method appropriate to radical disciple-
ship.”22 However, while I esteem Eller’s prophetic tonality and his 
emphasis upon the “infinite qualitative difference” between the 
human and the divine, my suspicion is that Kierkegaard himself 
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remained politically conservative and ultimately too profoundly 
horrified by the European revolutions of 1848 to have been com-
fortable with Eller’s appellation of “that ancient anarchist”.23
Kierkegaard’s personal anxiety about revolutionary Europe, 
the death of King Christian VIII and the end of absolute mon-
archy in Denmark, along with his reaction against the Hegelian 
leadership of the new post-1848 Danish People’s Church, are also 
in alignment with his critical stance towards the notion of a bour-
geois state—itself ensuing from a suspicion towards the wisdom 
of “the crowd” which he describes as essentially an expression 
of “untruth”.24 Under the gaze of Kierkegaardian solitude, “the 
crowd” evokes not only the revolutionary mob, but the primal 
image of the cacophonic crowd who howl for the crucifixion of 
Jesus—while also signifying the folly of the State trial of Socrates 
(an image which itself tempers any Hegelian romanticisation of 
the mythical Greek state).25 In contrast to Eller’s reading, Perkins 
thus explicitly considers Kierkegaard’s critique of “the crowd” as 
actually tantamount to a critique of anarchy itself:
Kierkegaard’s point is that any popularly based government cannot 
govern in the interest of the crowd because the party is the creature 
of the crowd at the same time that it manipulates the crowd. For 
Kierkegaard, the development of popular government answerable 
to the crowd was the way to anarchy […] As Kierkegaard per-
ceives the facade of the modern liberal state it is a mask for the 
grossest anarchistic hedonism imaginable. Everything in modern 
politics depends on who manipulates the crowd.26
As Perkin’s reading demonstrates, Kierkegaard ostensibly elides 
hedonism with both anarchy and egotism: “In the modern state, 
aesthetic egotism instead of being merely destructive of the single 
person, as presented in Either/Or, has become a politics of ego-
tism, avariciousness, and anarchy.” In other words, an aesthete’s 
life of hedonic self-indulgence expresses the way in which even 
the ostensibly individualistic libertine easily becomes a cell within 
a collective ego-State. Kierkegaard’s view, as Perkins observes, “is 
that a state which possesses a power base only in the crowd, its 
whims, and ill-defined but boundless desires has no rational and 
essential unity.”27
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As an expression of “human egotism on a large scale and in great 
dimensions”, the state organises and subordinates all “individual 
egotisms” in such a way “that these must egotistically understand 
that egotistically it is the most prudent thing to live in the state.” 
Kierkegaard thus labels the state as “a calculus of egotisms”.28 If 
the state, as expressing Sittlichkeit (Hegel’s “ethical order”, embod-
ied in the ideal State), is the manifestation of a collective Spirit 
(Geist), then it stands in tension with Kierkegaard’s notion of Spirit 
(Ånd) as individual selfhood, as singular freedom before God. But 
even this individual self before God does not stand above, on top 
of, or in violation of others. Rather it stands alongside in radical 
equality with all other singular selves, who are themselves equally 
entitled to Spirit. “Before God” becomes the paradigm of all indi-
viduality and equality which is, as divine, never mine to ascribe or 
refuse but is always and already God’s gift given in love.
Therefore, as a derivative of theonomy, individual equality is 
no one’s to bestow or deny. It is a divine command which binds 
all individuals together as equal in God’s love: not simply as “the 
other” but as “the neighbour”.29 Kierkegaard therefore rejects the 
quasi-Providential human notion of a “pyramid-union” of human-
ity, at the peak of which stands “a super-king” who is the closest to 
God, who has the ear of God, even to the inevitably revolutionary 
point of being able to dethrone God. Christianity, according to 
Kierkegaard, teaches that God opposes, even despises, this pyr-
amid structure of power. By contrast, “Christianly, God chooses 
and is closest to the despised, the castoffs of the race, one single 
sorry abandoned wretch, a dreg of humanity.” Since “God is in-
finite love”, God “readily sees how cruel this human pyramid-idea 
can easily become toward the unfortunate, the ignored, and the 
like in the human race”. In defence of those who bear the weight 
of the base of the pyramid, and in opposition to the self-apotheosis 
of the one who stands at its pinnacle, “God pushes over the pyra-
mid and everything collapses”, though lamentably “a generation 
later man begins the pyramid business again”.30
In contrast to this hubris of the pyramidal state, Kierkegaard 
asserts the theological meaning of Spirit as individual and per-
sonalised freedom. “Voluntariness is the precise form for quali-
tatively being spirit”.31 The freedom of will as Spirit is expressed 
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through “this fundamental idea in Christianity, that which makes 
it what it is: transformation of the will”.32 The struggle of wills 
with God is not, however, a struggle against a God who stands “in 
the external, palpable sense [as] a power who, face to face with 
me, asserts his rights.” Rather, the God-relationship is such that 
the divine will is revealed in the Word of God—a disempowered 
Word which one is free and responsible to read as one wills, which 
one is free even to reject. As the Word which is spoken or read, 
“God is not an external, palpable power who bangs the table in 
front of me when I want to alter his will and says: No, stop! No, 
in this sense it is almost as if he did not exist. It is left up to me”.33 
The individual is left free to respond to the Word, according to the 
autonomy of human subjectivity. God withdraws, almost to the 
point of non-existence.
Christendom, however, betrays such a vision of Christianity 
by transposing its concern from the sphere of the Will and “into 
the sphere of the intellectual” where it sublimates the subjective 
struggles of the will into intellectual strivings with doctrine. While 
Christendom supposes itself to have raised Christianity to the os-
tensibly objective sphere of the intellect, it chooses to forget that it 
is ultimately towards the change of will “where Christianity aims 
its deadly blow. But Christendom deftly dodges the blow—and 
transposes everything into intellectuality”.34 Within the sphere of 
intellectuality, the existential freedom of the single individual as 
subjective Spirit becomes absorbed within the speculative ideal of 
objective Spirit, which Christendom’s intellectuals have inherited 
from the Hegelian dream of viewing all providence sub species 
aeternitatis (under the aspect of eternity). Christendom, as the de-
lusion of State Christianity, thereby betrays the New Testament 
concern with the subjective freedom of the self before God by 
“elevating” Spirit to the rarefied realm of intellect and objectivity.
Mindful of the extent to which Kierkegaard was aghast at the 
excesses of the revolutionary mob, I wish now to move towards 
a constructive reading of Kierkegaard in relation to his contem-
porary, Proudhon—a reading which elicits a potential spirit of 
anarchy, or perhaps more aptly an anarchism of Spirit within 
Kierkegaard’s writings. Christian anarchism, as Eller would have 
it, is concerned with “theonomy” rather than “autonomy”: the 
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arky of God rather than the rule of the self. However, as I shall 
explore below, the ‘power’ of this theonomy is not ultimately the 
crushing heteronomy of the Wholly Other Master who reduces 
the self to nothingness. A Kierkegaardian vision of divine omnip-
otence, and its concomitant notion that “God is that all things are 
possible”35 (even the freedom of creation before the gaze its cre-
ator) are not reducible to the Master-Slave dialectic which marks 
human struggles for empowerment through recognition.36 In con-
trast to human struggles for the possession of being-in-and-for-
itself, I suggest that Kierkegaardian theonomy can be understood 
as the law of Love which names Spirit as freedom, a freedom in 
which Spirit is truly realised through the transfiguration of self 
before a divine gaze which does not base its being-as-Master on 
recognition from the abject other-as-slave.
Reciprocally, I suggest that while subjectivity is established in 
the sphere of the Will, authentic human selfhood is not realised 
by struggling, unto death and despair, to will one’s own autono-
my over-against the heteronomous gaze of the Wholly Other. The 
freedom of the Will is finally realised in the paradox of willing to 
become oneself, as nothing, before and even in God. Self as Spirit 
is the transfiguration of the self before God, the self as it “rests 
transparently in God”37: the omnipotent Creator whose gift of 
being and becoming to the self is the original gift of freedom in a 
love which neither needs nor coerces recognition.
While divine love is understood as a gift which, as gratuity, 
is not dependent upon reciprocity or recognition, this does not 
mean that God is indifferent to being loved by the other. On the 
contrary, God desires, though does not need, to be loved. And 
since love can only truly be free, God desires only to be loved 
from a heart of subjective freedom. “To be spirit is to be I. God 
desires [vil] to have Is”, Kierkegaard affirms, “for God desires to 
be loved.”38 But God’s Will is not coercive. The love which God 
desires can only, by definition, be love which is freely given ex 
nihilo: created from nothing, and therefore independent and au-
tonomous. Love therefore discovers it origin in the divine act of 
an independent creation which makes freedom possible.
In this agapeistic, even erotic, cosmogony, an inexorable, even 
tragic gift of freedom arises at the heart of Kierkegaard’s vision 
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of the self-God relationship. Divine omnipotence is expressed, 
indirectly, by human freedom. As such, God’s true and gracious 
omnipotence is revealed in creating human beings as free ex nihi-
lo, because only free beings can truly love without coercion. This 
freedom, however, also begets anxiety—fear and desire of free-
dom and the nothingness of non-being—and the possibility to say 
‘No’, or even to say nothing at all, to the gift of divine love. Such 
freedom is the possibility of offence: “the unfathomable grief of 
[divine] love”39 in which God is wounded by God’s own refusal 
to deny the autonomy of the human self. This grief of divine love 
is even essentially tragic insofar as human freedom, by subjecting 
itself to the heteronomy of the crowd, rejects and crucifies the 
God of love. Creation ex nihilo is sustained in the true sense of 
the Providence (preservatio) of crucified Love. Such preservatio 
of ex nihilo freedom also maintains the possibility to say “No” to 
divine power, even to being itself—a “No” which is dialectically 
expressed by the anti-theism of Proudhon.
Anarchist Dialectics: Proudhon’s Anti-Theism as Eternal 
Via Negativa
“Humanity is a spectre to God, just as God is a spectre to hu-
manity; each of the two is the other’s cause, reason, and end of 
existence.”
—Proudhon, The Philosophy of Misery40
“My criticism of the idea of God is […] a systematic negation, 
which is meant to come to a higher affirmation, equally systematic.”
—Proudhon, Letter to abbé X., Jan. 22nd 184941
While Proudhon’s “offence” and Kierkegaard’s “faith” may appear 
dialectically related, the search for a synthesis between Proudhon’s 
anti-theism and Kierkegaard’s theism is problematized by the 
suggestion that Kierkegaard also subverts central assumptions 
of traditional Christian theism and Church sovereignty which 
Proudhon himself resists. Nevertheless, while the individualistic 
freedom at the heart of Kierkegaard’s “self before God” refutes 
the voluntaristic (will-centred) mastery of “the other”, it ultimate-
ly discovers its true freedom in the free submission of the self-will 
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to the Holy Other: that is, to a God who is revealed through 
kenotic love as otherwise than the God of Providential theism 
against which Proudhon struggles. However, this free submission 
is not tantamount to total abjection. As the self before God is con-
summated in relationship with others—a relation grounded in the 
liberating grace of love—so too does Kierkegaardian submission 
to God (becoming nothing before God; or resting transparently 
in God) also entail becoming something in relation to God. This 
something is namely a self in freedom, a self as Spirit.
Before proceeding further, however, certain caveats ought to 
be noted. For one, it should be observed that Kierkegaard’s own 
knowledge of Proudhon’s thought is extremely modest.42 While 
Kierkegaard may have heard the dreadful echoes of Proudhon’s 
promethean judgement that “God is evil”,43 he gives no sense that 
he is cognisant of its ultimately dialectical meaning.44 Nonetheless, 
in a profound sense Kierkegaard also struggles in his darkest mo-
ments with a similar abyssal possibility: how is one to uphold faith 
in divine love when it appears that God is evil? However, whereas 
Proudhon’s practical yet dialectically provocative philosophy in-
tends the negation of the idea of “God” in the name of human 
justice, Kierkegaard’s agonistic spiritual interiority seeks to affirm 
the Absolute yet subjective reality of God in the name of a fearful 
and trembling faith. In other words, while Kierkegaard’s ultimate 
concern is with the subjective self-God-relationship, Proudhon is 
essentially engaged with indicting the theistic conception of the 
God of Providence (an objective ideal in which, for Kierkegaard, 
the single individual becomes lost).
According to what might be called Proudhon’s quasi  apophatic 
anti-theology, God (if there is such a “being”) remains  essentially 
unknowable, whether by kataphasis (positive assertions) or 
apophasis (negation). Consequently, “God” cannot be meaning-
fully invoked within human ethical concerns: “we cannot legiti-
mately deny anything or affirm anything of the absolute; that is 
one of the reasons why I rule the divine concept out of morality.”45 
This radical anti-theological position allows Proudhon to evacu-
ate God from “the alpha and omega” of his argument: Justice.46 
“If God is outside knowledge for us,” Proudhon infers that “he 
must remain outside practical matters […] When religion, through 
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its theology, its revelations and its cult, brings God out of the ab-
solute, it drives man out of morality.”47 Humanity and divinity are 
so radically different that “God”, as beyond human knowledge, 
must remain irreducibly wholly other than ethics. Proudhon thus 
regards it as his duty to struggle against the idea of the transcen-
dental God of ecclesiastical Providence: a “God” whose intrusion 
into human morality serves to maintain the unjust status quo of 
tyranny and poverty. This idea of the God of Providential theism is 
the God of evil who disrupts the possibility of true inter-personal 
and systemic human justice.48
This evil God of theism is diagnosed by Proudhon as an idol-
atrous construct of anthropomorphism: “the theology of infancy 
and poesy” which projects the idea of God in the image of Man. 
By attempting to mediate or sublate the wholly otherness of the 
Absolute, Man attempts to reduce an unknowable Absolute to an 
object which can then be wielded according to the aggrandising 
desires of Man’s self-apotheosis:
But having made God in his own image, man wished to appro-
priate him still farther; not satisfied with disfiguring the Almighty, 
he treated him as his patrimony, his goods, his possessions. God, 
pictured in monstrous forms, became throughout the world the 
property of man and of the State. Such was the origin of the cor-
ruption of morals by religion, and the source of pious feuds and 
holy wars.49
The discipline of theology, in Proudhon’s verdict, becomes the “the 
science of the infinitely absurd”50 which, through the idea of God, 
enslaves humanity in miserable self-alienation, leaving it with the 
“eternally antagonistic” vision of “Man […] at war with himself”.51 
Only anarchy as “the absence of a master, or a sovereign” can exor-
cise the spectre of theology and emancipate true human justice from 
the regime of theonomy. “Liberty is anarchy”, Proudhon asserts, 
“[…] the balance of rights and duties. To make a man free is to 
balance him with others, —that is to put him on their level”.52 Such 
anarchistic equality frees humanity from the necessarily imbalanced 
heteronomy of subjection to a Wholly Other God.53
Proudhon affirms that true anarchic justice is only realisable 
at the inter-human level, without the intrusion of metaphysics. 
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Within this strict horizon, “Équité, justice, and society, can ex-
ist only between individuals of the same species”, and therefore 
“They form no part of the relations of different races to each 
other,—for instance, of the wolf to the goat, of the goat to man, 
of man to God, much less of God to man”.54 If God is as Wholly 
Other as some projections of theism would postulate then there 
can be no relationship of justice between humanity and divin-
ity, since the notion of true justice demands both equality and 
reciprocity. “The attribution of justice, equity, and love to the 
Supreme Being is pure anthropomorphism”, Proudhon therefore 
contends, “[…] God can be regarded as just, equitable, and good, 
only to another God. Now, God has no associate; consequently, 
he cannot experience social affections, —such as goodness, équité, 
and justice”.55
While rejecting the anthropomorphic construction of theism’s 
idea of a Wholly Other God of Providence, Proudhon nonetheless 
retains a “social” idea of God as a cypher to the past, present, and 
even the future of humanity. In contradistinction to the theist’s 
projection of the God of Providence, Proudhon speaks of “God, 
the great unknown” as “an hypothesis […] a necessary dialectical 
tool” which in its social context “[…] is much more a collective 
act of faith than an individual conception”.56 Unlike Kierkegaard’s 
concern with the individual self-God-relation, Proudhon’s hypo-
thetical “God” performs a collective social function. Nonetheless, 
at the same time as he dismantles the theistic construct of the God 
of Providence, Proudhon also confesses that belief in God “is a 
fact as primitive, an idea as inevitable, a principle as necessary as 
are the categorical ideas of a cause, substance, time, and space to 
our understanding”.57 By virtue of this necessity, Proudhon treats 
the “hypothesis of God” as the dialectical social a priori of an-
ti-theism.58 Without the idea of “a God or master-builder” the uni-
verse, and humanity itself, cannot be conceived to exist. Proudhon 
calls this rather deistic conception (a deity who is not regarded 
as intervening in creation) “the social profession of faith.” In ten-
sion with the thought that existence without God as its first cause 
seems inconceivable, however, Proudhon asserts the notion that 
“also without man God would not be thought, or—to clear the 
 interval—God would be nothing”.59 In other words, whether in 
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deism, theism, or anti-theism, the thought of God and humanity 
appear within a mutually inter-dependent configuration.
Though anti-theism seeks the negation of the theistic idea of 
God, Proudhon tempers his polemic with the avowal that his 
“criticism of the idea of God [theism] is similar to all the criti-
cisms I have made of authority, property, etc.; it is a systematic 
negation, which is meant to come to a higher affirmation, equal-
ly systematic.”60 In striving for an almost apophatic negation 
Proudhon desires a further dialectical via negativa which rises 
above the self-delusions of atheism’s denial of God’s existence. In 
Proudhon’s eyes, atheism attempts a self-apotheosis which thinks 
itself “intelligent and strong”, but which, by failing to discover 
a higher systematic negation of both the idea of “God” and of 
itself, is in reality merely “stupid and timid.”61 Proudhon and 
Kierkegaard are allied in discerning an unconscious irony in athe-
ism’s denial of the existence of God. Despite its self-aggrandising 
claims to a Promethean form of freedom, humanist atheism mere-
ly seeks to re-internalise the idea of God which it had projected 
and alienated from itself.62 As such, atheism’s negation of the idea 
of God cannot aspire towards a higher systematic affirmation be-
yond itself, as sought by Proudhon’s anti-theism.
However, anti-theism operates under the caveat that consum-
mate realisation of this “higher affirmation” remains eternally 
elusive. The dialectic is never resolved, the system is never com-
plete; and so the struggle continues. Anti-theism will not find rest 
with the distant God of deism, according to which “God” serves 
a merely hypothetical or social purpose. While it may strive be-
yond atheism’s deicidal re-appropriation of theism (as Feuerbach 
sought to reclaim statements about God as statements about 
Man), Proudhon’s anti-theism itself is motivated by an irascible 
sense of Misotheism (hatred of God63). In contrast to the late 
revolutionary deistic beliefs of théophilanthropie (a sect affirm-
ing friendship of God and man), anti-theism is unmoved by the 
promise of rapprochement, preferring instead to struggle against 
the God of Providence “like Israel against Jehovah [Genesis 32], 
until death.”64 However, by desiring its own elusive higher sys-
tematic negation, anti-theism, developing Proudhon’s principle, 
also seeks something beyond itself which in turn struggles against 
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it. As such, anti-theism aspires beyond the despairing hubris and 
egoism of humanistic atheism at the same moment in which it 
struggles for the negation of the God of theism. Humanity, in 
Proudhon’s system, actually surpasses itself, not by re- assimilating 
the “God” who symbolises its self-alienation, but by continu-
ing to engage in an eternal dialectical struggle against all ideas 
of “God”. Proudhon opposes “God” in a spirit of misotheism 
 dialectically compelled by the belief that “God is man’s adversary, 
and Providence a misanthrope”.65
Theology’s myth of divine Providence, the consoling yet deso-
lating thought of a cosmic harmony presiding over human order, 
stands in direct violation to the visceral sufferings of the human-
ity it stands over: “the bread, kneaded in blood and tears, upon 
which you [God] have fed us”.66 The all-seeing eye of Providence 
is tragically blind to the suffering and injustice which announce 
its negation. Far from being the perfection or idealisation of hu-
manity, the classical Divine Attributes thus express the negation 
of human values: “God is contradictory of man, just as charity is 
contradictory of justice”.67 Rather than aspiring to a sublation of 
the human and the divine, Proudhon’s anti-theism asserts a “radi-
cal antinomy” between humanity and God:
Antinomy, literally counter-law, means opposition in principle or 
antagonism in relation […] antinomy is the conception of a law 
with two faces, the one positive, the other negative.68
Within this antagonism of the positive and the negative there is a 
tendency towards reciprocal negation. “An antinomy is made up 
of two terms, necessary to each other, but always opposed, and 
tending to mutual destruction”; and yet, in anti-theism’s system-
atic negation a higher affirmation arises: “from the combination 
of these two zeros unity springs forth, or the idea which dispels 
the antinomy”.69
This affirmation, inevitably, is itself vulnerable to its own sys-
tematic negation, thereby continuing the eternal struggle, perpet-
uating “the insoluble antinomy between God and man”.70 Any 
affirmation which emerges from this antinomy is itself always vul-
nerable to further negation. As such, a sublation of humanity and 
divinity is never attained within the eternal antinomy of theism 
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and anti-theism. In radical and perennial struggle, the human and 
the divine retain an inexorable alterity (a radical otherness irre-
ducible to sameness or reconciliation). In terms of Kierkegaard’s 
own refusal of Hegelian sublation (Aufheben), there remains an 
“infinite qualitative difference” between humanity and divinity. 
Or, in Proudhon’s words, there remains a refusal to “make God 
into humanity”, a sublation which, after all, “[…] would be slan-
der of both”.71 Yet while Kierkegaard aspires towards a restless 
“synthesis” of the human and the divine realised through a self-
God relationship which retains the agonistic tension of infinite 
alterity, Proudhon refuses any spiritual horizon of reconciliation 
between the human and the divine. “God and man hold each 
 other in perpetual check and continually avoid each other”.72
Whereas Kierkegaard hopes for a personalised relationship 
between self and God beyond the realm of ideality, Proudhon 
remains within the principle of irascible antinomy. Divinity and 
humanity are each the shadow-side of the other: “Humanity is a 
spectre to God, just as God is a spectre to humanity; each of the 
two is the other’s cause, reason, and end of existence”.73 Each is 
incomplete without the other who it both haunts and is haunted 
by; and yet, according to the eternal antinomy, the other will nev-
er complete it nor reconcile it to itself.74 God may be “the com-
plement of man”,75 but God is also the contradiction of Man. 
While Kierkegaard contemplates the revelation of an impossible 
reconciliation of the infinite qualitative difference in personal re-
lationship with the paradox of Christ, Proudhon remains within a 
principle of justice which continues to regard God and humanity 
as mutually, antagonistically, and irreconcilably wholly other.76
To recapitulate: Proudhon’s refusal to reconcile the antinomy 
of anti-theism is ultimately a struggle against theism and atheism, 
as well as a refusal of the benign concessions of deistic théophilan-
thropisme. In its striving to re-appropriate the image of God, 
Proudhon discerns that atheist humanism merely expresses the de-
sire to sublate theism. In light of this desire, “Humanism” becomes 
nothing but “the most perfect theism”.77 Opposing both atheism 
and theism (which are implicitly just two sides of the same coin), 
Proudhon’s asserts anti-theism as a struggle in which “God is in-
exhaustible, and our contest eternal.”78 In its intentional rejection 
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of humanistic atheism, of Providential theism, and of transcen-
dentally indifferent deism (théophilanthropisme), anti-theism can 
be read as an apophatic struggle against all forms of ideology 
and authority which manufacture idols from ideals of “God” or 
“Man”. By refusing to resolve this struggle, anti-theism can help 
ensure that humanity remains free from the totalising archē of 
either. Anti-theism refuses the metaphysical discourse between 
theism and atheism on the existence of God, preferring instead 
to critique the idolatry of essence.79 Proudhon asserts anti- theism 
as an expression of “practical atheism” as the struggle against 
providential theism and atheistic humanism’s re-appropriation of 
power.80 Since the divine essence is beyond human knowledge, 
anti-theism’s apophatic “first duty of man” is “[…] to continually 
hunt the idea of God out of his mind and conscience”, even in 
its moralist and deistic forms, insofar as “[…] every step we take 
in advance is a victory in which we crush Divinity”.81 Through 
 anti-theism’s struggles in the name of justice, the idol of divinity is 
“dethroned and broken […] For God is stupidity and cowardice; 
God is hypocrisy and falsehood; God is tyranny and misery; God 
is evil”.82
But it should not be forgotten that such statements are avowed 
by Proudhon as systematic negations aspiring towards—though 
never arriving at—a higher synthesis. Such denials of “God” are 
themselves vulnerable to future negations. They are spoken within 
the eternal struggle to think humanity and think God within the 
same horizon of freedom. It is, I suggest, in such openness to fu-
ture negation that anti-theism becomes a voice—even a prophet-
ic-demonic voice—to which theology might constructively attend. 
At the very least, as Kierkegaard observes, “the demonic always 
contains the truth in reverse”.83
Towards an Anti/Theology: An Apophatic  
Struggle with “God”
“[T]hat God could create human beings free over against himself 
is the cross which philosophy could not bear but upon which it has 
remained hanging.”
—Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers84
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By gesturing towards a notion of anti/theology, I intend a course 
of dialectical struggle between the embrace and rejection of theo-
logical thinking about God: a continuous apophatic process 
which struggles in the name of both human and divine freedom. 
This entails a dialogical approach to thinking about God which 
is mindful of the antipathy as well as the sympathy with which 
the human relates to the divine. In order to resist the temptation 
to sublate anti-theism into theology, however, it must be rec-
ognised that when Proudhon appeals to the notion that God is 
beyond knowledge he is not consciously aligning himself to the 
devotional via negativa (negative way) of mystical theology. Even 
negative theology’s confession of the unknowable nature of God, 
as Feuerbach similarly implored, can be rejected as represent-
ing a mere subterfuge and mystification of the idea of God. The 
 denial of qualities to God, according to Feuerbach, renders God 
as nothing more than “a negative being” and, as such, is merely 
a symptomatic “offspring of recent times, a product of modern 
unbelief.”85
Historically and conceptually untenable as Feuerbach’s  dismissal 
may be, his identification of negative theology with implicit athe-
ism contains a powerful critique of the temptations of employ-
ing the via negativa as a strategy for theological mystification. 
However, by inscribing ‘negation’ within a dialectical relationship 
to ‘affirmation’, Feuerbach fails to appreciate the extent to which 
the negation of positive predicates is only an initial stage on the 
way of apophatic theology. Apophasis does not merely rest with 
the dialectical negation of the via eminentiae (the way of eminence; 
also via positiva) by the via negationis (way of negation; also via 
negativa). Apophasis negates the dialectical negation between 
positive and negative statements about God in order to move to-
wards a higher sense of God beyond affirmation and negation.86 
Feuerbach remains unable to escape the dialectical relationship 
between divine and human attributes, as reflected in his rejection 
of the theological distinction between “what God is in himself and 
what he is for me”. Feuerbach cleaves to his notion that God’s 
nature is identical to the anthropocentric standpoint: “I cannot 
know whether God is something else in himself or for himself than 
he is for me; what he is to me is to me all that he is […] his very 
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nature”.87 In doing so Feuerbach denies in advance the apophatic 
possibility of a God beyond or otherwise than human conception. 
This is further reflected in his insistence on referring to God in terms 
of a being, “the Highest Being” in reference to the human being.88 
For mystical theology, by contrast, God is hyperousious: beyond, 
before, or otherwise than the category of ‘being’ itself. As the classic 
illustration of Pseudo-Dionysius leads us: the affirmation that ‘God 
is light’ is negated by the denial that ‘God is darkness’. The nega-
tion between these two is, however, transcended by the notion that 
‘God is dazzling darkness’: a statement which carries one beyond 
the limited dialectical thinking of affirmation and denial.
Although Proudhon would surely suspect such moves of mys-
tification, I suggest that his notion of anti-theism is actually more 
consistent with apophatic technique (if not its motivation or goal) 
than that of Feuerbach’s atheism. As Proudhon recognises, athe-
ism (as the denial of the existence of the God of theism) remains 
unconsciously dependent upon the idea of God it seeks to negate. 
Anti-theism, however, aspires beyond atheism by negating the 
idea of God in order to perpetuate the eternal struggle between 
theism and itself: a struggle which perpetuates the endless antin-
omy between God and humanity. While theism may affirm that 
‘God is good’, anti-theism denies this goodness by stating that 
‘God is evil’. However, anti-theism would not rest content with an 
apophatic sublation of these statements. Anti-theism refuses the 
synthesis offered by such a mystical statement as ‘God is beyond 
good and evil’. Anti-theism would rise up again against this state-
ment, denying the idea of a God who is beyond accountability to 
morality in the name of visceral human justice.
This, I suggest, is precisely where the voice of Proudhon’s 
 anti-theism speaks most deeply to theology (even at its mystical 
edge), from the outside, as “ab hoste consilium” [advice from 
the enemy] who may be a “malitieus dæmon” [evil daimon]. 
More than this, anti-theism, especially in its critique of the God 
of Providence in the name of human suffering, offers a power-
fully prophetic voice against the power-plays which linger with-
in many strands of theology. Anti-theism itself reminds us that 
the struggle between theism and anti-theism remains unresolved, 
even by the consolations of mystical theology: consolations which 
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for some will appear more like desolation and mystification than 
a resolution to the problems of human suffering. From the dia-
lectical struggle between theism and anti-theism, I suggest, a new 
expression of theism may emerge (perhaps even a new mystical 
theology). But this new form does not dispel the antinomy. So too 
must a new anti-theism arise against every new expression of the-
ism. In maintaining this perpetual struggle, consolation is always 
countered by the spectre of desolation. The idea that ‘God is be-
yond good and evil’ does not resolve the anti-theistic agony of the 
statement that ‘God is evil’. All it does is challenge it to re-assert 
itself in a manner which struggles authentically with its antagonist. 
Theology should be willing to express the goodness of God in a 
mode which is capable of struggling with the concomitant sense of 
the darkness of God.89
The ongoing deferral of sublimation which arises from this 
method may, furthermore, actually be more apposite to the strat-
egy of apophasis itself. Even the statement that ‘God is dazzling 
darkness’ is vulnerable to the charge of mystification, just as a 
mystical theodicy of a God of Providence ‘beyond good and evil’ 
remains vulnerable to the antagonistic reality of unjust suffering. 
In other words, even the most apophatic of negative theologies 
must struggle against the practical assertion, as exemplified by 
Proudhon, that the idea of God can become far removed from 
cries of human justice. Mystical theology must contend with the 
temptation to occupy itself solely with a “God” who is “beyond” 
to the point of mystifying detachment from the cries for justice 
of those in suffering. The “practical” denials of Proudhon’s anti- 
theistic struggle against God in the name of human suffering and 
social justice cannot be fully negated, cannot be reduced to silence 
by any totalising apophasis. Theism and anti-theism struggle in 
the space between the affirmation and negation of God, between 
the Kierkegaardian polarities of “faith” and “offence”. Such is 
the indeterminate space in which the agonistic and apophatic di-
alectics of anti/theology might operate: a space marked by the 
unsettling and unresolved cry “My God, my God, why have you 
forsaken me?”.90
In seeking to clear such a space for anti/theology I return fi-
nally to Kierkegaard who I suggest provides theistic grounds 
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for upholding the voice of anti-theism, even though it is a voice 
he ultimately identifies as a cry of despair. The fact that the last 
word goes to Kierkegaard discloses the notion that this nascent 
vision of anti/theology operates within a provisionally theolog-
ical framework. It is as if anti-theism is finally viewed via the 
diagnostic lens of theism itself—albeit a form of theism which 
privileges human and divine freedom as related in Love rather 
than Power. While I conclude here with this sense, it is important 
to regard such a view as provisional, as potentially anarchic, as 
open to the struggles with a higher anti-theism—which in turn 
drives both onwards in Love.
From Kierkegaard’s avowedly theological perspective, the pos-
sibility of anti-theism is itself implicitly sustained by an account of 
divine and human freedom grounded in the nature of God’s om-
nipotence as love. This is an account of divine omnipotence as the 
Love of God which is itself critical of both theistic notions of di-
vine Providence and of human constructs of power. That is not to 
say that Kierkegaard evokes an image of harmony. As Proudhon 
urges an eternal struggle against God, Kierkegaard elicits the pres-
ence of an inexorable struggle between the human and the divine 
at the genesis of his own dialectical vision. This struggle is itself a 
symptomatic expression of the relationship between both divine 
and human freedom: freedom understood as a divine gift of om-
nipotent love which God, even in God’s unfathomable grief, will 
not violate. Kierkegaard seeks to evoke and also to provoke this 
existential tension by declaring that “God is man’s most redoubt-
able enemy, thy mortal enemy; He would that thou shouldst die, 
die unto the world”.91
If one is only willing to gaze deeply into the abyss of existence, 
then we will see that the world does not express the Providence 
of God transmitted through benign ecclesial hierarchy. Rather, we 
should discern the ancient and perennial struggle between “Spirit” 
(Ånd) and “spiritlessness” (Åndløsheden) which promises to 
awaken us to the realization that “there is a life and death battle 
between God and man; God hates man just as man hates God.”92 
In eliciting a struggle of alterity at the heart of this relationship, 
Proudhon and Kierkegaard each regards the relation between 
the divine and the human as irreducible to either the sublation 
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(Aufheben) of Hegelian Geist in history or the sublimation of 
Feuerbachian humanist atheism.
However, the decisive point of departure for Kierkegaard’s re-
lational theism from Proudhon’s antinomous anti-theism is found 
in Kierkegaard’s account of divine omnipotence expressed in 
love’s irrevocable gift of freedom—a freedom which, nonetheless, 
sustains the possibility of anti-theism as the freedom of “offence”. 
In other words, the freedom to negate the idea of “God” in the 
name of offence is itself an expression of a God-given freedom 
which the divine itself refuses to negate. God’s refusal to negate 
the one who struggles against God expresses a notion of divine 
omnipotence opposed to the a/theistic projection of human ideas 
of “power” as “mastery over the other”. Instead, divine omnip-
otence becomes a kenotic expression of God’s love for an other 
who remains free to refuse the very love which creates its being 
and its freedom. The human individual, as freely-created ex nihi-
lo (out of nothing), is ultimately free to refute the cause of its own 
being (since it depends upon nothing). As ex nihilo the creature is 
free to will itself; or even to will its own nothingness. It is free to 
not be. What is more, as Kierkegaard describes in one of his most 
extensive and remarkable journal entries from 1846, this ground-
ing of divine omnipotence in kenotic love implies a redefinition 
of the relationship between God and evil—one which contrasts 
profoundly with Proudhon’s assertion of the God of Providence 
as the God of evil:
The whole question of the relation of God’s omnipotence and 
goodness to evil (instead of the differentiation that God accom-
plishes the good and merely permits the evil) is resolved quite 
simply in the following way. The greatest good, after all, that can 
be done for a being, greater than anything else that one can do 
for it, is to make it free. In order to do just that, omnipotence 
is required. This seems strange, since it is precisely omnipotence 
that supposedly would make [a being] dependent. But if one will 
reflect on omnipotence, one will see that it also must contain the 
unique qualification of being able to withdraw itself again in a 
manifestation of omnipotence in such a way that precisely for this 
reason that which has been originated through omnipotence can 
be independent.93
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The vision of freedom and independence presented here seeks 
to exceed human notions of inter-subjectivity, insofar as they 
are typically enslaved to a dialectic approximate to Hegel’s ac-
count of the relation between Master and Slave (Herrschaft und 
Knechtschaft – or “Lordship and Bondage”94):
This is why one human being cannot make another person wholly 
free, because the one who has power is himself captive in having 
it and therefore continually has a wrong relationship to the one 
whom he wants to make free. Moreover, there is a finite self-love 
in all finite power (talent etc.). Only omnipotence can withdraw 
itself at the same time it gives itself away, and this relationship is 
the very independence of the receiver. God’s omnipotence is there-
fore his goodness [rather than the evil Proudhon identifies with the 
God of Providence]. For goodness is to give away completely, but 
in such a way that by omnipotently taking oneself back one makes 
the recipient independent. All finite power makes [a being] depen-
dent; only omnipotence can make [a being] independent, can form 
from nothing [creation ex nihilo] something that has its continu-
ity in itself through the continuous withdrawing of omnipotence. 
Omnipotence is not ensconced in a relationship to another, for 
there is no other to which it is comparable [Proudhon may agree 
with this point]—no, it can give without giving up the least of its 
power, that is, it can make [a being] independent.95
Such a vision, however, conflicts with merely mundane capacities 
for relative dependence and independence, as habitually encoun-
tered in the world:
It is incomprehensible that omnipotence is able not only to create 
the most impressive of all things—the whole visible world—but 
is able to create the most frail of all things—a being independent 
of that very omnipotence. Omnipotence, which can handle the 
world so toughly and with such a heavy hand, can also make itself 
so light that what it has brought into existence receives indepen-
dence. Only a wretched and worldly conception of the dialectic 
of power holds that it is greater and greater in proportion to its 
ability to compel and to make dependent.96
Omnipotence is not expressed, as human power typically is, 
in the mastery of slaves or even as a direct Providence which 
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macro-manages the worldly status quo of suffering and injustice, 
or evil.
No, Socrates had a sounder understanding; he knew that the art 
of power lies precisely in making another free [insofar as Socrates, 
as a maieutic and incidental teacher, helps deliver the individual 
of a truth which liberates them from heteronomous delusion and 
into the light of their own autonomy]. But in the relationship be-
tween individuals this can never be done, even though it needs to 
be emphasized again and again that this is the highest; only om-
nipotence can truly succeed in this. Therefore if a human being had 
the slightest independent existence over against God (with regard 
to materia) then God could not make him free. Creation out of 
nothing is once again the Omnipotent One’s expression for being 
able to make [a being] independent. He to whom I owe absolutely 
everything, although he still absolutely controls everything, has in 
fact made me independent. If in creating man God himself lost a 
little of his power, then precisely what he could not do would be to 
make a human being independent.97
In other words, whereas the powerful tend to crave greater and 
greater power over others, only true divine omnipotence has the 
power to make another free. Kierkegaard thus interprets divine 
omnipotence as kenotic love and as a gift of freedom which creates 
ex nihilo the space for a self to become itself as truly independent. 
The self truly becomes itself, not in sole relation to the others, nor 
to the State, none of whom can make it free. The self becomes it-
self before God in relation to whom it becomes conscious of itself 
as “Spirit”—Spirit realised as individuated freedom.
At this moment, however, Kierkegaard and Proudhon assume 
their stands even further apart. While Proudhon may regard the-
ism as a necessary dialectical agonist for anti-theism, Kierkegaard’s 
theism validates the possibility of Proudhon’s negation of “God” 
as an inexorable, yet ultimately grievous, expression of the free-
dom of offence. Under Kierkegaard’s theological dialectic, there-
fore, Proudhon’s anti-theism becomes an expression of despair: 
specifically “In Despair to will to Be Oneself: Defiance”.98 While 
anti-theism is made possible by freedom, its expression ultimately 
leads away from the realisation of freedom as Spirit and down 
into the abyssal un-freedom of despair. In struggling against God, 
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anarchistic anti-theism refuses to submit to God as Master, nor to 
any other as Master. Yet according to Kierkegaard’s diagnosis of 
such defiant despair, the self which refuses all external powers and 
wills to become its own Master is itself doomed to internalise and 
thereby to enslave itself to the power dialectic of Master-Slave.99 
Such a self is essentially master over nothing (reflecting its cre-
ation ex nihilo) because it has become enslaved to the unrealisable 
ideal of mastery, of power, of itself.100 Even without the archē of 
God or the other, the anti-theist cannot escape the fall into slav-
ery at the hands of its own self. For Kierkegaard, unless the self 
becomes itself as Spirit, one will always deprive oneself of one’s 
own freedom because one is fatally flawed by the desire to master 
oneself. Even the single anarchist cannot become free from this 
self-enslaving power of the self—the despair which Kierkegaard 
names as the sickness unto death. 
Anti/Conclusion: Neither/Nor?
“Do I step forward as one who in God’s behalf, so to speak, has 
orders to reduce Christendom in rank? O, no, I am without author-
ity. Stirred by the ideal myself, I find a joy in being reduced in rank 
myself, and I strive “without authority” to stir others to the same.”
—Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers101
Kierkegaard’s verdict is intense. Anti-theism is made possible by 
divine freedom; but it expresses itself as despair, and despair is a 
turning away from freedom—a turning inward into nothingness. 
The anarchic self is never free from itself; autonomy descends into 
self-incarceration. Under the heteronomous rubric of Kierkegaard’s 
diagnosis, Proudhon’s anti-theism discovers itself inscribed within 
the categories of “defiance” and “demonic rage”, under the bond-
age of which the self labours in the unfreedom of “despair”.102 
The despair of defiant anti-theism is demonic: “the will of unfree-
dom”.103 But Kierkegaard is himself open to the inverted wisdom 
of the demonic enemy. What is more, Kierkegaard identifies the 
despair of offense as symptomatic of a rise in consciousness from 
spiritlessness to Spirit itself.104 As such, there is hope that for dia-
logue beyond this apparent impasse. It is, furthermore, pertinent to 
the anarchē of Proudhon’s position that while anti-theism refuses 
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the heteronomy of theism, it simultaneously invites a systematic 
negation of itself which may raise thinking up to a higher affir-
mation in the eternal struggle between the human and the divine. 
Kierkegaard, for his part, might suggest of Proudhon that insofar 
as it is continually re-assigning itself within this eternal struggle, 
anti-theism cannot, or will not, break itself free from the imagery 
of a religion which it professes to despise. Proudhon’s ultimate de-
spair may reside in the fact that he cannot say that God does not 
exist. He does not believe in God; but he cannot free himself from 
the idea of “God” which resides as an insidious presence within 
the human imagination.105
In Proudhon’s demonic antagonism of theology, however, 
“God” effectively becomes “Satan”: the adversary, the evil one 
against whom one struggles in the name of the human good.106 As 
Proudhon may wish to retain some dialectical notion of “God”, I 
wish to uphold the freedom of anti-theism’s “offence” against evil 
perpetrated in the name of a “God” who appears more demonic 
than divine. In such cases, the cry of the anti-theist, as Proudhon 
himself sensed, can speak prophetic truth to the idols of power. 
Latent in Proudhon’s demonic struggles against God, Meltzer, like 
Marx, suspects a nostalgia for religion which recurs in Proudhon’s 
enduring rhetoric of redemption and in “a style of dialectics pro-
fessing to ‘cure’ contradiction through ascension (with vestigial 
religious undertones) rather than Aufhebung [sublation].”107 In 
this respect, Proudhon’s preference for renewed antinomy over 
sublation can be compared with Kierkegaard’s preference for the 
unresolved tension of a paradoxical “synthesis” which nonethe-
less refuses to sublate the “infinite qualitative difference” between 
humanity and divinity.108 Furthermore, both Kierkegaard and 
Proudhon oppose any idea of “God” which upholds the provi-
dence of the powerful over the weak, the impoverished, and the 
oppressed: namely, the God of evil.
However, insofar as it exposes Christendom’s construct of a God 
of Providence as a projection of human delusions of power, I sug-
gest that Kierkegaard’s theology might offer a higher negation of 
Proudhon’s anti-theism. Both the theism of Christendom and the 
anti-theism of Proudhon are ultimately realised via Kierkegaard’s 
lens as manifestations of despair. And yet, in the irrepressible spirit 
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of anarchē as well as apophasis, I suggest that Kierkegaard’s nega-
tion is itself laid open to even higher negations by renewed forms 
of anti-theism—forms which perhaps break free of despair, forms 
which we have yet to see.
Insofar as it seeks for a higher theonomy, the aspiration of this 
dialectic is ultimately theological—albeit a theological apophasis 
which remains dialectically open to its negation by anti-theology. 
In this respect, such an anarchistic and apophatic theology under-
stands its struggle with God somewhat differently from Proudhon. 
Whereas Proudhon wages eternal war against the idea of the God 
of Providence in the name of justice, Kierkegaard urges Christianity 
to struggle against the idols of the mind, incarnate in the illusion 
of state Christendom, which imagine divine omnipotence to be 
an infinite projection of finite human power. Unlike Proudhon, 
Kierkegaard discerns that at the ground of all freedom there is 
the revelation of a hidden, silent lake—even a secret abyss—of 
unfathomable divine love. Ultimately the self is enabled to struggle 
with God because, out of the omnipotence of love, God gives the 
ground of freedom from which struggle becomes possible.
Furthermore, God has given Godself to be struggled with: as 
an other whose omnipotence does not subjugate, re-assimilate, 
or annihilate the self, but who desires the self to become itself 
(and no other) in freedom as Spirit. To an extent, Proudhon and 
Kierkegaard agree that God is Wholly Other; but for Kierkegaard 
this is only one side of a deeper dialectic. God is ultimately the 
Holy Other who also descends—as well as withdraws—in the gra-
cious gift of a divine love which offers itself in the space of alterity. 
For Kierkegaard, while struggle is free to express itself in despair, 
defiance, offence, love, or even indifference, such struggles are ul-
timately stages on the way to a higher synthesis: the struggle of 
restless Spirit, as self, as freedom, realising itself as the image of 
God, in faith willing to become itself, resting transparently in God.
In Genesis thirty-two’s image of Jacob’s conflict with the mys-
terious divine stranger to which both Proudhon and Kierkegaard 
appeal, de Lubac discerns “the condition of all greatness, and it 
may be the means—but here Proudhon would no longer follow 
us—of a purer submission.”109 Such “purer submission” involves 
a self-denial which consummates the loving struggle with God 
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by reconciling itself in faith’s vow, “nevertheless, not my will, but 
your will be done” (Luke 22:42). Denying its claim to be its own 
archē, the restless self surrenders its despairing will-to-power110 
in order, paradoxically, to will to be itself as resting transparently 
in God.111 In doing so, the self surrenders itself to a God who, 
through the primal creative kenosis (self-giving) of love, has al-
ready surrendered what humanity would imagine to be absolute 
power in the creative gift of freedom.
The Spirit, once again, is freedom. And freedom is also manifest 
in the possibility to negate “God”—a possibility of despairing ne-
gation which, out of wounded love and with “unfathomable grief”, 
God does not negate. As such, the kenosis of the human self as 
Spirit is a free response to grace: the primal kenosis of divine om-
nipotence, sacrificed to the inviolable divine gift of human freedom. 
So long as the human imagination remains inventive and evasive in 
its construction of theological idols to subsidise its own desire for 
power, however, theological thinking does well to heed Proudhon’s 
demonic-prophetic profession that “God is inexhaustible, and our 
contest eternal”.112 Until it discovers final rest in God, the restless 
Spirit is destined to struggle against and with God; against “God” 
and with God. Perhaps in a spirit of anarchē and agonia as well 
as apophasis, theology should struggle against the idols of despair, 
continually renewing the spirit sought by one of its greatest mys-
tics: “Therefore let us pray to God that we may be free of God”.113
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fluence on Baudelaire’s poetic idea of “the demonic” (see further 
Meltzer, Seeing Double: Baudelaire’s Modernity, pp. 45–65).
107. Meltzer, Seeing Double: Baudelaire’s Modernity, pp. 52–53.
108. I discuss this further in Struggling With God, pp. 220–224.
109. The Un-Marxian Socialist, p. 275.
110. For a compelling and critical comparison of Nietzsche’s will-
to-power and Kierkegaard’s view of power in relation to Christ see 
J. Keith Hyde, Concepts of Power in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2010). Hyde argues “that Kierkegaard’s theory 
of power is more coherent and consistent than Nietzsche’s position 
[which Hyde regards as undermined by inconsistency and contra-
diction], which he foresaw and “forswore” with uncanny accuracy” 
(p. 7). Nonetheless, Hyde also suggests that had Kierkegaard been 
able to read Nietzsche, he would have esteemed him “for openly ex-
pressing his antagonism against divine authority” and for pursuing 
“a tragic bid for freedom” which shames “the deplorable ways that 
the church, grace, and compassion had been used to buttress political 
power in state Lutheranism” (p. 183).
111. SUD, p. 82.
112. De la Justice dans la Révolution et dans L’Eglise, volume ii, 
p. 253. Cited in de Lubac, The Un-marxian Socialist, p. 289.
113. Meister Eckhart, The Complete Mystical Works of Meister 
Eckhart, trans. Maurice O’C Walshe (New York: Crossroad, 2009) 
Sermon Eighty-Seven, p. 422.
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A common view of morality and religion is that they demand 
self-denial. The starting point is me in isolation, to which we 
then ought to add a moral concern which restricts my doings, or, 
 according to the self-professed egoist, ought not to add. The moral 
difficulty is hence about forcing oneself to renounce the things one 
wants, even parts of oneself. Religious belief means servitude, and 
we have to choose between it and freedom. In this chapter, the intri-
cacies of this picture of morality and religion are critically discussed. 
In this discussion, Max Stirner is used as the main interlocutor. 
Another understanding of morality and religion is contrasted to the 
egoist one, a contrasting understanding in which it is egoism that is 
the result of self-denial: the egoist must harden his or her heart, that 
is, must renounce love. According to this contrasting understanding, 
religious belief is thus positively related to freedom.
In John Milton’s Paradise Lost, Satan says: “Better to reign in 
Hell, than serve in Heav’n.”1 And “Here at last / We shall be 
free”.2 Or as the anarchist would say: “no gods, no masters”.3 
According to this well-known anarchist slogan, all servitude 
should be  rejected.4 That slogan suggests that anarchism does not 
only affect the political realm narrowly understood, but also has 
a religious import: all gods should be eliminated too, not only all 
earthly masters. Religious faith means servitude and is therefore 
antithetical to freedom.
Such a general rejection of religion can be easily countered 
by pointing out that it is only possible to claim that religious 
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belief necessarily mean servitude if you have surveyed all religious 
possibilities, including all imagined, not yet actual ones. In other 
words, it is not enough just to point to specific historical forms 
of religion, many of which are no doubt incompatible with anar-
chism. Answering the question whether religious belief necessarily 
means servitude in the affirmative would hence be a strange thing 
to do.
However, such a criticism of the “no gods, no masters” slogan 
is too superficial. The mistake is not simply an undue general-
ization. What is imperative is, instead, to get to grips with the 
thinking which lies behind it: what picture holds me captive when 
I definitely rule out all religious possibilities as ‘servitude’?5 In this 
paper I will only discuss one such picture, and my discussion is 
therefore by no means exhaustive. In the anarchist tradition there 
have been many critics of religion, but that criticism seldom oc-
cupies centre stage. Max Stirner’s Der Einzige und sein Eigentum 
(1844) is in this respect very different.6 His book can be read as 
an extensive discussion of the “no gods, no masters” slogan (even 
though he never uses that phrase) in that it is an attempt at spell-
ing out what it would mean to reject servitude in general. There 
is thus an obvious picture of the above kind at work in it. This 
is the picture my discussion will be centred around. What makes 
Stirner’s criticism of religion interesting for my purposes is that it 
is much more general than only restricted to religious belief: it is 
based on a picture of human life in its entirety. Focusing on that 
picture means that religious faith will not be the main focus of 
my discussion, but indirectly my discussion will suggest possibil-
ities in which religious faith and anarchism are compatible, even 
though that is not my primary goal.
Since my starting point is a specific question – does religious 
belief necessarily mean servitude? – and since what my discussion 
will be centred around is a specific picture at work in Stirner’s 
text, my focus will not be Stirner’s text itself and its historical 
context. Scholarly exegeses of Stirner’s works can be found else-
where.7 Stirner will here be used as an interlocutor in order for 
us to learn something as regards the main question. This could 
basically be done in two ways: either by turning something he 
says into a positive contribution to the answering of the question 
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or by disentangling mistakes he makes in a way which makes it 
possible for us to gain better insight into the principal issue. In 
none of these two cases is his text or his historical context some-
thing to which we have to be faithful. Instead, the philosophical 
aim of this paper is to turn something seemingly dead into some-
thing that is still able to speak to us. One of my tasks is there-
fore to establish connections between Stirner’s text and what is 
 existentially relevant, positively or negatively, that is, to discuss 
the picture at work in it.
1. Stirner and the rejection of religious belief
Not knowing anything about Stirner, one might suppose that his 
criticism of religion is the usual one: religion is unreasonable. But 
what characterises the Young Hegelian criticism of religion is that 
it is not so much a criticism as an interpretation of religious belief 
from a position already more or less distant to it. Der Einzige und 
sein Eigentum should be understood as a radicalization of that 
approach and thus as a criticism of the way in which it has been 
carried out previously, for example in Feuerbach’s Das Wesen des 
Christentums (1841, 2nd edn 1843). According to Stirner it is not 
only the religious believer who believes in “ghosts”: reason is a 
ghost too and the belief in it just another form of religious belief. 
Stirner writes: “Whether the church, the bible or reason […] is the 
holy authority makes no essential difference.”8
What is then, according to Stirner, the common problem? 
“Everything holy is a bond, a fetter.”9 This could be understood 
as a summarizing definition of the holy. Anything that binds me 
in this way is religious, even if it is not normally presented in that 
way. “Alienness is a criterion of the ‘holy’. In everything holy there 
is something ‘uncanny’ [Unheimliches], i.e. alien, in which we are 
not quite at home [heimisch und zu Hause]. What is holy to me, 
is to me not my own”.10
The problem, as Stirner sees it, is a problem pertaining to any 
ideal, no matter whether it is expressed in religious terms or not. 
An ideal is something I must strive toward but cannot ever reach. 
Ideals thus create the alienation they, superficially considered, 
might seem to be the solution to.11 “Atheists” are in this regard no 
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different than religious believers but only believe in other gods:12 
reason, truth, man, the good, justice, humanity, freedom.13
This is a crucial point in Stirner’s line of thought but at the 
same time one that is hard to fathom. What, exactly, is it that 
Stirner criticises? What is an “ideal”? As I understand Stirner, it 
is not attempting to achieve something in general he finds prob-
lematic. What is it he finds problematic? The problem, if there is 
one, becomes especially poignant when failure to live up to the 
ideal is inevitable: since it is not possible to be reason, the good, 
humanity, or, for that matter, God, my life, if I made these ideals 
central to it, would, according to Stirner, always be a failure.14 But 
what makes failure so bad? What Stirner finds problematic is, as 
I understand him, hence rather one possible attitude to failure: 
when I relate to myself as to a possible object of disrespect and 
self-contempt.
One way of explaining this is by means of an example. A good 
one could be one in which the ideals are ideals of etiquette. I try 
to become a refined person, but if those ideals of refinement I 
have adopted are impossible to live up to, I will always, though 
to different degrees, see myself as vulgar and shabby. And even 
if they are not impossible to live up to, and even if I succeed in 
living up to them, this will not be a permanent accomplishment: 
I will always need to keep up this refinement, against the risk of 
sinking into vulgarity. Here we have a case where the ideals ap-
parently create the possibility of refinement but in fact only create 
alienation.
Of course, a more sophisticated form of etiquette will not make 
its distinctions in terms that are obviously empty and vain. On the 
contrary, taking clothes and superficial manners to be essential to 
etiquette could be seen as vulgar. So the more sophisticated form 
of etiquette will make its distinctions in other terms, for example 
moral ones. The alienation is created when I relate my distance 
to the moral ideal to myself. Hurting somebody is thus here un-
derstood not as something I do to her but as something I do to 
myself: I fail to live up to the ideal. And doing good to her is not 
something I do for her sake but for the sake of the good, that is 
for the sake of the ideal. Stirner writes:
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Not τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, human beings, but τὸν ἄνθρωπον, man, the 
philanthropist carries in his heart. He certainly cares for each in-
dividual, but only because he wants to see his dear ideal realised 
everywhere. So there is no question of care for me, you, us15
Since he however does not pay much respect to what you are 
privatim – indeed, if he follows his principle strictly, attaches no 
value at all to that – he sees in you only what you are generatim. 
In other words: he sees in you not you, but the species, not Peter or 
Paul, but man, not the real one or the individual, but your essence 
or your concept, not the living one, but the spirit.16 
And at bottom – this is the reason why the ideal, or any formulated 
principle, never touches upon what is essential – you and I are not 
conceptual: “neither I nor you are sayable, we are unspeakable”.17
In other words, the problem with ideals is, first, to relate what 
one is doing to oneself, as if what I cared about was not the one 
I am trying to help but at bottom only about myself or about 
my ideal self; second, to see others as just potential instances of 
something general which my helping them really concerns. And 
these two problems are of course connected: understanding things 
in terms of etiquette, that is, understanding them in terms of my 
potential refinement and vulgarity, means understanding what I 
do as concerning who I am, and that in relation to the ideals I try 
to live up to, not to the one I am, say, rude to.
This, however, goes beyond anything Stirner actually says or 
even could have said. By trying to picture the situation in which 
what he says is actually connected to something important I have 
made his point far less general than it is for him, even distorted it. 
I will come back to that; this far I have only tried to create a sense 
of what he is up to by showing that he is on to something when 
he wants to get rid of ideals. Even if I will criticise him in what 
follows, there are things he is right about, but to see what these 
are we have to depart from his general way of thinking.
So, to sum up, what Stirner criticises all previous forms of crit-
icism of religious belief for is that they have not touched upon 
the fundamental problem. In fact they have even reinforced that 
problem although the terms used are not so obviously religious 
anymore:
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To be sure, you could say, with Feuerbach and others, that religion 
has taken what is human out of man and placed it into a beyond 
so that it there, unattainable, has its existence as something per-
sonal for itself, as a “God”. But […] you could certainly let fall 
the personality of the removed human, could transform God into 
the divine, and you would still remain religious. For the religious 
consists in being dissatisfied with present man, i.e. in setting up a 
“perfection” to be striven for18
The ideal, the perfection to be striven for, promises refinement, 
were I to live up to it. But what it does not say is that I would not 
understand myself in terms of vulgarity and would not be dissat-
isfied with myself, were it not for the ideal. So the road away from 
alienation and to being at home in the world does not consist 
in fulfilling the ideal, which I would nevertheless fail to do, but 
in rejecting the ideal. The first kind of life only means servitude 
to something alien. The second kind of life would not even be a 
“kind”, for this word would only suggest a new ideal.
This summary leaves us with a question: how come I submit to 
something which only makes me dissatisfied with myself? Stirner 
explains this by saying that I have become “possessed” by the 
 ideal.19 In other words, it is not mine. If it were mine, it would not 
alienate me and make me feel dissatisfied, for then I would be free 
in relation to it and would be able to live in accordance with it or 
not care about it, as I would see fit. But, in fact, this is not what 
an ideal means, for an ideal is precisely that which I cannot alter 
as I please. Expressed in Stirner’s terms: an ideal is real only if you 
are possessed by it. The problem begins “[p]recisely when an end 
ceases to be our end and our property, which we as proprietors 
can control at pleasure”.20 But this means that what I said above, 
that there is a difference between doing good to someone for her 
sake and for the sake of the good, is something Stirner would pro-
test against. If I do something for any other sake than for my own 
sake, this means that I cannot do as I please with that end. I am 
possessed by the ideal and if I do not live up to it, it will turn 
against me, judge me, and make me discontent with myself. This 
feeling of discontent I am not able to get rid of, for I am not able to 
dispose of the ideal. The end is, in short, not in my own power.21 So 
the alternative to the life of alienation and servitude, that is to the 
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obviously religious or merely apparently atheist life, is egoism.22 
(Stirner’s alternative to the life of servitude to something alien is 
thus nonetheless a specific kind of life, a fact which will serve as a 
starting point for my critical discussion in the next section.)
This conclusion could be seen as a result of a reflection on moral 
autonomy. Only those ends I have set myself are mine; any other 
end means servitude. Of course, Kant believes that autonomously 
set ends really do bind me – that they really form nomous – but 
it is easy to see what Stirner would say about that. Connecting to 
the second formulation of the categorical imperative:23 the respect 
to be paid to reason, in myself and generally, only means dividing 
me into an essential part and an inessential part,24 means alien-
ation, and means forgetting that I, as a corporeal existing being, 
that is not as thought, always go beyond all determinations.25 In 
short, “autonomy” is a contradictory concept: a duty is precisely 
what I cannot do as I please with.
2. The possibility of complete control
If we accept this, there are different conclusions to draw. One 
would be to say that that kind of independence Stirner wants is 
impossible and that there always will be ends set by others to 
which you have to adapt yourself.26 As a human being you are 
almost totally helpless as a newborn and therefore dependent on 
your parents, or others, and the ends they set for your life. But this 
Stirner would accept: those connections of dependence become 
looser as we grow up, and if they do not ever vanish complete-
ly, that only means that I should take command over my own 
life to the extent this proves to be possible.27 Another conclusion 
would be to say that in the choice between servitude and egoism 
we should choose servitude. There are after all more important 
things than myself and to those I should submit. This is the price 
I have to pay. And a third conclusion would be that Stirner is 
completely right.
But all these conclusions presuppose that Stirner is right con-
cerning the relation of what we, to sum up, could call “ morality” 
(including religious faith) and myself.28 According to Stirner 
there is necessarily a conflict here, for the first one always means 
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servitude and self-denial. But is this really so? This is what the rest 
of this paper will, in different ways, try to question.
When questioning Stirner’s point it would however be easy to 
misread him and take him to deny the many ways in which our 
lives are connected. But, as I pointed out, Stirner does not deny 
that. Stirner tries to show that what we often take to be a form 
of moral behaviour is in fact motivated egoistically: when doing 
something for my friend, I do something for what is mine, that is 
for myself.29 Saying this risks making the term “egoism” meaning-
less, since there seems now not to be any contrast to it. But there 
is after all one thing that Stirner wants to combat: being possessed 
by something. When you are possessed, you are not doing what 
you are doing for egoist reasons and for your own sake, for you 
are not in control and able to skip doing it as you please. Stirner 
does not claim that morality is the only thing which gives rise 
to servitude and self-denial. For example, greed is according to 
Stirner a good example of being possessed, for I am here bound to 
the things I want to get in possession of in a way in which I am not 
able to control.30 But even though he does not claim that morality 
is the only thing which gives rise to servitude and self-denial, love 
is still his paradigmatic example. Love is a kind of symbol for ev-
erything he sees as problematic.31 Love is what you are not able to 
control and dispose of as you please. Love binds me and I am not 
able to control it. Love means servitude and self-denial.
A real situation in which I am possessed by ideas destructive 
to myself shows however rather the opposite of what Stirner is 
saying. Think of a voice of self-contempt: here it is clear that the 
ideas are destructive. But that very clarity would, if Stirner was 
right, testify that I am still in the grips of some ideas, namely those 
ideas that form the basis of my realization that the contemptuous 
voice is destructive. If I were able to stand free in relation to those 
ideas, the clarity would not be there anymore. And that is after all 
what the voice of self-contempt could be saying. In other words, 
I am able to say that these ideas are clearly destructive only in 
so far as the applicability of the terms by means of which I say 
this is not possible to decide to reject. And the same goes for the 
distinction between my own voice and the voice which has taken 
possession of me. If this were not so and that distinction were one 
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which I could draw in any way I please – but which I? and what 
does “please” here mean? – I would never be able to tell which of 
the voices were mine and which of them were destructive.
Furthermore, trying to stand free in relation to all alternatives 
and have all of them in one’s power is also a kind of life, and liv-
ing that life thereby means renouncing all other alternatives. The 
word “renouncing” is here apt, for those other kinds of life I could 
not have dropped by choosing their alternative in a situation in 
which I stand free in relation to both them and their alternative, 
for this would mean being already decided in favour of the latter.
3. Love as a contrast both to control and servitude
These objections are however too clever and do not get hold of the 
fundamental problems. Let us instead examine some of Stirner’s 
examples of what it means to have one’s ends in one’s power. Love 
is, as I said, the typical example of being possessed. What form 
should our relations have instead, according to Stirner? Of course, 
the basis must be found in myself: I do not relieve your suffering 
for your sake but in order to relieve that suffering which I feel 
when seeing you suffer.32 Such an example is however unconvinc-
ing. If I were able to dispose of any end when I want to, it would 
certainly be easier to relieve my pain in that way than by helping 
you. So if I help you, that shows that I am possessed by you, if we 
use Stirner’s terminology. It would be more convincing to express 
this in positive terms: by means of other people I acquire things I 
am not able to acquire on my own. And then we come to love, or 
to the only kind of love Stirner accepts: “love is […] as each of my 
feelings, my property. Earn, i.e. buy my property, then I let you 
have it.”33 And vice versa:
A friend and a service of friendship […] society cannot procure for 
you. And yet you will at all moments be in need of such a service 
and on the slightest occasions need someone who is helpful to you. 
Therefore do not rely on society but see to it that you have the 
means to buy the fulfilment of your wishes.34
Buying and selling is here the best example of a relation where no 
ties are created between us and where we will consequently not be 
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possessed by each other. No doubt Stirner is abstracting from the 
contexts in which buying and selling takes place in real life – that 
the cashier in the grocery store says good afternoon may be com-
pany regulations, but if you meet every other day it may turn into 
something fairly personal – but such an abstraction is perhaps 
acceptable here. Since he talks about love and friendship – what 
society cannot do for you – he is not talking about situations like 
the one in the grocery store, where these abstractions are easily 
made. So if Stirner happens to meet the prostitute he visited the 
night before, who gave him all that society cannot procure for 
him in terms of comfort, consolation, and sex, what will be his 
reaction? Of course, he may see himself in the light of society’s 
view of prostitution and react with shame if its view demands 
that. But if he does not, or if the society in which he lives does not 
support such a view, would that really mean that the abstraction 
is easily made? Will he not find the situation, say, awkward, and 
act as if he did not recognise her? In other words, if he manages 
to isolate the night before from the rest of his life so that their 
lives are not weaved together in any way, that will precisely be 
an accomplishment, an ideal he is trying to live up to by denying 
parts of himself.
This is not a sad fact about human existence, as if this were akin 
to the fact that as a newborn, and also later, you are dependent on 
others for your physical survival, that is, that you need the things 
society can procure for you. To society, I am just a particular in-
stance of the general, and if society distinguishes me, it distin-
guishes me because of my properties, that is, because of something 
general, which means that I am nevertheless substitutable; what 
society therefore cannot do is recognize me in my singularity. This 
is how Stirner sees it,35 but what he forgets is that this means 
that only to the extent that I do not believe that my friend is my 
friend simply because of my money, that is, because of something 
general, friendship is something society cannot procure for me. 
In other words, what society cannot procure for me is my being 
recognised as someone not possible to dispose of at pleasure. But 
if my friend is not able to dispose of me at pleasure, I may still be 
able to dispose of him at pleasure, that is, the threads by which 
our lives are weaved together only run in one direction. But is this 
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really so? Of course, initially he may be anybody to me, but the 
extent to which he remains one is the extent to which what we are 
talking about when we meet is not important to me, is the extent 
to which the consolation he affords me is not one I am in great 
need of, in short, is the extent to which I see his place in my life 
as an isolated and superficial one. The extent to which he is not 
able to dispose of me at pleasure is the extent to which I will not 
be able to dispose of him at pleasure. The life Stirner wants to live 
would thus be deprived of all such relations. The point is not that 
such a life is impossible – that would be another question36 – but 
that it would be a life of renunciation, of trying to live up to an 
ideal. Stirner wants to control his feelings – himself be “able to 
get away from or renounce”37 any feeling – but is this not a prime 
example of asceticism?
Since the kind of life Stirner wants to live is, in fact, a life of 
renunciation, of trying to live up to an ideal, he could, to use 
his own terminology, be said to be possessed by an idea. Stirner 
would of course deny this and say that this is an idea he is in con-
trol of and that he is able to dispose of it at pleasure, but saying 
this would prove the very opposite. Again a perhaps too clever 
comment: by controlling his ideal of control, he succumbs to it. 
That he is possessed by an idea shows in his insistence on concepts 
and pictures of power, control, and self-interest. These constitute 
the screen through which everything is seen. And here we come to 
something much more interesting, especially in relation to the top-
ic of this paper: one has not rejected power if one has rejected the 
power of “God, men, authorities, law, state, church” to the benefit 
of the power of “myself”38. Autarchy is not anarchy. Liberation 
would mean rejecting this way of thinking in its entirety, not, as 
Stirner, only turning up another side to it. This, however, does 
not mean that we should celebrate being possessed by something: 
when I love someone, neither do I say “here I stand, I can do oth-
erwise”, nor “here I stand, I cannot do otherwise” – “the principal 
motto of all possessed”39 – for both would be to relate to my love 
(in both senses of the word) in an external way.
The close relation of egoism and ideals became in fact visible 
already in the beginning of our discussion. When discussing ideals 
of etiquette, especially that more sophisticated form of etiquette 
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which makes its distinctions in moral terms, it became evident 
that it is precisely when I relate what I am doing to myself that 
alienation starts. Trying to live up to ideals could, in fact, be seen 
as an advanced form of self-centredness: the ideal demands that 
I look at myself with the ideal as a mirror. What takes me out of 
that circle is doing something for someone else’s sake. The sorrow 
I may feel is then not about my own failure to relieve her pain – 
the self-contempt I feel when not being as skilful as I ought to 
be – but precisely about her. In the first case an infinite striving 
for control and mastery starts; in the second case the affection 
I feel is certainly not something I control, but that is not a con-
trol I see myself as lacking, and I may certainly try to learn more 
about, say, first aid, but that does not mean that the meaning of 
what I know and do not know is its contribution to my self-admi-
ration and self-contempt.40
4. A contrasting understanding of morality and religion
A common picture is that morality demands self-denial. The start-
ing point is me in isolation, to which we then ought to add a 
moral concern which restricts my doings, or, according to Stirner, 
ought not to. The moral difficulty is hence about forcing oneself 
to renounce the things one wants, even parts of oneself. The strug-
gle could be seen as a struggle between servitude and freedom. 
And goodness is then connected to strength and control, badness 
to weakness. The task of philosophy and reason is here to add to 
that strength; in the light of its results badness is only possible in 
the form of stupidity or (temporary) insanity.
But the above discussion points in a very different direction. 
What we had there was a person who denied parts of himself, 
strove for control, and submitted to an ideal. But the very point 
of this was to achieve the egoist life, by fighting the ways in which 
his life is weaved together with the lives of others. In other words, 
if the moral difficulty according to the common picture is about 
forcing oneself to deny parts of oneself, the moral difficulty is 
here about not denying parts of oneself, about not making things 
difficult for oneself. The starting point is not me in isolation but 
the concern for others I feel, a concern which I then, possibly, 
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renounce; since badness is renunciation of that concern, the con-
dition of possibility of the moral distinctions is not amoral. The 
egoist life demands that I deny parts of myself by changing my-
self in the direction of an ideal, and therefore it is that life which 
requires strength and control. Doing things for my own sake in 
terms of motivation – trying to live the egoist life – is precisely 
not to do things for my own sake in terms of outcome. The moral 
struggle could in this case, if one wants to, be seen as a struggle 
between servitude and freedom, that is, between serving oneself or 
letting oneself be free. And the latter does not need the help of phi-
losophy, for there is no strength here to add anything to. If there 
is a task for philosophy, it is merely to disclose the attempt of the 
former to confuse the situation by self-deceptively describing itself 
as freedom and the latter as servitude and self-denial, and to show 
that what the former tries to deny it still presupposes and that 
the renunciation therefore cannot be more than by halves; trying 
to show the stupidity and insanity of moral badness risks on the 
contrary to contribute to that very badness by appealing to that 
sense of shamefulness which only directs one’s gaze at how one 
appears in the light of the ideal.
When we now have two ways of understanding the relation 
of morality to myself – a common picture and something that 
points in a very different direction – it can be tempting to try 
to determine which of them, if any, is right, in general or by de-
scribing those cases the one is right about and those the other is 
right about. But this would, as I see it, be a mistake, for reasons 
I will come to.41 Instead we will investigate that understanding 
which points in a very different direction in order to understand 
its meaning, see what possibilities it offers, and what light it sheds.
What am I then doing, in the light of this other understanding, 
when trying to live the egoist life? Ostensibly I am repudiating 
serving, but what I really do is hardening my heart. What does 
this mean? It means trying not to listen to, trying not to hear, that 
is, trying not to understand, an address directed at me. What is 
that address about? That things concern me, say, sometimes in 
both senses of the word. But whereas I am certainly able to decide 
not to respond to the address, I am not able to decide not under-
standing it. And therefore there is always some sort of response of 
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understanding, however distorted it might be: for example, later 
on I might realise that the repugnance, even rage, I felt against 
someone was in fact compassion for him, compassion I did not 
want to acknowledge. So if understanding something is some-
thing you cannot decide not to do, that means that the origin of 
the address is not to be placed there, in my power of decision. 
If that were the place it came from there would be no need of 
hardening one’s heart against it. But the address cannot be said 
to be forced upon me either. If it were, there would be no need of 
hardening one’s heart against it, for being forced to do something 
means precisely that your heart is not in what you are doing. So 
the address is not the result of, or some form of, social pressure. 
On the contrary, a social pressure is one of the sources of a felt 
need of hardening one’s heart, obviously when whom my care 
concerns is a member of an outcast group and strongly felt when 
the consequences of that address involves my confrontation with 
that sociality the pressure expresses. Just as the contrast between 
egoism and self-denial is merely apparent, the same goes for the 
contrast between egoism and sociality.
What all this means is that what we are left with when having 
repudiated servitude is not a bare self; that bare self belongs, on 
the contrary, to the side of servitude. “Being oneself” is not to 
return to some self hidden beneath that which covered it, for ex-
ample that which took possession of me; it is to enter into that 
extending movement which I am and which the egoist life is an 
attempt to put an end to. For what we are left with when hav-
ing repudiated servitude is that which we hardened our hearts 
against, those relations of care – or more positively expressed: of 
love – which the above address is about, which therefore cannot 
definitely be placed either inside or outside me, and which here is 
the starting point of morality and not something that should be 
achieved by means of it.
A religious believer could here see God as not only one possible 
object to harden one’s heart against but also what I harden my 
heart against as soon as I harden it against anything. According to 
this believer, the religious difficulty is not about denying parts of 
oneself in order to create a place for God, a God I consequently 
do not have anything to do with to begin with but have to force 
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myself into wanting to establish a relation to; the religious diffi-
culty is about not denying oneself, for by doing so one destroys 
the already existing relations to God. For this believer, atheism 
would be chastity and asceticism, that is, an attempt at denying 
oneself dimensions, possibilities and abundances of human life.
This means that submitting to the authority of God could be 
understood in two very different ways. In the first one, that sub-
mission is identical to self-denial. According to the believer I have 
tried to give voice to here, this submission means turning one’s 
back on God; the problem with this form of submission is then 
not that it is too severe but that it is too tempting, that its severity 
is tempting. In the second one, submitting to the authority of God 
is what I do when I do not submit to any authority, including my 
own.42 The slogan “no gods, no masters” would thus according to 
this believer be mistaken, for it is precisely by seeing God as mas-
ter I do away with all authoritarian thinking. The believer I have 
tried to give voice to could talk in that way, but it is also possible 
that she finds this way of talking too dangerous in that it invites 
misunderstandings, also and above all in herself, for only if one 
understands that talking in this way means rejecting “submission” 
and “authority” completely, not only having given them a new ap-
plication, has one understood it. No matter what, that believing in 
God for her means not submitting to any authority means that for 
her there is a freedom which logically precedes all political free-
doms, including religious freedom, for the latter ones are granted 
by the state in that the state, so to speak, restricts itself. And that 
freedom, the most basic and original, is for her religious.
5. An example: Martin Andersen Nexø’s Pelle Erobreren
In order to let you see how some of this shows, especially in relation 
to political struggle, I will in this section connect to Pelle Erobreren 
(1906–10), a novel by the Danish author Martin Andersen Nexø. 
The third and fourth parts of the novel, which are the ones I will 
discuss, depict the political awakening of the protagonist, Pelle, his 
marriage and having children, his commitment and work for the 
union, his time in prison, and the political work he is engaged in 
after his release. No doubt there are many problems in the novel’s 
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perspective on the political and existential questions it deals with, 
but these problems will not bother me here.
After having come to Copenhagen, from an agrarian, almost 
feudal, environment to an industrial one, Pelle hardens his heart:
the capital was simply a battleground, where army upon army had 
rushed forward and miserably foundered. Everywhere were heaps 
of fallen, the town was built over them as on top of a cemetery; 
you had to tread upon them in order to be able to move – and 
harden your heart. This was basically the lot of life; and you closed 
your eyes43
But this “had to” is after all an illusion. In fact, it is only with open 
eyes one can give this description. So Pelle’s political awakening 
could be described as the opening of his eyes, as the softening of 
his hardened heart. But this is not the result of some decision or in-
tellectual process. It happens quite spontaneously, and his growing 
political commitment is a result of that, rather than what makes it 
happen. Pelle simply becomes involved in the life of his neighbours 
and it is only then, that is, for their sake, that he feels a need to 
change things; on his own and isolated he is passive and accepts 
things as they are.44 This conflict repeats itself several times, espe-
cially in relation to his wife and children; on the one hand his new 
family opens up his concern, on the other hand it restricts it to a 
definite unit. The conflict is however not symmetrical: restricting 
himself to himself (and to his family) involves rationalization and 
self-persuasion, whereas his involvement in the life of those he en-
counters happens without his decision, quite spontaneously.45
All this has an explicitly religious dimension, a religious belief 
born in and out of the political struggle.46 The climax occurs in 
prison, where Pelle, having hardened his heart against all those 
whom he feels have forsaken him, has a revelation of God.47 After 
his release he returns to Copenhagen, but many years have passed 
and much has changed. One of the first things he does is to go to 
a political celebration and improvising a speech:
His [Pelle’s] words became a greeting to them from a world they 
did not yet know, that great solitude in which you have to travel 
alone – without loud-voiced companions to brace one up – and 
listen for the way ahead, until you hear your own heart beat 
Does religious belief necessarily mean servitude? 299
inside. He sits in a cell again, as in the first original germ of life – 
alone and forsaken, above him a spider spins its skilful web. In 
the beginning he is angry with the busy animal and tears the web 
apart, but the animal indefatigably begins again. And this sud-
denly becomes a consolatory lesson about never giving up; he 
becomes fond of this little vigilant creature, which spins its web 
really skilfully, as though it had a great responsibility […] He bit-
terly regrets his ravaging and would give much for a sign that the 
little animal is not angry with him; for no one can afford to push 
away another […] And one day as he sits reading and the spider is 
busy with carrying a thread just past him, it comes down intimate-
ly and uses his shoulder as a temporary hold. Never before had 
such trust despite everything been showed him, the little animal 
knew how a hardened prisoner should be taken. It taught him that 
he had both a heart and a soul to take care of! – A greeting to the 
comrades from that great stillness, waiting to speak to them one 
by one.48
The speech is a failure, however. The crowd meets him with indif-
ference and they do not listen to what he is saying. Two different 
worlds stand against each other: on the one hand Pelle, the lone 
one who listens to his own heart, and his message of solidarity, on 
the other hand the crowd, during the last years more and more 
shaped by bourgeois individualism. Pelle is happy with that eco-
nomical development which has made this possible, but most of 
all he deplores this shift of mood: the lost feeling for the miracu-
lous and incomprehensible and that lost solidarity this gives rise 
to, in particular on the part of the established working class with 
the new groups coming to the city and becoming pauperised.49 By 
listening inward you will find everyone, the whole world, and that 
which cannot be comprehended.50 But by being part of the crowd 
you succumb to one or the other of its ideologies, for example in-
dividualism, an ideology which hence means renunciation both of 
oneself and of the life together, and the one by means of the other.
6. Concluding discussion
“But is it not, after all, better to be able to dispose of that which 
pains one? Perhaps you are right in that caring only for oneself 
means renunciation, but caring for others means that I would feel 
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their pain, and believing that it is possible to relieve all pain in 
the world is utopian. So I choose the lesser evil and care only for 
myself. That renunciation is after all the smaller one.”
The problem this imaginary interlocutor formulates seems to 
be possible to solve in two different ways: either by ceasing to care 
for others or by creating a heaven on earth. And the questions we 
then seem to have to answer are whether the one or the other is 
possible, which of the solutions is the easier one, and which of the 
two renunciations is the smaller one. And after having answered 
these questions we are able to choose the one or the other of the 
two solutions. But this is, after all, an illusion. The terms in which 
any comparison of that kind could be made are taken from the 
two solutions themselves, so it is only after having chosen the 
one or the other you could say which of the two renunciations is 
the smaller one. What content could the concept of renunciation 
have that is not dependent on any of these two solutions but, 
nevertheless, makes it possible to determine which of them is the 
better one? But, to be strict, they could not even be seen as two 
different solutions to a common problem. This is obvious from 
the perspective of that understanding pointing in a very different 
direction I described in section 4. The starting point there is not 
me in isolation but the concern for others I feel, a concern which 
I then, possibly, renounce, which means that there is no choice to 
be made prior to this very starting point. And furthermore, since 
your caring for others is here not understood as merely a part of 
yourself, it is not possible to renounce that part and have another 
part left, which means that choosing that solution will never be 
made more than by halves. But that they could not even be seen 
as two different solutions to a common problem is obvious also 
from the other perspective: caring for others could here not even 
be seen as a possibility, for seeing it is a possibility would mean 
that you actually do care for others. In other words, since they 
could not even be seen as two different solutions to a common 
problem – the problem being understood in different ways and 
the other solution not being understood as even a possibility – it 
would be a mistake to try to determine which of them is right. 
Trying to determine which of them makes it possible for me to 
“be myself” is for example not possible, for the terms in which I 
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try to evaluate this will already be biased in favour of the one or 
the other. This does not mean that there is not anything to be said 
about the issue, but what is to be said depends, as I said, on where 
one stands and that standpoint already involves some stance or 
other on the issue.
“Here at last / We shall be free […] Better to reign in Hell, 
than serve in Heav’n.”51 That Satan understands religious faith to 
mean servitude and lack of freedom is hence not surprising. The 
only possibility is for him one of power and the question then 
simply concerns who shall have it. So he is the prime example of 
an authoritarian figure. What he says could thus be understood as 
a self-deceptive attempt at confusing the situation by describing 
that renunciation and self-denial serving oneself means as free-
dom. That freedom Satan contrasts servitude to is a freedom of 
reigning; the concept of power is not rejected and this freedom is 
thus not won.
One way of concluding is to say that I have not showed that 
Stirner’s way of thinking should be rejected, only that there is no 
necessary conflict between religious faith and freedom. Religious 
faith does not necessarily mean servitude, for I have described 
a possibility in which it does not. But this is, in fact, both to 
over- and underestimate the consequences of what I have said. 
It is to overestimate them, for Stirner could say that he does not 
understand what I have said at all and that he finds it completely 
incomprehensible. It is to underestimate them, for if he does un-
derstand what I have said and sees it as a possibility, that means 
that his own possibility does not exist anymore. For seeing caring 
for others as a possibility means caring for others; seeing it as a 
possibility means that the address I talked about above is under-
stood, although not necessarily actively responded to. So when 
having understood that the life Stirner wants to live is a life of 
self-denial, it is not possible anymore to choose it as the lesser 
evil, for having understood this is in fact having rejected it as a 
possibility. This does however not mean that the “understanding 
that points in a very different direction” and the understanding 
of the believer I tried to give voice to necessarily are the only 
possibilities. Whether that is another question or not, is another 
question.
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Werkausgabe, ed. by Wilhelm Weischedel, 12 vols (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Suhrkamp, 1968), vii, 7–102 (pp. 60–61 (AA 4:428–29)).
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25. Stirner, Der Einzige und sein Eigentum, p. 139; Stirner, Kleinere 
Schriften, pp. 346–51, 384.
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I like it or not, I will always have ideals (Ludwig Feuerbach, Über 
das »Wesen des Christentums« in Beziehung auf den »Einzigen und 
sein Eigentum«, in Werke, ed. by Erich Thies, 5 vols (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Suhrkamp, 1975–76), iv (1975), 69–80, 454–63, (pp. 461–62)) and I 
will always understand myself by comparing myself with others and 
them by comparing them with each other (pp. 74–76).
27. Stirner, Der Einzige und sein Eigentum, pp. 202, 342, 344. This 
issue is however more complicated than as just presented. There is 
another strain to Stirner’s text that, in the end, would deny all kinds 
of dependence, when he writes that “[o]nly I am not abstraction alone 
[…] I am no mere thought” (p. 381) and describes the I in terms by 
which God is described in philosophical theology: perfect, self-suffi-
cient, creator ex nihilo (pp. 5, 39, 378–79, 412). But if this strain of 
Stirner’s text were the only one you would emphasise a very one-sided 
picture would be the result; that I leave it out of account is however 
due to the fact that it is not that relevant as to the theme of this paper.
28. For examples of Stirner’s “immorality”, see Kleinere Schriften, 
pp. 271–72, 279–80, 293.
29. Stirner, Der Einzige und sein Eigentum, e.g. pp. 4, 45, 324–25.
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Stirner, Kleinere Schriften, pp. 274–77.
32. Stirner, Der Einzige und sein Eigentum, pp. 324–25.
33. Stirner, Der Einzige und sein Eigentum, p. 326.
34. Stirner, Der Einzige und sein Eigentum, pp. 304–305.
35. Stirner, Der Einzige und sein Eigentum, p. 304. What he says here 
is of course heavily dependent on Hegel’s view of society as about the 
general, of the family (most obvious in the relation of brother and 
sister) as about the singular; see Hegel, pp. 241–44, 247–48.
36. As we will see in section 6 however, this is after all not another 
question.
37. Stirner, Der Einzige und sein Eigentum, p. 330. Stirner has tak-
en this understanding of feelings from Feuerbach (Das Wesen des 
Christentums, p. 50) but comes to a very different conclusion.
38. Stirner, Der Einzige und sein Eigentum, p. 187.
39. Stirner, Der Einzige und sein Eigentum, p. 66.
40. For additional discussion of the issues in this section, see Hugo 
Strandberg, Self-Knowledge and Self-Deception (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), esp. ch. 11; Hugo Strandberg, “Is 
Pure Evil Possible?”, in The Problem of Evil: New Philosophical 
Directions, ed. by Benjamin W. McCraw and Robert Arp (Lanham: 
Lexington Books, 2016), 23–34.
41. See section 6.
42. For more about this use of “not … any” and “nothing”, see 
Gareth Moore, Believing in God: A Philosophical Essay (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1988), passim, e.g. ch. 4.
43. Martin Andersen Nexø, Pelle Erobreren: Bind 2, 15th edn 
(Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2006), p. 58.
44. Nexø, pp. 58–61.
45. See Nexø, e.g. pp. 171–72, 176, 241, 394.
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48. Nexø, p. 357.
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Anarchism and religion have historically had an uneasy relationship. 
Indeed, representatives of both sides have regularly insisted on the 
fundamental incompatibility of anarchist and religious ideas and practices. 
Yet, ever since the emergence of anarchism as an intellectual and political 
movement, a considerable number of religious anarchists have insisted 
that their religious tradition necessarily implies an anarchist political 
stance. Their stories are finally gaining increasing public and scholarly 
attention.
Reflecting both a rise of interest in anarchist ideas and activism on the 
one hand, and the revival of religious ideas and movements in the political 
sphere on the other, this book examines a range of examples of overlaps 
and contestations between the two from a diverse range of academic 
perspectives. 
The first pioneering volume of Essays in Anarchism & Religion comprises 
eight essays from leading international scholars on topics ranging from the 
anarchism of the historical Jesus to Zen Buddhism and the philosophies of 
Max Stirner and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. 
In a world where political ideas increasingly matter once more, and religion 
is an increasingly visible aspect of global political life, these essays offer 
scholarly analysis of overlooked activists, ideas and movements, and as 
such reveal the possibility of a powerful critique of contemporary global 
society.   
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